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Abstract 
This research tries to identify how, and to what extent, engagement with the European Union 
(EU) changes the political behavior of civil society actors and minority groups in Turkey. It is 
argued that the EU assistance changes the availability of political and financial resources for 
minority civil society organizations in Turkey, which is a critical component of 
Europeanization and constitutes a significant test for the EU’s enlargement strategy. The key 
objective is to identify how, and to what extent, engagement with the EU changes the political 
behavior of civil society actors and minority groups in Turkey. It examines the fluctuations in 
the level of civil society activism in Turkey among minority organizations and consider the 
extent to which the interaction with the EU explains the variation in their political efficacy 
through the availability of different financial, political and human resources. In a broader 
context, this thesis will contribute to the general research on Europeanization by elaborating 
on the transformative impact of the EU on civil society activism. To achieve this, this research 
employed a mixed methodology. Surveys were conducted with civil society organizations 
representing twenty-three different ethnic, linguistic and religious minority groups. In addition, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with different actors representing the minority 
groups in question. In conclusion the results showed that the Europeanization process allowed 
EU actors to promote EU ideas, norms and standards in their interactions with civil society 
organizations causing a differential empowerment of these organizations. It also demonstrated 
that empowering civil society organizations through capacity-building mechanisms and 
political dialogue triggered the mobilization of civil society organizations in Turkey, however 
their empowerment is still contingent upon a number of other factors. While situating itself 
within the existing literature that tries to explain the effects of international institutions and 
norms on civil society organizations, this thesis shows that unlike other external actors, the EU 
strengthened the civil society activism in Turkey particularly in a contentious area such as 
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minority rights and in the presence of resistant political elites. In return, these actors were able 
to represent themselves in other national and international platforms, which yielded increased 
political efficacy.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The core objective of this thesis is to identify how, and to what extent, engagement with the 
EU changes the political behavior of civil society actors and minority groups in Turkey. It 
looks at how engagement with the EU serves as a catalyst for civil society organizations 
increasing their mobilization capacities through the availability of different financial, political 
and human resources. The aim is to examine the fluctuations in the level of civil society 
activism in Turkey among minority organizations and consider the extent to which the 
interaction with the EU explains the variation in their political efficacy. This thesis mainly 
seeks to illustrate the transformative impact of the EU on civil society activism in Turkey 
particularly in a contentious area such as minority rights and in the presence of resistant 
political elites. However, the data collected as part of this thesis revealed that even though EU 
assistance changes the availability of political and financial resources for minority civil society 
organizations in Turkey, their empowerment is still contingent upon a number of other factors: 
the level of interaction and the nature of the relationship with national political actors, how the 
organizations are established and access resources, the extent to which these organizations are 
connected to national and international networks, the population of the minority group, the 
region where the minority groups is mainly settled, how these minority groups are able to 
represent themselves in other national and international platforms as well as their attitudes 
towards enlargement and the EU.  
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Such a point of view posits that civil society organizations are involved in an interactive process 
at the domestic level induced by their engagement with the EU and where EU norms are 
internalized by these organizations. It is discovered that such an engagement with the EU in 
turn yields increased political efficacy, which shows variation from one minority group to 
another and between groups within the same minority. This research defines engagement with 
the EU as the process through which European rules and practices penetrate the domestic 
context while at the same time providing the civil society organizations with the ability to 
connect with financial and political networks at the EU level. The outcome of this process 
varies from the increased ability to access funding to establishing credibility and legitimacy 
and leverage within the domestic context. These outcomes also depend on the minority group 
in question. While some minority groups such as the Roma use the EU to access financial 
grants and sustain their civil society activities, others such as the Kurds acquire credibility for 
their advocacy activities through their increased relations with EU representatives. Yet others 
as in the case of Christian minorities are able to become a part of a pan-European network, 
which delivers connectivity, collaboration opportunities with other European civil society 
organizations and exchange of information on key areas related to minority rights among other 
things.  
 
The thesis studies the civil society organizations established by the minority organizations in 
Turkey and the changes in their behavior as a result of their engagement with the EU. However, 
it does not include other actors such as the religious institutions, business organizations, other 
international organizations and donor institutions. The civil society organizations are important 
in the Turkish case since after the adoption of the EU reform packages by the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government, the number of the civil society organizations increased 
significantly and they actively opposed the practices of the government and state institutions. 
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Secondly, the minority issue has been a contested issue throughout the history of the Turkish 
Republic and the state’s approach has always been hostile towards the minority groups. 
Therefore, civil society organizations provided these minority groups to form associations and 
act collectively while struggling with the oppressive policies adopted by the state.  
 
The accession of the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries to the EU encouraged a greater 
theorization of the phenomenon of Europeanization. Indeed, the experience of the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements encouraged scholars to acknowledge that Europeanization is a complex 
process that does not necessarily follow a direct correlation with enlargement.1 It also became 
evident that it was necessary to conceptualize the EU’s impact on accession states in terms of 
the restructuring of domestic institutions as well as national policies. Following this, three 
broad perspectives on Europeanization have formed whose common focus was transformation, 
while diverging on how this change was manifested or achieved.  Firstly, Europeanization 
refers to the direct transfer of norms, rules, regulations and standards from the EU level to the 
national level also referred to as a top-down process.2 Secondly, it is conceptualized through 
the interactions between member states both at the national and the supranational level and the 
outcomes of Europeanization. The main focus of this approach is related to the process of 
integration and convergence at the European level and less attention is paid to how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2004. “Governance By Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to 
the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of Public Policy 11(4): 661-679; Frank 
Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds. 2005. The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. New 
York: Cornell University Press; Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes. 1998. Enlarging the EU Eastwards. London: 
Pinter; Heather Grabbe. 2006. The EU’s Transformative Power Europeanization Through Conditionality in 
Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Christian Haerper. 2002. Democracy and 
Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe. New York: Routledge; Claudio Radaelli. 2004. “Europeanization: 
Solution or Problem?” European Integration Online Papers 8(16): 1-23; Maria Green Cowles et al, eds. 2001. 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. New York: Cornell University Press. 
2 George Kazamias and Kevin Featherstone. 2001. “Introduction: Southern Europe and the Process of 
Europeanization.” in George Kazamias and Kevin Featherstone, eds. Europeanization and the Southern 
Periphery. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 4-5.  
	   17	  
Europeanization influences the domestic politics of member states.3 Finally, a third 
understanding of Europeanization emphasizes the extent to which transformation occurs as a 
purely domestic process whereby the EU provides the context and the resources for cooperation 
among domestic actors, which in turn impacts upon the domestic setting.4 Such a 
conceptualization of Europeanization tries to capture a more nuanced understanding that 
encompasses both top-down processes, transfer of rules from the EU level to the national level 
and interaction between different actors occurring at the domestic level5, which resonates most 
closely with the approach adopted in this thesis. This is also related to the impact of external 
actors on domestic contexts through linkages and leverages as argued by Levitsky and Way.6 
According to the authors, in terms of democratization, there are two ways international actors 
can influence domestic contexts: leverage which refers to the exertion of pressure on the 
national governments and linkage which points to the reinforcement of political, economic, 
cultural and organizational relations with the West. Levistky and Way conclude that linkage 
facilitates democratization more compared to leverage even under unfavorable domestic 
conditions. This is particularly relevant to the Turkish case and the impact of Europeanization 
on the protection of minority rights in Turkey. Turkey has been an EU candidate since 1999 
however the formal progress attained with regard to democratization and human rights is still 
significantly insufficient. On the other hand, the linkages or the dialogue established with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jim Buller and Andrew Gamble. 2002. “Conceptualizing Europeanization.” Public Policy and Administration 
17(2): 15; Vivien Schmidt. 2009. “The EU and its Member States: From Bottom Up to Top Down.” in eds, David 
Phinnemore and Alex Warleigh-Lack. Reflections on European Integration. 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome, New 
York: Palgrave. 
4 See Johan Olsen. 2002. “The Many Faces of Europeanization”. ARENA working paper; Hughes et al. 2004. 
“Conditionality and Compliance in the EU’s Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-
national Government”. Journal of Common Market Studies 42(3): 523-551; Commission of the European 
Communities. 2001. European Governance, A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 (Luxembourg: OOPEC); Beate 
Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, eds. 1999. The Transformation of Governance in the European Union. London: 
Routledge; Ian Bache and Adam Marshall. 2004. “Europeanization and Domestic Change: A Governance 
Approach to Institutional Adaptation in Britain.” Queen’s Papers on Europeanization 5: 1-17. 
5 Radaelli 2004, 5. 
6 Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2006. “Linkage versus Leverage. Rethinking the International Dimension 
of Regime Change.” Comparative Politics 38(4): 379-400. 
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EU along with the political and economic resources provided, led to the mobilization of 
minority civil society organizations and granted them credibility and leverage in the domestic 
context. 
 
This research defines Europeanization as the process through which European rules and 
practices penetrate the domestic context causing a transformation at the domestic level. The 
outcome of this process is identified as formal and informal compliance with EU requirements. 
In terms of EU’s transformative power and the mechanisms of Europeanization, Turkey stands 
apart given its difficult history of relations with Europe and the EU in particular.7 However, a 
closer look at Turkey-EU relations allows us to offer a more substantial explanation of the 
EU’s role in the recent reform process that has seen the implementation of some of the long-
awaited minority protection reforms.8 The challenging nature of the minority issue arises from 
the oppression exerted towards minority groups in the name of nationalism and the perception 
that the recognition of different minority groups would fuel the separatist inspirations of these 
groups.9 Turkey is home to a variety of religious, ethnic, and linguistic minority groups. 
However, these groups are denied the rights specified in different international and European 
instruments, including “group specific cultural and linguistic rights, power-sharing 
arrangement, and socio-economic rights that are central to the accommodation of minorities, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin, eds. 2003. Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic 
Integration and International Dynamics, London: Frank Cass; Atilla Eralp. 2004. “Turkey and the European 
Union”, in eds. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, Cambridge: MIT 
Press: 63-82; Kristy Hughes. 2004. “Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement? Exploring the 
implication of Turkish accession.” Friends of Europe paper; Sevilay Elgun Kahraman. 2000. “Rethinking Turkey-
European Union Relations in the light of Enlargement.” Turkish Studies 1(1): 1-20; Meltem Muftuler-Bac and 
Lauren M. McLaren. 2003. “Enlargement preferences and policy- making in the European Union: impacts on 
Turkey.” Journal of European Integration, 25: 17-30. 
8 Baskin Oran. 2007. “The Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne Peace Treaty and Current 
Issues” in ed. Zehra Arat. Human Rights in Turkey, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 52. 9	  Ibid,	  53-­‐‑54.	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while at the same time highly controversial and contested”10. This arguably places minority 
communities in Turkey at a distinct disadvantage vis-á-vis the ethnic Turkish majority.11  
 
Minority protection has been a critical issue throughout the history of the Turkish Republic for 
a number of reasons. First, minority rights and the definition of a minority in Turkey is based 
on the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which does not recognize the ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
minorities except the three non-Muslim minority groups.12 Second, the lack of official and 
public acceptance of all groups as minorities and equal citizens, regardless of religion, 
language, or ethnicity, remains a significant barrier to improving the human rights regime in 
Turkey. On this basis alone, the minority rights issue provides a good opportunity to measure 
the transformative power of Europe in Turkey. The existing literature on Europeanization and 
conditionality studies the divergent minority rights standards within member and candidate 
countries.13 However, adopting a top-down approach, the majority of these studies fails to 
consider the impact at the domestic level, as well as how the EU affects non-state actors. A 
more detailed examination of the EU's transformative power with regard to minority rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse. 2003. “Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and 
Minority Protection in the CEECs.” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 1: 3. 11	  Oran	  2007,	  36-­‐‑37.	  
12 Ibid, 36; See also Ioannis Grigoriadis. 2008. “On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing 
the Cases of Greece and Turkey.” Mediterranean Politics 13(1): 23-41; Ahmet Icduygu and B. Ali Soner. 2006. 
“Turkish Minority Rights Regime: Between Difference and Equality.” Middle Eastern Politics 42(3): 454.     13	   See	   James	   Hughes	   et	   al.	   2004.	   Europeanization	   and	   Regionalization	   in	   the	   EU’s	  
Enlargement	  to	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe:	  the	  Myth	  of	  Conditionality,	  London:	  Palgrave;	  Gwendolyn	  Sasse.	  2008.	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Conditionality:	  The	  Norm	  of	  Minority	  Protection	  before	  and	  after	  EU	  Accession.”	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy	  15(6):	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   2003.	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   2009.	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  New	  York:	  Routledge;	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  Judith	  G.	  2004.	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  politics	  in	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  power	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   and	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   Princeton	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   Guido	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  2005.	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  of	  nondiscrimination	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needs to focus beyond formal compliance and top-down analysis, and deconstruct what limits 
and helps Europe’s transformative power in the context of a challenging issue like minority 
rights. 
 
Even though, the issue of minority rights constitutes a good opportunity to test the 
transformative impact of Europe in Turkey, there are certain challenges related to the 
Europeanization of minority rights. First of all, even though minority protection has become 
more emphasized in EU documents and instruments related to human rights, European 
minority groups are still not recognized and sufficiently protected by the member states. Put 
differently, Europeanization of minority rights cannot be shaped through general European 
policies because it is not a part of the acquis communitaire but the protection of minority groups 
is left to the discretion of national states. Secondly, the Europeanization of minority rights is 
usually state-oriented and do not follow a uniform pattern among different member countries 
while the candidate countries are expected to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and are 
subject to harsh criticisms due to the lack of a sufficient minority protection regime. Therefore, 
Europeanization policies neglect the minority issue and give the nation-states the exclusive 
decision-making power when it comes to minority rights. This is also related to the perception 
of the minority question in Europe as an issue of security and instability, rather than being 
related to rights and freedoms.  
 
1.1 The Broader Literature: Europeanization 
The initial research on Europeanization was dominated by attempts to explain the willingness 
of member states to be bound by EU directives.14 These studies considered Europeanization as 
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   T.	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   2001.	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  International	  Organization	  55(3):	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  and	  Simon	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  eds.	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identical to integration, and therefore examined it through the lens of integration theory.15 In 
this early phase of the literature, Europeanization was seen as equivalent to institution building 
at the European level, which took place through the progressive transfer of power from the 
member states to the EU.16 This approach defined Europeanization as a function of European 
integration and was mainly concerned with the impacts of enlargement.17  
One of the key changes in the understanding of Europeanization was the shift from its 
perception as the transfer of competencies from national to the European level, in other words 
a one-way process, into a two-way process that saw the outcome of Europeanization as 
transformation of the domestic context.18 Moreover, in a quest to explain variation in levels of 
domestic transformation, the importance of adopting both a top-down and bottom-up approach 
was recognized19, which mainly diverge in the way they explain the role of the EU within the 
domestic transformation processes.  
In this respect, whilst a top-down approach considers the EU as the independent variable 
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  “Introduction:	  European	  Integration	  and	  National	  Political	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  University	  Press.	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  al.	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   in	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   James	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   al.	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  University	  Press,	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   Diana	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   2008.	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   Quest	   for	   EU	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   Bloomington:	   Author	  House,	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18 Borzel 2002, 193.  
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Politics of Constraint. Oxford: Oxford University Press.    
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causing domestic transformation, the bottom-up approach regards Europeanization as starting 
and ending at the domestic level and views the EU as an intervening factor.20 The bottom-up 
approach on the other hand entails involving a multiplicity of actors in domestic processes as 
a result of the EU’s impact. The crucial difference between the two approaches is the way that 
the relationship between Europeanization and enlargement is considered: the bottom-up 
approach is based on an understanding of Europeanization as an interactive process instead of 
a unidirectional, top-down impact of the EU on the domestic politics of member countries. 
Such a difference is grounded in the way domestic actors can make use of the Europeanization 
process in accordance with their own interests.21 Therefore, bottom-up Europeanization argues 
that domestic change and adaptation of European rules is more complex and includes a variety 
of actors other than the policy makers at the elite level, which directly translate European rules 
into the domestic legislation. 
As Europeanization was no longer perceived as an outcome, but started to be regarded as an 
interactive process, the different conditions that affect the levels of compliance in member 
states were more frequently and carefully analyzed.22 It was argued that the prescription of 
certain institutional requirements by the EU to the member states does not lead to convergence 
but the adoption of the same rules and regulations may be manifested differently at the domestic 
level across different policy issues.23 In this regard, it was underlined that one of the main 
driving forces to trigger domestic change was the level of discord between European rules and 
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  et	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domestic structures.24 The harmonization of national policies with EU rules and regulations 
was suggested to be a responsive and unpremeditated process that takes places as a result of a 
lack of convergence between European and domestic structures.25 In addition to this, there are 
five other factors—“multiple veto points; facilitating formal institutions; the organizational and 
policy-making culture; the differential empowerment of domestic actors and learning”26—that 
also determined the outcome of the pressures exerted by the EU for compliance at the domestic 
level. According to this model, EU pressure generates new opportunity structures for the 
domestic actors so that they can use these resources in pursuit of their interests. In other words, 
domestic transformation either occurs directly through policy goals or indirectly through the 
power resources provided for the domestic actors.27 
For the top-down approach, the common thread is that the EU definitely has an impact on 
national policies, through a unidirectional process whereby states are expected to adopt the EU 
policies. One of the key variables determining the EU’s impact on domestic changes and rule 
application is the character of pre-existing structures or institutional capacities. Domestic 
structures and institutions are significant for explaining the variation among member states as 
they determine how and to what extent European practices will permeate the domestic 
context.28 Also called the resource dependency approach, this view is exemplified through the 
diversified impact of European integration on the regional administrations in France and 
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Germany.29 The main empirical variables—institutional capacity and legal structures—are 
identified as allowing or constraining the extent to which domestic institutions are able to make 
use of the opportunity structures provided by the EU.30  In addition to this, the existence of 
veto players and pro-reform formal institutions also play an important role in determining the 
levels of compliance in member states as they oppose or facilitate the transformation 
processes.31 However, the effects of Europeanization on domestic transformation for the top-
down approach are not limited to the formation of new opportunity structures, but also to the 
internalization of EU practices through other means including “socialization, learning or 
persuasion”32. In this case, the existence of actors that may mediate the transformation process 
and progressive informal institutions act as facilitating factors.33 In other words, 
Europeanization transforms domestic structures by altering the preferences and strategies of 
the domestic actors causing them to internalize European practices and beliefs, or through 
mobilizing European support for domestic pro-reform actors that have the capacity to 
implement the necessary changes within the designated institutional structures.34  
The bottom-up Europeanization approach emphasizes that domestic transformation occurs 
through the changes in the redistribution of power resources, which opens the way for the 
involvement of various domestic actors in the reform process. The bottom-up approach 
provides that “the concept of Europeanization refers to the processes of construction, diffusion 
and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms, which are first defined and consolidated 
in the making of EU public policies and politics, and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 	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discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies”35. For advocates of the bottom-
up approach, Europeanization leads to domestic transformation through the reconstruction of 
the political space to the degree that national politics becomes permeated by European 
dynamics causing the transformation of the “organizational logic of politics and policy-
making”36. Such an understanding implies that the political opportunities will be available so 
that participation of both state and non-state actors can be ensured.   
The main feature that distinguishes the bottom-up approach from the top-down perspective is 
the identification of the level at which Europeanization occurs. For the bottom-up approach, 
transformation that comes as a result of the Europeanization process is both initiated and ends 
at the domestic level. The significance of this is that the bottom-up perspective does not see 
Europeanization as depending directly on accession or entail the formal integration of a state 
as the ultimate measure of progress.37 Domestic transformation might come as a result of the 
changes within the domestic opportunity structures irrespective of the progress in the 
enlargement process. Moreover, a member state might be less Europeanized in certain issue 
areas, or an applicant country might go through domestic transformation prior to and regardless 
of the progress in the enlargement process.38 Thus, the bottom-up approach allows for the fact 
that Europeanization may occur due to the restructuring of the opportunity structures 
irrespective of the progress towards full membership. This distinction is also significant as it 
challenges the notion that enlargement is always a rational process that takes place based on 
the extent to which an applicant state meets the accession criteria.  
While the approaches that discuss Europeanization in the context have been instrumental in 
explaining variation in the implementation of certain policies in a cross-national context, they 
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have generally failed to account for the external governance model that formed during the pre-
accession periods of the CEE countries. Indeed, the underlying logic simply assumes that the 
EU is a platform for bargaining among the member states, where they would try to pursue their 
interests determined in accordance with the domestic structures and institutions.39 However, 
the EU does not only provide new opportunities for the actors within the member states or does 
not only yield compliance within member countries but also candidate states and even third 
and neighboring countries, and therefore Europeanization cannot only be associated with the 
member countries. This approach does not reflect universality and limits the impact of the EU 
as an external actor. In this regard, the accession of the CEE countries and their domestic 
transformation in line with European rules has given rise to a broad array of research to 
examine the differentiated impacts of Europeanization in a different context than member 
countries and on diverse policy areas.40 
The Europeanization of the CEE countries prior to their formal accession date was mainly 
associated with the unique characteristic of these countries as they had experienced a recent 
regime change and were determined to adopt European rules and regulations. Therefore, the 
questioning of the variation in rule adoption within member states was replaced with an 
examination of the factors and mechanisms that caused compliance and domestic 
transformation within candidate countries.41 The previous understanding of integration as the 
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independent variable could no longer be applied when testing for the impacts of the 
Europeanization process in candidate countries. In this respect, the underlying reasons and 
motivations for the adoption of EU-compliant policies and politics within the CEE countries 
were examined from an external governance perspective.  
Conditionality, which in essence refers to a system of rewards for compliance42, was identified 
as one of the main mechanisms triggering domestic transformation in the CEE countries. 
According to the conditionality argument, transformation in candidate countries is ensured 
through the use of rewards or punishments where full membership becomes the final reward.43 
The examination of rule adoption in the CEE countries demonstrates that Europeanization has 
a direct influence on domestic policies, politics, and polities. These impacts can be explained 
through three different explanatory models either driven by domestic forces or by the EU itself. 
The “external incentives model” corresponds to a rationalist bargaining model and manifests 
the underlying logic of EU conditionality in which rule adoption is a precondition for receiving 
certain rewards from the EU.44 The rewards range from technical and financial assistance to 
institutional ties and full membership. In this framework, conditionality aims to transform the 
national practices by providing rewards for compliance with the rules that need to be adopted 
into the national legislation prior to full accession. Conditionality might operate through 
intergovernmental bargaining where the national political elites calculate whether the 
incentives provided by the EU “exceed the domestic costs”45. It might also cause 
transformation through the differential empowerment of domestic actors who believe the 	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adoption of EU rules would help to solve certain domestic problems in their favor and to 
increase their influence within the domestic political system.46 From a bottom-up perspective, 
EU conditionality changes the domestic opportunity structures and reinforces the “bargaining 
power of these actors against their opponents”47, leading to change at the domestic level. 
However, the impact of conditionality is not homogeneous for every candidate state and 
depends on a variety of factors. These factors range from the determinacy of conditions to the 
size and speed of rewards and domestic costs for adoption. Domestic transformation occurs 
prior to enlargement with the expectation that the candidate countries will be Europeanized 
before they become a part of the Union and before they start taking part in the policy-making 
processes at the European level. However, these rewards can only be provided once the 
accession negotiations start with the states in question and they are more credible if there is a 
definite timetable for full accession. Therefore, Europeanization is in essence connected with 
the enlargement process even though progress may not follow the same sequence or level. 
However, even though it was recognized that Europeanization is a complex process rather than 
just a direct consequence of enlargement, the CEE countries were not as Europeanized as they 
were expected. Conditionality was found to be most effective when the costs for deviation were 
relatively small and the benefits from membership were still high.48 Moreover, since the 
announcement of the Copenhagen criteria and Madrid Council decisions, accession has 
transformed into a multiple step process that include a number of monitoring mechanisms and 
incentives. These mechanisms range from annual progress reports or various financial 
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assistance programs that depend on the levels of compliance with the requirements of the 
acquis communitaire or the Copenhagen criteria. The effectiveness of the conditionality 
mechanism was closely tied to the opening of the negotiations and the determination of the 
final date of accession in the case of the CEE countries.49  
The external incentives model designates that conditionality will be most effective if the rules 
and conditions regarding the rewards are determinate; conditional rewards are high and 
delivered quickly; conditionality is credible; adoption costs are low and the number of veto 
players is few.50 The alternative explanations to the external incentives model are identified as 
the social learning model and the lesson-drawing model. The social learning model dictates 
that a candidate state will internalize EU rules and regulations if it believes that the EU 
practices correspond to domestic norms, discourses and identities.51 The lesson-drawing model 
on the other hand suggests that third countries will adopt EU rules into their national legislation 
in the absence of any rewards and as a result of their satisfaction with national practices. In this 
case, policy transfer happens voluntarily depending on the expectation that EU practices might 
help solve domestic policy problems.  
In sum, all of these mechanisms try to reflect upon the reasons for domestic transformation 
within the CEE countries prior to their accession to the EU and aim to account for the variation 
in compliance levels. Domestic transformation is associated with three models identified as 
external incentives, social learning, or lesson drawing. The common emphasis for all of these 
models is that domestic transformation occurs prior to accession. For these models, the EU acts 
as an intervening variable. However, the majority of the existing studies neglect to examine 
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how domestic actors actually benefit and make use of the accession process. The literature 
provides an extensive assessment of the impacts of Europeanization at the domestic level in 
terms of the redistribution of resources however it does not specify the conditions under which 
or to what extent the domestic actors actually exploit these new opportunities provided by the 
EU in order to pursue their demands. Therefore, these studies fail to explain which factors 
influence the participation of domestic actors in the decision-making processes and what drives 
the domestic actors to get involved in the accession process.  
1.2 EU-Turkey Relations: Literature Review 
The formal relations between Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC) date back 
to 1959, when Turkey first applied for association membership and consequently signed the 
Ankara agreement in 1963. However, a major turning point in Turkey-EU relations took place 
as a result of the transformation of the EU into a political entity. Following this, the agenda of 
Turkey-EU relations revolved around a number of issues in relation to democratization, human 
rights and minority rights, which proved to be major stumbling blocks in Turkey’s EU 
accession process. Given this, the literature on Turkey-EU relations expanded considerably 
parallel to the rapid development of events in Turkey’s accession process, especially from 1999 
onwards. In this regard, two strands were formed within the literature, focusing either on the 
impact of the accession process or the motivations of both Turkish and European actors to 
endorse or oppose to the process. This booming literature is characterized by its aim to 
highlight the changes within the Turkish context as triggered by the EU.52 However, these 
studies were still limited as they adopted a top-down approach that was constrained to 
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examining the direct policy transfer from the EU to Turkey neglecting to consider 
Europeanization as a broader, transformative process.  
 
EU-Turkey relations still remain to be one of the most debated themes within the literature on 
enlargement generating a vast amount of research on the subject of Turkish membership to the 
EU. The existing literature on Turkey-EU relations tends to focus on the actors involved, good 
governance, foreign and security policies, trade agreements, migration, and the environment, 
which are salient both in the European and in the domestic context.53 In regard to governance, 
particularly in relation to political reforms and human rights, the approaches of Turkish and 
European actors towards Turkey’s European integration, as well as foreign and security policy 
in the context of EU integration, are highly researched.54 In addition to these, trade agreements, 
particularly those of the Customs Union and Turkish migration to the EU, are also among the 
areas of research contemplated within the literature.55 However, until the early 2000s, literature 
mostly provides a general overview of the relations, focusing on the strategic importance of 
Turkey in the post-Cold War international context.56  
 
When examining the impacts of the accession process, some of the literature tends to review 
the institutional history of relations while others explore the different aspects of candidacy 
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using the legal, political, and economic criteria defined by the EU.57 After Turkey was granted 
official candidacy status, more attention was given to issues such as human rights, minority 
rights, and democratization as these were identified as potential sources of conflict in the 
accession negotiations.58 In accordance with this, particular emphasis was placed on the 
impacts of the accession process on different actors including parliamentarians, military, 
political parties, general public, economic actors, and the Islamist movement and the different 
views adopted by these actors.59 These studies mostly delve into the discrepancies between 
Turkey’s foreign policy, which aspires to become a full member of the EU, and the domestic 
policies that are characterized by anti-democratic practices.60 These studies have also expanded 
the scope of Europeanization to analyze a wide range of issue areas. While most of them 
concentrated on the changes in the domestic context as a response to the introduction of the 
Copenhagen criteria in a more general sense, such as the efforts of democratization by the 
political actors61, the military’s role in national politics62, the characteristics of the Turkish state 
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with regard to secularism63 and the relations between the state and civil society organizations64. 
However, there are still only limited number of empirical studies focusing on the domestic 
transformative effects of the EU with regard to particular policy areas in Turkey. 
  
These earlier studies also remain constrained to the interactions between the EU and the 
Turkish state and the impact of Europe is not examined by taking different domestic actors into 
account, which interpret and translate EU differently into the domestic context depending on 
their expectations from the EU process. In addition, the studies examining the factors that 
facilitate or limit the transformative power of the EU at the domestic level are rare.65 They are 
mostly confined to the levels of formal compliance with EU rules and the reasons for the lack 
or presence of formal transformation whereas this study investigates how civil society actors 
translate the EU accession process into the domestic context on a particularly controversial 
issue as minority protection, which leads to an increase in their mobilization capacities.  
 
The increased interest in EU-Turkey relations was further amplified after the start of the 
accession negotiations in 2004. Even though the membership negotiations were pushed back 
in the agenda of the Turkish government particularly after 2007, Turkey-EU relations still 
continued to be a topical issue for the scholarly literature. In particular, the expansion of the 
European studies literature to the impact of the EU on accession states enabled a more 
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enlargement focused perspective on EU-Turkey relations.66 Following the Helsinki Summit, 
there was a gradual increase in academic literature that examined the consolidation of 
democracy in Turkey, including the electoral system, civil-military relations, the situation of 
the Kurds, cultural rights, the situation of religious minorities, and respect for human rights. 
Moreover, there was an increase in the number of studies that provided a costs/benefits analysis 
concerning Turkey’s EU membership. One of the key studies by Mehmet Ugur highlights the 
tensions between EU and Turkey and the latter's failure to meet the requirements of 
membership.67 In his framework, which he calls The Anchor/Credibility Dilemma, Ugur 
suggests that Turkey is not a credible candidate because it cannot adopt the majority of legal 
reforms required by the EU, whereas the EU in turn is not acting as an effective anchor since 
it does not provide enough sanctions or incentives that would motivate Turkey to adopt the 
required reforms. According to the author, the Anchor/Credibility Dilemma led to a vicious 
circle in EU-Turkey relations, which could only be broken after 1999 when Turkey was granted 
candidacy status and EU could have a certain degree of leverage.68 However, Ugur fails to 
consider the role heterogeneous character of the society and the presence of pro-reform actors 
that might guide or push for the reform process. Ugur’s study does not refer to the increased 
mobilization of civil society organizations as a result of Turkey’s accession process and their 
role to create a dynamism at the domestic level as they internalize the EU standards and norms.     
 
Some recent studies have tried to examine the transformative power of Europe on Turkey by 
examining the variety of actors involved in the process.69 In this regard, Tocci and Kaliber 	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highlight the role of the NGOs asking how much of the current constitutional and political 
changes can be attributed to civil society actors and how the opportunities, identities, aims, and 
strategies of these actors changed and whether it is possible to attribute such a change to the 
Europeanization process.70 However, Diez et al. argue that the vocal actors for Turkey’s EU 
membership are limited to business organizations and the private sector. While it is true that at 
the beginning of the 2000s, the main non-state actors pushing for EU membership were 
business organizations as in the case of TUSIAD; following the adoption of the reforms that 
govern the civil society organizations there was a significant boom in the number of the civil 
society organizations and more importantly a diversification of the interests represented by 
these organizations. Therefore, as the EU provides political opportunities for the non-state 
actors other than business actors, they use these resources to push for more formal compliance 
from the government. Tocci and Kaliber on the other hand portray the different civil society 
organizations that hold an interest in the Kurdish question – both securitizing and non-
securitizing – extensively however they give an account of the activities of these organizations 
and their contributions to the securitization or desecuritization of the issue rather than 
explaining how the Europeanization process actually transformed these organizations. They 
only take domestic factors into account to explain the transformation of civil society that impact 
the Kurdish question while they neglect the impact of the EU. They underline the limited 
dialogue between the pro-Kurdish organizations and the Turkish state, however fail to explain 
the role of the EU for the empowerment of these organizations.  
 
The majority of the literature on EU-Turkey relations fails to investigate the changes in the 
engagement of the minority civil society actors with the EU comprehensively but rather focuses 
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on the reforms adopted by the Turkish government and the formal compliance achieved so far. 
In this regard, Grigoriadis looks at the impact of EU conditionality on minority rights in Turkey 
from a formal compliance point of view and in comparison to the situation in Greece.71 
Grigoriadis investigates how Turkey and Greece responded to the pressures exerted by the EU 
to reform the minority protection rules however while doing that traces the development of EU 
conditionality towards Turkey. The author provides an encompassing examination of the 
minority issue in Turkey and the recent reforms as a response to EU conditionality however 
fails to diverge from the rest of the literature by neglecting the role of the non-state actors and 
domestic pro-reform coalitions. In a similar manner, Yilmaz only focuses on the formal 
compliance of Turkey with European minority rights standards from both rule adoption and 
implementation perspectives.72 The author gives a detailed outline of the EU demands from 
Turkey and how the Turkish government responded to these demands by providing the 
legislation that correspond to the issues prioritized by the EU. However, similar to Grigoriadis, 
Yilmaz also focuses on the institutional changes rather than the impact of the Europeanization 
process on domestic actors that shape the minority rights policies at the domestic level. She 
portrays the reforms adopted by the state only as a response to EU pressure while failing to 
explain the involvement of domestic actors in the adoption of those reforms. To give an 
example, she provides that there was EU pressure for the improvement of cultural rights of the 
Kurds and claims that in response the government adopted a development plan.73 However, 
she fails to explain how the Kurdish civil society organizations have become more mobilized 
as a result of their interaction with the EU while having no relations with the government. 
Instead she portrays the positive developments related to minority rights only as a response to 
EU conditionality dismissing the role of civil society organizations completely. Other studies 	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tend to analyze the role of civil society and the transformative impact of the EU on pro-reform 
actors in Turkey; however, none of these go beyond conditionality and institutional 
compliance.74 The changes in the civil society organizations’ mobilization levels as a result of 
Europeanization is lacking from the analyses.  
  
Even though a variety of issues are tackled within the literature on EU-Turkey relations with 
an especially increased amount of studies after the end of the 1990s, little attention is given to 
consider Turkey within the broader literature on enlargement. In this sense, there is an 
important gap in terms of the increased political efficacy of civil society actors and their 
interaction with the EU. Most of the studies remain state-centered focusing on institutional 
compliance adopting a top-down approach. However, studies that reflect upon the experience 
of different civil society organizations and the heightened activism of these organizations as a 
result of the Europeanization process is largely missing. Therefore, the potential for EU’s 
transformative power is only explained through a simple institutional compliance perspective 
without investigating the particular characteristic of the Turkish case, where informal and 
formal change does not follow a rigid sequence. In this sense, this thesis tries to fill this gap by 
examining how minority groups in Turkey benefit from interaction with the EU through civil 
society and how the dialogue sustained between these civil society organizations and EU 
officials act as a source of leverage and ensure their access to more political resources.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Bahar Rumelili. 2005. “Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish cooperation.” South European 
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 1.3 Identifying Research Questions 
The over-arching objective of this research is to identify whether the engagement of minority 
organizations with the EU increased their social mobilization levels and to what extent they 
were able to benefit from the availability of EU resources delivered as part of enlargement and 
EU aid. It questions the degree to which the EU resources are utilized by civil society 
organizations. In other words, what is under examination here is how, and to what extent, the 
EU process has changed the political efficacy levels of civil society organizations in Turkey at 
the domestic level. It is on such a theoretical premise that this empirical research project is 
undertaken: should the impact of the EU on the minority civil society organizations in Turkey 
be studied through the lens of how civil society is affected by international assistance and how 
the Europeanization process is increasing the mobilization capacities of civil society 
organizations.  
 
To realize this objective, this thesis will test for the impact of the EU on domestic civil society 
actors and whether it has led to their mobilization. This is significant since shortly after the 
granting of candidacy status, the Turkish government at the time initiated a series of reforms 
for lifting the ban on civil society activities allowing civil society organizations to obtain 
international funding and form networks with other international organizations.75 This caused 
the Turkish political scene to be divided into two camps with respect to the trajectory of 
Turkey-EU relations. For the pro-reform political and civil society actors, Europeanization 
signified an opportunity to exert pressure for the adoption of the long-awaited human rights 
reforms. On the other hand, state elites who associated EU with modernization and economic 
development were unwilling to adopt the EU-compliant legislation on more controversial 
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issues such as minority rights. As the accession process moved forward with the involvement 
of civil society actors, the vetoing state actors were forced to concede to the new rules and 
regulations relating to minority rights. In this context, I set out to examine the changes of civil 
society activism in the Turkish pre-accession period that was initiated in December 1999 at the 
Helsinki Summit. Drawing on an important strand of the Europeanization literature, I 
investigate whether transformation is occurring in the realm of minority rights protection as a 
consequence of increased mobilization capacities of civil society organizations even in the 
presence of political resistance.  
 
This thesis will investigate whether, how, and to what extent Turkey’s Europeanization process 
mobilized the pro-reform civil society actors causing a transformation of collective 
understandings at the domestic level. It will be argued that the differential empowerment of 
civil society actors in Turkey as a result of the EU accession process has had several 
ramifications on minority rights. Empowerment as used in this thesis refers to making use of 
the opportunities and resources provided by the EU for civil society organizations as well as 
the ability to participate in decision-making processes at different stages. Building on this, this 
research in particular examines the civil society actors among the minority groups in Turkey 
and whether the interaction with the EU shapes the variation in their mobilization capacities. 
Taking all these developments into account, this research proposes to ask the following 
questions: 
•   How has the engagement with the EU empowered and changed the behavior of minority 
civil society organizations in Turkey?  
•   How have minority organizations benefited from the availability of EU resources? 
•   Which factors explain the differentiated impact of the EU on minority organizations in 
terms of political efficacy and mobilization? 
	   40	  
•   What are the effects of other means of influence on the empowerment of the minority 
groups in Turkey such as the distinction between ethnic/linguistic and religious 
minorities or the parliamentary representation of some of the groups? 
 
This thesis analyzes the Turkish case in depth to test the hypothesis that Europeanization has 
altered the opportunity structures of the minority civil society actors in Turkey leading to their 
involvement in an interactive process at the domestic level with state actors. The minority 
groups or the civil society organizations representing these groups and their interaction with 
the EU sit at the core of the proposed research question. In this respect, the thesis broadly 
examines whether civil society actors and minority groups are individually and collectively 
mutating in the course of the EU accession process. It is argued that the ability of the minority 
groups to engage with the EU are dependent on a number of contingent variables accounting 
for the differentiated impact of the EU on minority organizations in terms of mobilization. 
Therefore, the Europeanization process arguably increases the political efficacy of minority 
civil society organizations in Turkey. The Turkish case is important because it provides an 
opportunity to test the transformative effects of the EU on a highly contested issue such as 
minority rights and in the presence of high political resistance. Additionally, as Turkey has 
been a candidate state for a long time, the limited progress achieved in formal compliance with 
respect to minority issue also provides an opportunity to test the extent to which the EU had an 
impact on the civil society mobilization and the formation of an interactive domestic process 
through the availability of political and financial resources. In light of these, the significance 
of the Turkish case lies in the levels of domestic change that led to the participation of civil 
society actors in decision-making processes even though formal accession process has not 
progressed in a similar pace and direction due to high political costs. However, the examination 
of the Turkish case also poses certain limitations especially as the engagement of the civil 
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society actors with the EU is contingent upon a number of other factors. Most importantly, the 
ban on the establishment of minority civil society organizations have recently been lifted 
therefore almost all of the minority organizations examined, had been recently established. 
Secondly, these civil society organizations could only cooperate with foreign organizations and 
obtain funding from international donors after the elimination of the ban in 2002, making the 
engagement with the EU a very recent concept. Given this, most of the civil society 
organizations were still at the initial stages of forming international partnerships. Finally, the 
Turkish case diverges from previous enlargements as the relations with the EU were stalled at 
several points throughout the history due to a number of conflicts between Turkey and EU 
member states such as the Cyprus issue or the recognition of the Armenian genocide. 
 
1.4 Research Methods  
This research employs a mixed methodology including both qualitative and quantitative 
research methods. It uses classic content analysis to examine the documents mapping out EU-
Turkey relations and the legislation in Turkey and in Europe pertaining to minority rights and 
civil society actors. These documents include European Commission progress reports, opinion 
papers and European Parliament resolutions as well as the legislation and reform packages 
passed by the Turkish government between 2002 and 2006. This type of content analysis offers 
a definitive and detailed analysis of the formal compliance achieved in Turkey so far. It also 
helps to portray the responses at the formal level of EU institutions and the Turkish state. It 
also uses process tracing to identify how the mobilization of civil society organizations and 
their involvement in the decision-making processes evolved as well as the adoption of the 
reforms regarding the civil society and minority rights throughout the years since the beginning 
of the accession negotiations in 2004.  
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The core aim of the empirical data is to answer the question whether one can really talk about 
an increase in the mobilization capacities of civil society organizations induced by their 
interaction with the EU. As part of the qualitative research, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with the objective of understanding the reactions of different actors towards the role 
of the EU in the improvement of minority rights in Turkey. The interviewees were selected 
according to their affiliation with the minority groups and the civil society organizations. These 
selections were then classified into three main groups. The first group of interviewees included 
the opinion and religious leaders representing the minority groups in question such as the 
Armenian Orthodox Patriarch of Istanbul or the Jewish Minority Presidents in different cities. 
These interviewees were included as they constitute a bridge between the decision-makers and 
the minority group that they represent and therefore they were able to provide insight to the 
general perceptions of both sides with respect to the role of the EU. The second group included 
the political actors representing the minority groups such as the parliamentarians or the mayors 
from the pro-Kurdish Political Party, BDP as well as the presidents/secretaries of the main civil 
society organizations that have close relations with the national government. It was believed 
that these actors could explain how their interaction with the EU contributed to their relations 
with the government and the adoption of the reforms for the improvement of minority rights. 
Finally, the last group included the staff of the civil society organizations that represented 
different minority organizations or worked on minority rights while operating at the national 
level. Such interviews are also believed to enrich the study for getting insight about how these 
civil society organizations individually contribute to policy making. As most of these non-state 
actors and civil society organizations were based in larger cities, Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakir 
were selected as the pivotal points. Depending on the characteristics of the minority 
organization smaller cities were also included. These were selected as Mardin where the 
Assyrians predominantly reside, Edirne where the largest Roma organization is located and the 
	   43	  
Roma are most populated and finally Antakya which is home to several minority groups instead 
of a predominant group.  
 
The quantitative analysis on the other hand provides a descriptive statistical analysis of the 
impact that interaction with the EU has on civil society organizations in Turkey and the level 
of mobilization of these organizations. It also acts as a means to identify which variables are 
significant in the differentiated impact that the EU has on these civil society organizations 
while trying to distinguish the effects of the EU from other international organizations. These 
analyses were not only used to comprehend the varied levels of empowerment of the civil 
society actors as well as their ability to make use of the resources and opportunities resulting 
from their engagement with the EU. The data to test the research questions were collected 
through electronic and telephone surveys with 106 different civil society organizations around 
Turkey between July 2011 and September 2012. In total surveys and interviews were 
conducted with 126 respondents representing the minority groups or working on the minority 
issue in Turkey. They were recruited through e-mail or telephone correspondence and selected 
as a result of online analyses of the websites of main minority federations or the website of the 
European Delegation in Ankara. The civil society organizations that responded to the surveys 
were chosen depending on a number of factors. The first of these was related to the activities 
organized by the civil society organization in question. Only those organizations that were 
active, in terms of organizing advocacy activities, training courses, seminars and meetings or 
published publications etc. were included instead of the CSOs that were mostly considered as 
a place of gathering for the members of a minority group. For instance, there were a lot of 
Caucasian or Roma organizations that were merely used as a place to bring together the 
members of a certain minority group in that location and did not organize any activities or did 
not have a budget. These types of organizations were not included in the study. Secondly, the 
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civil society organizations were chosen based on the minority group in question. For those 
minority groups that are more populated and widely represented, those organizations that were 
located in larger cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakir and had larger budgets or 
conducted more activities were included along with those branches in smaller cities that were 
more active than the rest regardless of their location. For example, even though the head of the 
Roman federation was located in Ankara, the organizations in Edirne, which is a small city in 
the Thrace region were also surveyed because they were able to obtain funding from the EU 
for three different projects they implemented in collaboration with other domestic and 
European organizations. On the other hand, for those minority organizations that have a much 
smaller population and have lower number civil society organizations such as the Lom fraction 
of the Roma or the Mhellemis, all of the minority organizations representing these groups and 
that were organizing activities and implementing projects were included. Given this, in terms 
of associational structure, some of the groups have only one minority organization representing 
them as in the case of Loms whereas others such as the Alevis not only have a multilevel 
structure composed of federations and confederations but also different fractions representing 
various perspectives, such as Kurdish Alevis. The final group of survey respondents were 
selected based on their activities within the field of minority protection. These were selected 
from the major foundations, associations and professional/sectoral organizations that were also 
active in the field of minority rights. These include human rights organizations, institutes, 
think-tanks, professional and business organizations, sectoral associations or chambers, 
research units, and umbrella organizations.76 The Human Rights Association (IHD) is an 
example to this, with branches scattered all over Turkey. Among the IHD branches, those 
located in larger cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Adana and Diyarbakir were surveyed. In the 
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same manner, even though the Union of Educators (EGITIM-SEN) was an organization 
focusing on education policies in Turkey, the branches in Adana and Diyarbakir were included 
due to their activities organized on education in mother-tongue languages. In total, civil society 
organizations representing 23 different minority groups were surveyed. The survey 
respondents were identified through the websites of these organizations. While the interviews 
and surveys provided an investigation of the varied mobilization patterns among minority 
organizations, they were limited in terms of providing a more comprehensive understanding of 
how the EU changed the behavior of each minority group specifically and how the attitudes of 
these minority organizations towards the EU were altered over time. Additionally, even though 
the surveys shed light on the increased political efficacy of minority organizations as a result 
of the interaction with the EU, they were constrained in terms of explaining how significant 
the other factors were. The interviewees on the other hand, sometimes felt less inclined to 
answer the questions related to their relations with national political actors due to fears of 
prosecution.  
 
1.5 Thesis Outline  
The thesis consists of seven chapters including the current conceptual and methodological 
introduction. Chapter 2 (Civil Society and Europeanization) develops the theoretical frame of 
reference for the thesis by tracing how the EU conceptualizes civil society and how it compels 
candidate countries to strengthen the civil society organizations. It also provides a detailed 
analysis of how the concepts of civil society are used within this thesis explaining it from a 
historical, international and European perspective. Additionally, the civil society organizations 
are discussed in detail within this Chapter. Chapter 3 (Minority Rights in the Context of Modern 
Turkey) presents a discussion of minority rights in the context of modern Turkey. This chapter 
explores how minority rights are used in the European context and analyzes the reasons for its 
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complicated and controversial character. In addition, it looks into the role of civil society 
organizations in relation to the development of minority rights schemes in Europe and how or 
why the minority issue has been a critical issue in Turkey. Finally, it provides a detailed 
examination of the minority groups in Turkey that represent different dynamics in terms of 
mobilization and activism. The following chapter, Chapter 4 (EU Conditionality Towards 
Turkey) discusses the use of conditionality in EU-Turkey relations from a thematic perspective. 
In this sense, it highlights the critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations that mark the use of 
conditionality for minority protection and civil society. 
 
Chapter 5 (Minority Rights and EU Compliance in Turkey) provides a detailed discussion of 
the civil society organizations representing the minority groups in Turkey while presenting an 
empirical examination of the factors that explain the variation in the associational structures of 
these minority organizations. Examination of ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities in a 
particular country touches upon one of the most controversial domestic issues because it 
infringes on the “traditional statist tenets of international relations, such as state sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, non-intervention, and the like”77. Since its foundation, the Republic of 
Turkey granted official minority status to only three non-Muslim minority groups, namely 
Jews, Greek-Orthodox, and Armenians.78 Accordingly, the Republic of Turkey signed and 
ratified various European and international treaties for the protection of minority groups with 
the reservation that the minority rights granted through these treaties do not contradict the 
provisions of the Lausanne Treaty.79 For the purposes of this thesis and contrary to Turkey’s 
official stand, a wider conception of minority groups is adopted. The list of minority groups 
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used in this thesis is non-exhaustive; it includes the main minority groups that are represented 
by non-state actors. The key minority groups referred to in this thesis are summarized in Table 
1. Given this, the chapter provides a selection of groups representing different dynamics and 
an in-depth discussion of these groups in terms of their organizational profile and the changes 
they have undergone with respect to public/political presence.  
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Minority Groups in Turkey80 
Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities Religious Minorities 
Kurds: officially not recognized as a 
minority. Comprised of two different 
linguistic groups, namely Zazaki and 
Kurmanji speakers, and three religious 
groups, namely Sunnis, Alevis and Ezidis.  
Alevis: officially not recognized as a religious 
minority. Comprised of people of both 
Turkish and Kurdish ethnic descent as well as 
Arab-speaking Nusairis.  
Arabs: officially not recognized as a 
minority. Comprised of Muslim and Christian 
groups. 
Greek Orthodox Christians: officially 
recognized as a religious minority 
Georgians: officially not recognized as a 
minority. 
Armenians: officially recognized as a 
religious minority. 
Abkhazians: officially not recognized as a 
minority. 
Jews: officially recognized as a religious 
minority. 
Circassians: officially not recognized as a 
minority. 
Latin Catholics: officially not recognized as a 
religious minority. 
Roma: officially not recognized as a 
minority. Comprised of people of Kurdish 
and Turkish descent and Sunni Muslims, 
Alevi Muslims, Christians and Ezidis. 
Assyrians: officially not recognized as a 
religious minority. Comprises of Assyrians 
and Chaldeans. 
Laz: officially not recognized as a minority. Ezidis: officially not recognized as a religious 
minority. 
Hamshen: officially not recognized as a 
minority. 
Protestants: officially not recognized as a 
religious minority. 
Mhelmis: officially not recognized as a 
minority. 
 
Molokans: officially not recognized as a 
minority. 
 
Bosnians and Albanians: officially not 
recognized as a minority.81  
 
Pomaks: officially not recognized as a 
minority. 
 
Africans: officially not recognized as a 
minority. 
 
 
The following Chapter 6 (Empowerment of Civil Society Organizations: Position on the 
Ground) will analyze the role of civil society organizations in the pre-accession period. It will 
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  As	  previously	  mentioned	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  minority	  groups	  provided	  in	  the	  table	  above	  cannot	  provide	  an	   exhaustive	   list	   of	   all	   of	   the	  minorities	   groups	   residing	   in	  Turkey	  but	   rather	   includes	   those	  minority	  groups	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis.	  
81 Bosnians and Albanians are officially not recognized as a minority group by the Turkish state and they do not 
demand any specific cultural, socio-economic or linguistic rights. The civil society representative interviewed 
clearly stated that they refer to themselves as “Turks” and their only demand is with regard to bilateral relations 
with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania as well as the improvement of the situation in these countries. 
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test for the increased mobilization of these different civil society organizations. This chapter 
will include the data collected through the interviews conducted in Turkey with civil society 
actors and representatives of the minority groups as well as the results obtained from the 
statistical tests that were used to test for the empowerment of these civil society organizations 
as a result of the political and financial opportunities provided by the EU. Finally, the thesis 
will conclude with a summary of the major research outcomes regarding the minority rights in 
Turkey in general and the transformative power of Europe on civil society organizations in 
particular. It will also discuss future research and the limitations of the thesis as well as further 
conceptual implications. 
 
1.6  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I sought to present the major research questions and the methodology employed 
in this thesis. The mechanisms of Europeanization to conceptualize the relationship between 
enlargement and domestic transformation were identified, while drawing on a strand of 
literature on Europeanization and civil society. The existing studies on Europeanization 
emphasize the role of the enlargement perspective in shaping domestic reactions to adaptational 
pressures. However, these studies fail to account for the limited progress in Turkey’s formal 
compliance and the continuing transformation of the strategies, aims, identities and 
opportunities of domestic actors. At the same time, limiting their examination of EU’s 
transformative power to formal compliance, they neglect the increased civil society activities 
induced by their engagement with the EU. In contrast, this thesis seeks to demonstrate how 
Europeanization actually shapes the civil society actors and facilitates their involvement within 
an interactive policy-making process at the domestic level. Therefore, I employ a bottom-up 
approach to examine the domestic impact of the EU on the civil society organizations in Turkey 
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specifically relating to minority protection. I question whether their engagement with the EU 
can be used to explain their increased political efficacy and mobilization levels. 
 
This approach should allow us to account for the outcomes of the EU accession process in 
Turkey. The EU’s goal to transform domestic politics within candidate states and to ensure 
compliance with EU standards have been restructured at the domestic level in Turkey. In this 
context, the aim to anchor the democratization process in Turkey first through the application 
of conditionality and later through engagement with domestic actors was inapplicable before 
the granting of candidacy status in 1999. This thesis challenges the idea that formal and 
informal change should always display a linear, sequential relationship and that domestic 
transformation should occur parallel to the progress achieved in the formal accession process. 
In other words, it fills the gap in the literature firstly by investigating how the EU continues to 
increase the mobilization capacities of the civil society organizations in Turkey despite the 
interruptions in the formal accession process and secondly how EU’s transformative power 
continues to yield an impact on minority groups in the presence of political resistance and 
despite the controversial character of the issue. In particular, it puts into question the capacity 
of the EU to contribute towards the goals of democratization and improving minority rights in 
different contexts, including the candidate states. The significance of the Turkish case lies in 
the levels of domestic change that led to the participation of civil society organizations in the 
decision-making process even though formal accession process has not progressed in a similar 
pace and direction due to the high political costs and resistance.  
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Chapter 2 
Civil Society and Europeanization 
The recent break from the state-centered view of governing required finding more flexible and 
indirect forms of governance to respond to the new economic and social conditions. In these 
new forms of governance, civil society assumed a central role as it started to be viewed as the 
place and mechanism where consensus is found and generated and a source of legitimacy for 
the policies implemented by the decision-makers. As new democratic opportunities emerged 
as a result of these new political structures within the EU, civil society organizations could 
participate in decision-making more actively. In this regard, the divergence from the state-
centered political structure created a democratic potential where the traditional roles of the state 
had to be reconsidered. Even though European understanding of civil society does not break 
this state-centric tradition, it refers to an intermediate area between the state, the market and 
the private sphere. The core of this new role assumed by the civil society lies in a decentralized 
decision-making system that includes shifting actors networked across countries and across 
levels of decision-making structures.  
 
At the Madrid Summit in 1995, the EU added a new criterion to the Copenhagen criteria that 
was announced in 1993.82 The candidate countries were required to have the necessary 
administrative and judicial institutions in order to be able to effectively adopt the acquis 
communitaire.83 The institutional capacity criteria was particularly significant for the CEE 
countries, as their candidacy created an excessive work load for the adoption of the required 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The European Council [Madrid Summit 1995], Madrid, 15-16 December 1995, Bulletin of the European 
Communities No.12/1995. 
83 Elsa Tulmets. 2005. “The Management of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the 
European Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary.” European Law Journal 11(5): 658.  
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policies, which became problematic in light of their limited resources. The concept of civil 
society was central for these debates and essential for the Europeanization of these candidate 
countries due to two reasons. First of all, since the candidate countries are not member states, 
the EU is not able to hierarchically impose the adoption of the acquis. The relations between 
the EU and the candidate states are strictly confined to methods of bargaining and diplomacy. 
Therefore, the only method that the EU can use to ensure the adoption of the acquis is the 
external incentives model and conditionality.84 Secondly, the adoption of the acquis created a 
significant burden on the CEE countries, which were already going through regime transition. 
As both the EU and the candidate countries did not have sufficient capacities and resources for 
the adoption and the adaptation of the acquis, state actors started searching for ways to 
collaborate with civil society organizations both at the national and European level so that they 
could delegate some of the tasks related to accession to these external actors. The European 
Commission also encouraged accession countries to involve civil society organizations in order 
to achieve effective adoption of the acquis as well as legitimacy.85 In return, the civil society 
organizations were able to influence policy outcomes in those areas that were particularly 
salient for them. In other words, the civil society organizations were used as an instrument to 
mitigate the challenges of accession.  
 
At the same time, the concept of governance acquired significance as it pointed to the inclusion 
of a variety of actors in decision-making processes. However, in spite of its popularity, there 
is no single definition or understanding related to the concept of governance and depending on 
whether it refers to national, European or international systems, the meaning of the term covers 
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a broad array.86 According to Pierre, the growing interest on governance was mainly based on 
the necessity to redefine the role of the state within society and to explain the transformation 
of the nation-state in light of the erosion of the traditional power structures.87 Employed both 
by international relations and comparative politics literature, the concept of governance is 
analyzed within a wide spectrum of studies ranging from state-centered views equating 
governance with government to the broader understanding that concentrates on the interaction 
of a plurality of actors.88 It is this latter conceptual framing of governance that forms the basis 
of the EU’s approach towards civil society organizations that will be applied to the Turkish 
case within this thesis. In its most basic form, the position of civil society within EU 
governance refers to a new and broader role, which is characterized by continuing interactions 
among actors from public and private spheres that can be involved in the decision-making 
processes as a result of the shift in the boundaries of the traditional state.89  
 
In this regard, this chapter will firstly present the conceptual development of civil society and 
how the understanding related to the role of civil society transformed throughout history. 
Secondly, the conceptualization of governance by the EU will be discussed by presenting a 
theoretical discussion of the new modes of governance. It mainly explores the model of 
governance that the EU aims to transfer to candidate countries. This is of interest particularly 
because it places considerable emphasis on the engagement of civil society organizations and 
an apparent subtle shift from hierarchy to networks. In light of this, it will discuss how the EU 
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attempts to impact upon accession states by requiring the civil society organizations in these 
countries to assume a more active role in the adoption of EU norms and rules. This is especially 
relevant for the Turkish case because the increased dialogue between civil society 
organizations and European Union not only changed the behavior of minority civil society 
organizations but also consequently transformed the Turkish context through the redistribution 
of power resources. The following section will discuss the research surrounding EU’s approach 
to civil society and the emergence of a European civil society as a result of the changing 
structures in EU governance. Finally, the last two sections will present the data collected about 
the civil society in Turkey and its transformation in the post-Helsinki period after Turkey has 
been granted candidacy status. The main objective is to shed light on whether the EU’s renewed 
understanding of civil society yield better results in terms of transformation in accession 
countries.  
 
2.1 Emergence of Civil Society 
Civil society is not a new concept. In fact, it dates back to Aristotle’s koinonia politike which 
as political society/community. In this original use of the term, there was no distinction 
between the political and civil society, but it rather pointed to all human beings coming together 
under a political order. Historically, the emergence of civil society can be traced back to three 
significant turning points: the works of John Locke, the Scottish enlightenment and Hegel. 
Locke did not make a contrast between civil and political societies and therefore, there was no 
distinction between the state and the society contrary to the current conceptions of the term. 
Instead, civil society was equated with a legitimate political order that would be formed with 
the consent of the citizens.90 In contrast to Locke, during the Scottish enlightenment in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, the theorists of civil society prioritized another form of 
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human association that is based on the dichotomy of individual interests and the need for 
fulfilling collective goals, which they named as the commercial society.91 However, the actual 
distinction between the state and the society was first put forth by Hegel. Hegel is actually 
considered pivotal for the contemporary approaches to civil society. Hegel’s understanding, 
which was based on the works of Locke and the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, was 
grounded in the search for solving the problem of distinguishing between the state and civil 
society. The most striking aspect of Hegel’s work was it no longer equated civil society to 
political society but separating it from both the family and more importantly, the state. Hegel 
defined civil society not only as a product of needs but as a platform for recognition, which 
was a horizontal rather than a vertical model.92 This dichotomy of the state and the civil society 
was later taken up by Marx, who identified civil society primarily with economic interaction 
through the market. However, in Marx’s view civil society was an instrument of class 
exploitation by granting freedom of action to individual citizens.  
 
Finally, Tocqueville formed the grounds for the modern ‘liberal-individualist’ approach to civil 
society by distinguishing political society, which refers to the acts of the populations as they 
participate actively in the matters of government and the state from civil society. Tocqueville 
defines civil society as the private relations between citizens and the non-political associations 
formed by these citizens.93 The recent literature on civil society, which was especially 
revitalized during the 20th century, was dominated by the liberal understanding of the civil 
society instead of the Marxist approach. Whereas the Marxist approach pointed to the use of 
civil society in order to disguise class exploitation, the liberal understanding highlighted the 
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associations formed by freely acting individuals.94 For the liberal theorists, the notion of civil 
society was articulated based on the dichotomy between the private and the public. 
Accordingly, they designated civil society as a public sphere that is occupied by private 
individuals. Even though both of these approaches situate civil society outside the domain of 
the state and emphasize the freedom of action for the individuals, they diverge from each other 
in terms of the goal of civil society. As reiterated by Cohen and Arato95, the current 
understanding of civil society that has reemerged over the recent years differentiates it both 
from the state and the capitalist market economy, where the focus is on “non-class based forms 
of collective action that is linked to the legal, public and associational institutions of the 
society”96.   
 
From this outline of the historical development of civil society, it can be seen that the current 
discourses related to civil society are different than those when the concept first emerged. Most 
importantly, as it is understood today, civil society is neither a component of private sphere, 
which includes the individual and the family nor is it the equivalent of a state. Civil society 
generally refers to the “realm of organized social life that is distinct from society in the sense 
it requires citizens acting collectively in a public sphere and has to be voluntary, self-
generating, self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order to set of 
shared rules”97. Given this, civil society may be located midway “between the private sphere 
and the state”98 and is composed of a number of formal and informal organizations ranging 
from “economic, cultural, informational and educational, interest-based, developmental, issue-
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oriented to civic organizations”99. Business organizations or partnerships make up the 
economic organizations that aim profit maximization through various means including 
lobbying for shaping policy outcomes in their favor, whereas cultural civil society 
organizations represent different religious, ethnic, and other community-based groups and 
lobby for the establishment of a national or an international regime granting them collective 
rights. Informational and educational civil society organizations provide and offer expertise, 
information and knowledge. Interest-based organizations primarily intend to pursue the 
interests of the members of their organizations regardless of them being for-profit or related to 
social issues. Developmental organizations seek to ameliorate the living conditions of their 
members whether through developing the infrastructure or strengthening public institutions, 
whereas issue-oriented organizations are those that advocate and defend specific issues, such 
as women’s rights, environment, human rights, and minority rights. Finally, civic organizations 
refer to those that try to contribute to the democratization of the political system and good 
governance in a given country through various means and activities.  
 
Diamond argues that, contrary to the literature, civil society cannot be described as comprising 
of all of those organizations that do not operate on behalf of the state. He claims that civil 
society organizations have distinct features that distinguish them from other social 
organizations.100 Firstly, civil society organizations are established based on the interests of 
their members and strictly at their own discretion. Secondly, they are independent from the 
state and they are not established through a top-down process, but rather originate from within 
the society. Moreover, civil society organizations are motivated to transform the state and to 
shape the decisions or the actions of the state in line with their interests. Janoski defines civil 
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society as the “sphere of dynamic and responsive public discourse between the state, the public 
sphere, consisting of voluntary organizations, and the market sphere concerning private firms 
and unions”.101 Therefore, civil society is synonymous neither with the state nor with society, 
and it is located between these acting as a mediator. It is the interaction of voluntary groups in 
the non-state sphere.102 In addition to these, civil society should represent a broad range 
interests as well as different segments of society. Hall’s definition divides society into four 
interactive components: state, private, market and public spheres. Contrary to Habermas, Hall 
argues that there is an overlap among these spheres and this overlap forms the basis of civil 
society. In this regard, civil society is considered as a platform for the articulation of interests 
other than political parties and therefore it creates a check and balances system against state 
power. According to this point of view, civil society consists of the public sphere of 
associations and organizations engaged in debate and discussion for political choice.103 The 
White Paper on Governance prepared by the European Commission in 2001 depicts civil 
society consisting of the following groups: trade unions and employer’s organizations 
identified as social partners by the EU; organizations representing social and economic players; 
non-governmental organizations that bring people together for a common cause, such as human 
rights organizations, environmental groups, and grass roots organizations; and finally, 
organizations that facilitate local participation of citizens including churches and religious 
communities.104 
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The main function of civil society is to challenge the monopoly of the state over the decision-
making processes and limit its powers and authorities. Such a function can imply both the 
monitoring and constraining the exercise of state power, which in turn strengthens democratic 
institutions and provides new platforms for the marginalized groups. For example, for 
Tocqueville civil society provides a “counterbalance to the increased capabilities of the modern 
state”105. Therefore, instead of replacing it, civil society forms a platform where it supplements 
and improves the acts of the state, making them more efficient.106 In addition to these, 
participation in civil society organizations enhances political activities of citizens in areas other 
than those determined by political parties and creates opportunities for them to express 
themselves through other means than political activities. Put differently, civil society generates 
channels other than political parties for the representation and articulation of interests.107 In a 
similar vein, civil society creates alternatives for participation in policy making by providing 
the means for influencing local, national and supranational levels of governance. Civil society 
accommodates a variety of interests within the EU decision-making system since civil society 
organizations act as transnational structures that allow different actors across and beyond 
national borders to express themselves. The main motivation behind the objective of involving 
civil society in EU affairs is usually linked to the democratic deficit problem of the EU. In 
2001, the Commission declared that there is a growing need within the EU to create a bridge 
between EU institutions and the citizens of member countries.108 Particularly, the increasing 
emphasis on old forms of governance as a result of the ratification of Maastricht Treaty caused 
the citizens to be disconnected from European governance processes. In addition to these, 
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strengthening of civil society has been identified as one of the major components of an enlarged 
EU as civil society has the power to legitimize EU policies within national contexts. According 
to the Commission report, “The Role and Contribution of Civil Society Organizations in the 
Building of Europe”, the EU reinforces the collaboration among various state and non-state 
actors and institutions, which is expected to increase their influence on policy outcomes and 
create a dynamism in terms of cooperative networks.109 
 
In an effort to provide an all-encompassing definition, Kohler-Koch and Quittkat110 surveyed 
scholars working on civil society and have come up with four different definitions based on 
their functions as representation, self-constitution, public discourse and public well-being. The 
first definition which serves the function of representation and takes the governance approach 
as the basis, describes civil society as including all voluntary and non-profit organizations, 
which play an important role in giving voice to the demands and needs of the citizens. This is 
the definition also utilized by the European Commission and the European Economic and 
Social Committee.111 According to the authors, these definitions yield two distinct conceptions 
of civil society. The first of these, also employed by the EU, points to a civil society 
representing the social and economic interests of the citizens, which is membership-based and 
reflect the views of a larger constituency. This definition is also easily integrated into the 
governance approach and it is in line with the principles of representative democracy. 
Therefore, the EU’s understanding of civil society points to a functional relation between the 
civil society organizations and national and European governing structures. In this regard, civil 
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society has been transformed from a defensive role against the state into a partner in political 
power when considered from the perspective of the EU.112 
 
This understanding is particularly relevant to the reemergence of civil society in the context of 
the transformation of Eastern Europe. This is also spelled out in John Keane’s definition, where 
the civil society is regarded as the opposite of authoritarianism, a platform for social groups to 
interact and exist under more acceptable conditions.113 Therefore, civil society is seen as  the 
mutual existence of consensus and conflict in a balanced manner, exhibiting social diversity 
while constraining political power.114 The concept’s recent and frequent use in reference to 
CEE countries is also reflected in Gellner’s definition, depicting civil society as “a set of 
diverse non-governmental institutions that can counterbalance the state while supplementing it 
in its role as an intermediator between the interests of the society”115. Therefore, contrary to 
the old definitions, in the context of Eastern Europe, civil society has come to be seen as 
fulfilling two roles: as a tool of information for the actors involved and as an instrument to 
shape policies and norms. Both of these roles taken up by the civil society reflect the 
transformation of the governing structures into new modes of governance in the EU that are 
more flexible and participatory and the role of the civil society in the EU governance system 
as collective agents representing citizens.  
 
2.2 Contemporary Debates on European Civil Society 
The current conceptualization of civil society by the EU considers a vibrant civil society as 
vital for a well-functioning democracy. The White Paper on Governance published by the 
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European Commission in 2001 states that the involvement of civil society in policy processes 
was one of the most underscored aspects of the White Paper as it indicated that the diversity of 
the participants of policy processes increase the validity of the EU’s actions.116 Within this 
framework, an active civil society is considered essential for facilitating the transition to 
democracy and for the consolidation of the accession process. Therefore, the key objectives of 
a European civil society are based on increased capacity and involvement in decision-making. 
This framework is not only important to understand how the EU conceptualizes civil society 
in member and candidate states, but it is also significant for understanding how the civil society 
organizations in candidate countries like Turkey can get more actively involved in decision-
making as a result of their increased engagement and dialogue with the EU.  
 
The European Union approach to civil society allowed civil society organizations to play a 
mediating role between actors of different levels, national or European. Even though Ruzza 
and Bozzini found that the Europeanization of civil society varied across countries and policy 
sectors, their central finding pointed to the relevance of the EU governance system for the 
European civil society organizations. While in some sub-sectors such as environmentalists, 
civil society organizations perceived EU to be highly relevant to their activities at the national 
level, those working on minority languages found the EU to be less prevalent for their efforts 
at the domestic level. However, the Europeanization of these civil society organizations 
indicated certain tasks common to all such as information providing, monitoring, contribution 
to policy deliberation, representation of the marginalized groups within the population and their 
potential to connect with these groups.117 In addition to these, the ability of the civil society 
organizations to impact upon the media and communicate their ideas through media outlets, 
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they are also considered as an instrument of legitimization of policies in the public sphere. 
Ruzza and Bozzini attribute four different routes that civil society organizations can follow to 
get involved in politics: traditional, European-up, European-down and national.118 The 
traditional route emphasizes affecting national policies and therefore participating in domestic 
policy processes. This is also relevant to the civil society organizations in the candidate states 
as well as Turkey because it refers to the civil society organizations acquiring information on 
existing EU directives to open up new opportunities. The authors exemplify Hungary, where 
the environmental civil society organizations were able to shape local politics by giving 
references to EU’s environmental regulations.119 In addition to these, the civil society 
organizations act as a source of information for the European Commission to monitor how 
these policies are being implemented in member and candidate states.  
 
Another way of getting involved in politics is the European route down, which implies 
participating in European politics in order to influence national policy-making processes.120 
For the issue of minority protection, in the case of member states, this method does not prove 
to be useful as the EU’s competences related to minority rights is limited. Therefore, the civil 
society organizations consider getting involved in European politics under two conditions. The 
first of these is the perception that such an engagement will allow activists to put pressure on 
national governments. Secondly, it is considered useful if it will allow them to transform 
national communities that are closed otherwise. Ruzzo and Bozzini argue that in the minority 
case, the civil society activists focus on national or regional institutions rather than European 
ones, because of the limited competences of European institutions.121 They also argue that the 
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regards to minority protection is limited for the member states, approaching the EU proves to 
be a more useful strategy in the case of candidate states. This is due to the fact that the EU can 
still use political conditionality towards the government of the candidate state for the non-
compliance with Copenhagen criteria. Therefore, it can be argued that instead of approaching 
their national governments, the civil society organizations in candidate states might find it more 
useful to approach the EU in order to instrumentalize the pressure exerted by the EU as a means 
to defend the minority groups that they represent.  
 
The acknowledgement of the significance of civil society by the EU and attributing a more 
prominent role to civil society organizations by the EU institutions mainly took place during 
the 1990s. The Maastricht Treaty is considered as the turning point in that sense for the greater 
engagement of civil society organizations.122 At the beginning, European civil society was 
introduced as a remedy to the challenges of European integration. Therefore, it had a more 
functional role that aimed to overcome the problems related to integration. For instance, 
Sutherland report published in 1992 as a response to the European Commission’s request for 
assistance in its preparations for the Single Market and the following correspondence in this 
respect point to the role of civil society actors for obtaining better results in policy-making.123 
Over time, it has acquired a more progressive meaning not replacing national formations but 
as an additional sphere where a partnership model can be applied. The difference from the 
traditional civil society within the nation-state, stems from the configuration of the EU, 
pointing to different levels of governance and therefore allowing these partnerships with civil 
society to be found across policies, countries and levels of governance. As a result of the 
expansion of civil society which was encouraged by the EU itself, these organizations started 	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123 World Trade Organization. 2005. “The future of the WTO: Addressing institutional challenges in the new 
millennium”, Geneva: World Trade Organization. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/future_wto_e.htm.  
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to take over certain tasks otherwise attributed to the states, such as delivering services, 
providing information and participation in decision-making. Therefore, such a transition in turn 
required the increase of the role, resources and the number of civil society organizations.  
 
This transition especially occurred during the accession of Central and Eastern European 
countries concurrent with the introduction of Copenhagen criteria. It became apparent that the 
EU started to regard the Union more than an economic unity. These led to the development of 
a new discourse regarding civil society considering it as an essential element of participation 
in democratic processes. Even though until the 1990s, the civil society had a more functional 
role, this started to change and as mentioned previously, the relationship with civil society 
actors pointed to not only better policy-making but also the establishment of democracy. 
Within this framework, civil society has played a significant role as the European civil society 
emerged as a platform for the representation of the citizens of member countries in EU 
decision-making. In fact, according to a study by Dür and Mateo124, certain groups lobbying 
for EU legislation find it easier to advocate for their interests at the EU level. In fact, it can be 
claimed that the European Commission gave legitimacy to civil society by encouraging new 
modes of governance and by prioritizing consultation that takes participation as basis125. Civil 
society participation became a guiding principle of EU governance and this principle was 
applied through material support provided to civil society126. This process entailed the 
formation of national, regional, European and international organizations and networks, all 
seeking to shape, influence and assess the decision-making mechanisms within the new EU 
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system. This was also mentioned within the White Paper on Governance published by the 
European Commission in 2001.  
 
The role and significance of civil society organizations became more prominent within this 
framework. This new approach highlighted that civil society organizations were able to 
influence norms and values leading social change, while providing the basis for transition to 
democracy. Along with other factors such as national governments, economic conditions, 
education that are believed to shape norms and values, civil society organizations were also 
regarded as having the ability to influence these values. This was especially the approach taken 
up during the Eastern enlargement. During this period, civil society organizations were 
assigned with other tasks such as serving as a platform for citizens to get involved in politics 
and to obtain information about the decisions adopted by the decision-makers. The significance 
of this role attributed to civil society organizations is that it enables citizens get involved in the 
issues that concern their daily lives therefore not only contributing to European integration but 
also ensuring the engagement of the citizens in member countries within EU decision-making 
processes. Moreover, the legitimacy of EU policies also depend on the capacity of EU 
institutions to voice diverse opinions from different member states. Therefore, it is believed 
that the participation of the citizens in EU member states will also contribute to the 
consolidation and legitimization of the policies adopted by the EU institutions.127  
 
Given the significance attributed by the EU to the participation of civil society organizations 
in decision-making, EU institutions follow different approaches for including civil society 
organizations. In this regard, whereas the European Council has fairly limited relationship with 
civil society organizations, the European Commission tries to have an open and direct 
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relationship.128 In fact, the European Commission highlighted the need for systematic 
consultation with civil society organizations in its Communication on Voluntary Organizations 
published in 1997, which was further acknowledged within the White Paper on Governance.129 
In comparison, the European Parliament has developed contacts with civil society 
organizations and channels of consulting as it facilitates the relations with lobbyists and interest 
groups more frequently.130 Given these, it is apparent that the EU has undergone significant 
transformation with respect to the relationships established between civil society organizations 
and EU institutions. Even though the initial aim was obtaining better policy outputs regarding 
the economic integration of the union, EU’s approach towards civil society was replaced with 
a more progressive understanding depicting civil society organizations as partners in and 
building blocks for democratic transition as well as a means for achieving democracy at the 
EU level. As these civil society organizations operating to speed up the integration process 
started forming networks, they also highlighted the importance they have in shaping and 
influencing the decisions adopted both at the national and European level.131 As a result of this, 
the European Commission also developed financial instruments that would support civil 
society organizations in their endeavors to shape and evaluate EU policies and programs.  
 
Respectively, the functional role of the civil society as it was seen initially was also 
acknowledged during the accession of CEE countries and onwards. The integration of the new 
candidate countries required a significant workload for the national governments while keeping 
the public opinion informed and supportive of the harmonization process. Not only did this 
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require the adoption of a large legislation but these new rules had to be legitimized and accepted 
by the public opinion. It is in this context that the role of the civil society organizations became 
more apparent and they were acknowledged also as the essential elements of a successful 
transition.  
 
2.3 European Civil Society Policy and Enlargement 
As mentioned above, the Eastern enlargement had the most profound impact on the European 
civil society policy. It has shaped the EU’s approach towards civil society not only during the 
pre-accession period of these countries but also in the post-accession period. The most 
significant result of such an impact was the development of the PHARE program in 1989 to 
support the transformation of these countries first starting with Poland and Hungary. 
Afterwards, the PHARE program which was also used by Turkey as well, was the main 
instrument for the technical and financial assistance provided by the EU to these countries. 
Moreover, conditionality tool was integrated to this financial assistance program where the 
financial support was tied to compliance with accession rules and legislative adaptation. 
However, as the EU aimed for a fast legal harmonization in these candidate countries during 
the enlargement of CEECs, it was observed that this did not entail implementation at the same 
levels. This led to the inference that sustainable results that can be carried over into the post-
accession process with regard to the adoption of the acquis and democratization were 
contingent on ensuring the support of the society. In this context, civil society organizations 
have emerged as key stakeholders in the accession process. They did not only provide the 
national states with the capacity to reach out to the citizens in a more effective manner, but 
they were also able to consolidate the decisions adopted by the national decision-makers with 
the public opinion and inform them about these decisions so that there would be a general 
consensus. Therefore, as mentioned previously, civil society acquired a role that revolved 
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around both consensus and contestation. Within this framework, it can be said that the EU 
expected the civil society organizations in these candidate countries to have a bottom-up effect 
for democratization and institutional reform complementary to the top-down formal accession 
process. In other words, EU’s understanding of the role of civil society organizations 
accompanied the conditionality applied by formal institutions directed at the national 
governments.    
 
The most fundamental critiques of European civil society pertain to its restricted role to 
monitoring instead of decision-making. It is argued that as the civil society’s role transformed 
from an opposition to authoritarian regimes to a partner in governance, its role has been 
confined to monitoring the activities of the state because it does not have a vote but only a 
voice. Secondly, the influence of civil society varies across sub-sectors and across countries. 
As the EU’s competence on certain issues such as minority protection is limited, civil society 
organizations find it more useful to try to influence regional and national governments in order 
to defend their interests. Therefore, the partnerships established between civil society and 
national governments and regional and local authorities are not uniform across member states. 
Moreover, it is argued that the EU considers civil society organizations as homogeneous and 
neutral and it does not consider a diverse composition. For instance, it is believed that all of 
the civil society organizations provided with the financial and technical instruments will use 
these in an equally efficient and beneficial manner. In return, the EU expects all of these 
organizations to contribute to the accession process at the same level. However, as clear from 
the previous experiences both in other candidate countries and in Turkey, the financial and 
technical assistance provided by the EU to these civil society organizations do not yield the 
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same results.132 In fact, civil society actors have their own ideological preferences and views, 
which affect their engagement with both national and European political actors.  
Another criticism of the EU’s approach towards civil society organizations is the rather naïve 
conceptualization that equates civil society organizations with further democratization.133 This 
understanding stems from the earlier definitions of the civil society as a set of actors opposing 
the state. However, as in the Turkish case and some of the minority organizations in Turkey, 
the civil society organizations do not always stand in opposition to the state but they might 
stand by the state. Therefore, not all civil society organizations can be expected to act as a 
monitoring mechanism towards the undemocratic practices of the state. As a result, 
conceptualizing the civil society as a homogeneous set of actors and definitely as a force of 
opposition to the state cannot be applied to all cases as it might be seen from the Turkish case 
in the following chapters. Additionally, the undemocratic and threatening practices of some of 
the civil society organizations also depicted as the uncivil society is also highly debated. In the 
most simplistic form, the uncivil society refers to all of those elements of society often 
exemplified by the extremist right and radical groups that are threatening to the public sphere. 
In addition to this, although some of the civil society organizations function as a civil society 
organization, they do not always have a democratic internal structure creating a paradox that 
even though they are considered as means of bringing democratization, they are not democratic 
in their own internal structures. Finally, it might be argued that the role of civil society 
organizations particularly in non-Western societies might be determined by the state ideology 
itself, which results in these organizations to compromise from their own interests and become 
dependent on official funding. However, as in the Turkish case, the EU funding and assistance 
provides an outlet for these organizations making them at least financially independent so that 	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they do not always have to rely on official state funds to carry out their activities. Nevertheless, 
the state still plays a pivotal role through political pressures and auditing mechanisms as in the 
Turkish case, limiting the space for maneuver for these civil society organizations. It is in this 
context, the political instruments of the EU become more significant for these civil society 
organizations as the engagement with the EU become a source of leverage, which will be 
further discussed in the following chapters.  
 
2.4 European Union Civil Society Policy in the Turkish Context 
Despite these challenges and critiques of EU’s civil society policy, financial assistance has 
been an important tool for the capacity-building and development of civil society 
organizations. Turkey has been receiving pre-accession assistance since 2001 under the 
Turkish Financial Instrument however prior to 2001, the level of financial assistance was much 
lower and consisted only of some programs related to the European Neighborhood Policy. In 
2001, the European Commission prepared a single heading under which all financial assistance 
provided to Turkey including MEDA and Customs Union regulations, were presented. A 
further adjustment to the Turkish Financial Instrument was adopted causing a progressive 
increase in the level of financial assistance.  
 
After the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU began in 2004, the Commission 
highlighted the importance of the role attributed to the civil society in order to ensure the 
development of a dialogue between different actors in Turkey and the EU.134 Moreover, the 
Commission pointed to the important role of such a dialogue for experience sharing, lesson 
learning and fostering the involvement of a multiplicity of actors on debates related to social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 European Commission. 2004. “Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards 
accession.” Brussels: European Commission. COM (2004) – 656. 
	   72	  
and political issues in Turkey.135 Within the civil society dialogue framework, the EU defines 
the civil society as consisting of “the labour-market actors, i.e. the social partners (trade unions 
and employers federations); organizations representing social and economic players at large 
(consumer organizations for instance,); non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
community-based organizations, i.e. organizations at grassroots level through which citizens 
participate in local and municipal life (e.g. youth or family associations); religious communities 
and media”136.  
 
The European Commission identifies civil society as a key stakeholder within the accession 
process even though civil society actors do not participate directly in the accession 
negotiations. In this context, the main role attributed to civil society organizations is the 
representation of various interest groups in order to facilitate involvement in the decision-
making processes. In this sense, the engagement of civil society is of paramount importance to 
the EU and there are a number of EU instruments designed for the civil society in Turkey 
ranging from individual grants to funding programs, from community programs to IPA 
assistance and the civil society dialogue framework disseminated by the European Commission 
in Brussels, the European Commission Delegation in Ankara or various national institutions in 
Turkey.  
 
Until 1999, the scope of financial assistance to Turkey was based on the objective of assisting 
and enhancing structural adjustment under the MEDA program, as in the case of other 
Mediterranean partners of the program.137 Given this, until 2002 the financial assistance to 
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Turkey was mainly comprised of the MEDA program and two regulations governing the 
financial aid provided as part of the Customs Union as well as economic and social 
development.138 In 2001, the Council’s regulation on pre-accession financial assistance for 
Turkey underlined the Commission’s aim to start a pre-accession financial assistance program 
for Turkey identifying €177 million assistance on average per year.139 In addition to this, the 
Commission Strategy Paper published in 2002 predicted a gradual increase in the level of 
financial assistance.140 Between 2004 and 2006, the priority areas for pre-accession financial 
assistance to Turkey were set as institution building, which includes twinning programs as well 
as financial aid allocated to the NGOs for “the consolidation and further development of 
democratic practices, the rule of law, human rights, equality for women and men and the 
protection of minorities”141. The second priority area was determined as investment, which 
aimed to launch or to enhance the governing structures necessary for the adoption of the acquis 
requirements and investment that will eliminate regional gaps between the regions and the 
disparity between Turkey’s national income and the EU average by fostering economic and 
social cohesion.142 
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Figure 1. Pre-accession Financial Assistance to Turkey (2004-2006)143 
 
 
As of 2007, the pre-accession Financial Instrument for Turkey has been replaced with the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) as in the case of other candidate and potential 
candidate countries. The importance of the IPA program is related to the changes in the extent 
of financial assistance and the new issue areas included within the scope of the program. In 
this context, the European Commission identifies IPA’s aim as to “be a bridge between external 
assistance and internal policies”.144 IPA objectives for Turkey include providing Turkey with 
assistance to implement the necessary reforms for accession and assisting Turkey with the 
administration of structural assistance.145 The IPA program provided over 2 billion Euros of 
financial support to Turkey between 2007-2010.146   
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Figure 2. Total IPA Support to Turkey (2007-2011)147 
 
The IPA program for Turkey has five different components;  “Transition Assistance and 
Institution Building, Regional and Cross-Border Cooperation, Regional Development, Human 
Resources Development and Rural Development”148. Civil Society Dialogue is financed under 
the Transition Assistance and Institution Building component. The IPA funds are coordinated 
by the EU Secretariat-General, the State Planning Organization, Central Finance and Contracts 
Unit and various ministries. Between 2007 and 2013, 4.908.900.000 Euros were allocated to 
various bodies, institutions, and organizations in Turkey within the framework of the IPA 
program.149 
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Table 1.  IPA Funds for Different Components (Million Euros)150 
  
COMPONENT 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 TOTAL 
Transition Assistance and 
Institution Building 
257 256 240 211 229 234 238 1665 
Cross-border Cooperation 2,1 2,9 3 9,6 9,8 10 10 48 
Regional Development 168 174 183 238 293 368 378 1801 
Human Resources 
Development 
50 53 56 63 78 90 96 486 
Rural Development 21 53 86 131 173 198 213 874 
TOTAL: 497 539 566 654 782 900 936 4873 
 
Within the context of the IPA, Turkey also benefits from various Community Programs that 
are partially financed by the IPA instrument. The European Community Programs are 
cooperation programs designed to stimulate collaboration between EU member states and 
candidate countries under different headings covering a variety of community policies.151 
Turkey actively participates in the following community programs: 7th Framework Program, 
Lifelong Learning Program, Jean Monnet Program, Youth in Action, Culture Program, 
Community Action in the field of Public Health, Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Program and European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.152 The European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights is a community program that was initiated in 
1994 for providing support to civil society organizations with the aim to promote human rights 
and democracy.153 Turkey is a beneficiary to the Democracy and Human Rights program since 
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2002 and 2 million Euros was allocated to different organizations in Turkey annually on 
average for macro-grants which are selected by the European Commission in Brussels and an 
average of 500.000 Euros per year for micro-grants which are selected by the Delegation of the 
European Union to Turkey in Ankara.154 The EIDHR has two components, first of which is 
related to reinforcing the capacities of civil society organizations so that their participation in 
policy processes can be expanded.  
 
In 2001, 3 million Euros were allocated to Turkey and until 2008, funding was provided for 
more than 100 projects with different scopes including freedom of expression, access to justice, 
prevention of torture, women’s rights, protection of refugees and asylum-seekers, minority 
protection and rule of law.155 The support is provided either through calls of proposals 
published on the website of the Europe Aid Cooperation Office in Brussels or the Delegation 
of the European Union to Turkey which is located in Ankara.156 For instance, one of the micro 
grants was granted to the Diyarbakir Branch of Human Rights Association to contribute to the 
promotion and protection of cultural diversity and respect for different ethnic, cultural and 
religious minorities in Turkey.157 The total project budget was 93,745 Euros and the project 
lasted for 12 months.158 Another project that was selected for a micro grant within the 
framework of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights was submitted by 
the Boyacikoy Surp Yerits Mangans Armenian Church foundation in collaboration with the 
Lions Association in Beykoz.159 The objective of the project was to raise awareness on the 
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social problems of the minorities in Istanbul.160 The total project budget was 68.100 Euros and 
the duration was 12 months.161 The main reasoning for EU support to civil society is grounded 
in the aim to strengthen the dialogue and cooperation between state and non-state actors while 
increasing the resources of these organizations so that they can be involved in decision-making 
processes at the domestic and national level. 
 
The European Commission also uses political tools for supporting civil society in Turkey in 
addition to the financial instruments.162 The political tools used by the European Commission 
include political meetings with government authorities, progress reports to provide annual 
reviews on the achievements of the candidate states, IPA component that includes activities 
such as supporting local civil society actors, coordinating the dialogue between various non-
state actors from Turkey and the EU, supporting the partnerships and networks between civil 
society organizations from Turkey and the EU for the transfer of know-how and experience-
sharing.163 Apart from these, the European delegation in Ankara corresponds with non-state 
actors through meetings, panels, workshops and other means of communication.164 The EU 
representatives from the European Commission, European Parliament and various EU 
countries’ embassies and consulates also visit civil society organizations and non-state actors 
on a regular basis in order to obtain objective and accurate information in relation to Turkey’s 
accession process.165 Finally, different civil society representatives from Europe visit the civil 
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society organizations and opinion leaders as well as politicians in Turkey in order to obtain 
objective information about the various social and political issues.  
 
2.5 Civil Society in Turkey 
There are many factors for choosing Turkey as a case study. First of all, Turkey provides a 
striking example of EU’s civil society policy. In the same line, part of the literature argues that 
following the granting of the EU candidacy for Turkey in 1999, one can observe significant 
pace in the developments related to the Europeanization process and the reforms associated 
with it.166 The Helsinki decision can be viewed as a cornerstone as the EU acquired a formal 
role for monitoring and pressuring for reforms only after Turkey was granted candidacy status 
while at the same time providing civil society with the resources so that they contribute to the 
resolution of the problems standing before Turkey’s full accession.167 Since the beginning of 
the formal negotiations for accession, the EU viewed the role of the civil society organizations 
as pivotal in the accession process and expressed the significance of these organizations on 
several occasions. It is also argued that the incompatibility of the state ideology in Turkey with 
a vibrant and active civil society, which form the building blocks of EU democracy, also 
compelled the EU to take a closer look at its civil society policy in Turkey. Given this and the 
minority question being one of the most contested issues in Turkey’s history, makes the 
Turkish case even more interesting because a consolidation of the public opinion with respect 
to the minority issue and the active involvement of minority civil society organizations in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 See Ziya Onis. 2000. “Luxembourg, Helsinki and beyond: towards an interpretation of recent Turkey-EU 
relations”, Government and Opposition, 35(4): 463-483; Paul Kubicek. 2005c. “The European Union and 
Democratization from Below in Turkey”, paper presented at the European Union Studies Association, Austin TX; 
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politics was one of the most difficult objectives to achieve. However, at this point, before a 
more in-depth analysis of the civil society in Turkey, it should be noted that the EU was not 
the only mechanism that influenced the minority civil society organizations in Turkey. There 
were other mechanisms and developments that had an impact on the minority groups and the 
civil society organizations representing these minority groups. In the post-1980 context, it was 
easily detectable that a body of civil society had started to be formed.168 The most important 
among these were the loss of the legitimacy of the strong state tradition concurrently with the 
political liberalization after the 1980s, the Habitat conference in 1996 that brought together 
civil society organizations and the Marmara earthquake in 1999, which fostered the dialogue 
and collaboration between Turkish and Greek civil society organizations.169 Moreover, not 
only the EU but also other international donors such as the United Nations and World Bank 
frequently underlined the significance of civil society organizations for social and economic 
development and stressed the need for capacity-building of the civil society organizations in 
Turkey.170 All of these developments contributed to a vivid civil society sphere in Turkey 
however, it was the EU accession process that had the most profound effect. This is because 
the EU accession negotiations led to the changes in the legislation related to the civil society 
organizations and eliminating the restrictions on the freedom of organization and assembly. 
Additionally, the constraints on the international relations and international funding of these 
civil society organizations were removed, resulting in the flourishing of these civil society 
organizations both with respect to number and capacity. Finally, the technical and especially 
the financial assistance provided by the European Union for the civil society organizations in 
Turkey contributed to their capacity-building more than any other international donor as it can 
be seen in the following section.  	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The three military coups hampered the development of civil society in Turkey seriously. In 
fact, until the reform packages passed after the Helsinki decision, the civil society is depicted 
as passive and weak.171 Looking at the historical context, the first instance concerning the 
development of civil society organizations in the Turkish Republic can be traced back to 1946. 
The 1938 Law on Associations amended in 1946 introduced civil rights allowing for an 
increase in the number of associations, chambers and unions.172 Along with the newly 
established multi-party system, from 1950s onward many groups previously not represented 
within the political sphere found a voice within the new governance structures. Nevertheless, 
the civil society organizations established during the 1950s could not flourish as they were 
severely constrained by the government at the time. In fact, most of the time the state 
institutions preferred to follow a hostile policy towards these organizations following their 
criticisms of the government about the economic policies.173  
 
During the period 1960-1980, state control and oppression over civil society organizations 
continued in an increasing manner and reached its peak during the 1980 military intervention. 
Even though the 1961 Constitution reinforced the grounds for democratic practices and 
broadened the extent of fundamental freedoms, the positive atmosphere could not be 
maintained for long.174 In fact, the civil society organizations in the 1960s were mainly 
composed of professional chambers and trade unions that could be partially independent from 
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the state.175 This period is also characterized with the left-right polarization both within the 
general public and within the social movements. The 1961 constitution also included township 
or solidarity organizations along with professional chambers and trade unions as part of the 
civil society however after the military interventions of 1971 and 1980, civil society 
organizations once again lost their autonomy and only those organizations that adhered to the 
interests of the state could be established.  
 
The 1980 military coup was a significant setback and disruption in Turkey’s democratization 
process. The military regime had an adverse impact on all layers of society including the civil 
society organizations composed of youth organizations, students’ movements, unions, 
workers’ associations and social movements. Following the military coup, almost all civil 
society activities were prohibited and a significant segment of the organizations were closed 
down.176 The 1982 constitution that is still in use today significantly constrained the capacities 
and the resources of civil society organizations.177 For example, the 1982 constitution 
authorized the government to suspend and close down civil society organizations if it deems 
appropriate. Prior to the military intervention in 1980, there were around 40.000 active civil 
society organizations in Turkey and the military regime closed down more than half of these 
in less than two years.178  
 
The strong and coercive attitude of the state towards the civil society organizations in the 1980s 
caused them to remain underdeveloped and dependent on the state until the late 1990s. It is 
argued that such increase in the quantitative and the qualitative properties of civil society can 
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be tied to three factors: free market based economy, globalization and the identity claims of 
minorities.179 Yet, a number of developments in the second half of the 1990s can also be 
identified as important junctures that shaped the civil society in Turkey. The first of these is 
the 1996 Habitat Conference that took place in Istanbul with the participation of several civil 
society organizations from abroad. This conference is believed to have an awareness-raising 
effect on the Turkish public with respect to civil society activities. Secondly, the 28 February 
1997 coup strengthened the Islamist-secularist conflict causing even more fragmentation 
within civil society organizations. Finally, the twin earthquakes of 1999 in Turkey and Greece 
led to the implementation of the Turkey-Greece Civil Society Development Program by the 
EU. This program allowed for Greek-Turkish civic cooperation through the channeling of EU 
funds up to 8 million Euros until 2002.180 Additionally, the reemergence of the concept of civil 
society during the second half of the 1990s in Turkey cannot be evaluated independently from 
the global resurgence of the concept in the 1980s and 1990s. In this regard, both the academic 
and policy-oriented interest in civil society were influenced by each other.181 In conclusion, the 
economic and political liberalization policies in the post-1980 period, the dismantling of the 
strong state, the global interest in the concept of civil society and the discourses of international 
donors such as the EU, UN and World Bank all contributed to the reformation of the civil 
society sphere in Turkey as well.182 In this regard, particularly the second half of the 1990s and 
the post-Helsinki period is characterized by the upsurge of the civil society, establishment of 
new civil society organizations, increase in the number and resources and broadening the 
agendas of existing civil society organizations and the depiction of civil society as a key 
stakeholder in Turkey’s transition.183 
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2.6 Civil Society: Post-Helsinki Period 
In the post-Helsinki period after the adoption of the reform packages, the number of civil 
society organizations increased visibly along with the instruments provided to them by the EU. 
From the mid-1980s onward, the discourse developed in Turkey regarding the civil society 
reflected political dissent and opposition. In fact, it was one of the few means available to voice 
criticisms regarding the state practices.184 However, it can be argued that the EU accession 
process also changed the notion of civil society in Turkey. Over time, some of the civil society 
organizations started to consider that civil society is not only an opposition to the strong state 
but it can also contribute to policy-making. Onis argues that even though civil society 
organizations have become particularly active in pushing the government for further 
democratization, these efforts remained limited to business associations and corporations.185 In 
a similar vein both Seufert and Bozarslan claim that the civil society in Turkey was being used 
as a slogan and it is not possible to talk about a clear definition that is accepted by all segments 
of the society.186 Instead, groups located at different points in the political spectrum, such as 
the nationalists or the minority organizations and even minority groups, interpret the use of the 
term civil society differently from each other. TUSEV report portrays the civil society in 
Turkey with low levels of engagement, membership and donations however the participation 
of those involved in these civil society organizations are characterized as intense.187 This might 
be related to the history of the civil society in Turkey and the strong state tradition, high levels 
of oppression and pressure applied to civil society organizations both institutionally and 
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individually on the basis of the members. This is most apparent in the case of Human Rights 
Association, which had most of its members, administrators and those families reporting 
disappearances to the organization tortured and imprisoned during the 1990s.188 In fact, during 
the interviews IHD executives indicated that during the 1990s, they had their members lined 
up for administrator positions because each week someone would be taken into custody and 
they did not want to leave these managerial positions empty to show the Turkish state that they 
did not give up their struggle.189  
 
In spite of these different interpretations, after 2002 in accordance with the reform packages 
and the reforms regarding freedom of association not only the number of civil society 
organizations increased significantly but also the type of organizations and the content of their 
activities were particularly diversified.190 In fact, Yildirim and Heper argue that gradually the 
state and political / economic actors also acknowledged the significance of the civil society 
organizations for Turkey’s political and economic development.191 The perception developed 
from the 1980s onward regarding the civil society as a means of challenging the authoritarian 
state was complemented with the emergence of new claims of different groups marginalized 
in the past by the Kemalist state tradition to get involved in politics.192  
 
The legislation in Turkey specifies six major civil society organizations; foundations, 
associations, trade unions, chambers, cooperatives and federations and confederations. 
However, a detailed list of civil society organizations would also include faith-based 
organizations, human rights organizations, educational organizations, non-profit media, 
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women’s organizations, youth and student organizations, professional organizations, 
community groups, economically oriented organizations, cultural organizations, 
environmental organizations, ethnic minority organizations, religious minority organizations, 
grant-giving organizations, networks, platforms and initiatives and social movements. Some of 
these minor organizations such as platforms, initiatives, networks, movements or advocacy 
groups cannot be officially registered with the Department of Associations, as there are no 
current legal frameworks that govern the activities of voluntary organizations.193  
 
Both the associations and the foundations are subject to the Turkish Civil Code as well as the 
Law on Associations and Foundations in addition to Article 33 of the Constitution. There is no 
definition corresponding to civil society organizations in Turkey. Given the lack of a special 
categorization of civil society organizations within the legislation, those organizations founded 
by the state or that require involuntary membership are evaluated in the same manner as other 
voluntary, non-profit organizations. Other legislation governing the civil society organizations 
include the Law on Fund-Raising, the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations, Provisions on the 
Relations of Associations and Foundations with State Institutions and Organizations, the Press 
Law, related provisions within Turkish Penal Code and Law of Misdemeanor and all related 
tax laws.194 Regardless of the recent reforms enacted through the harmonization packages, 
there are still significant barriers before the free and effective functioning of civil society.  
 
The provisions of the Law on Associations stipulate that associations are membership-based 
organizations that can be established by at least seven real or legal persons who are required to 
work towards a legal and non-profit goal.195 In 2000, the total number of active associations in 	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Turkey was 60,931 whereas in 2013 the total number of active associations is 94,124.196 
According to this, the total number of associations increased approximately 50% during the 
last 10 years. As indicated in Figure 1, there is an increasing trend in the number of associations 
throughout the decade. The decrease in the number of associations in 2004 is related to the 
dissolution of a number of associations as required by the amendments to the Law on 
Associations.197 The data obtained from the Department of Associations indicate that the 
highest percentage of associations is registered in the Marmara region, followed by the Central 
Anatolian region where the capital is located. The lowest number of associations is in the 
Southeastern Anatolian region, parallel to the low levels of development in the region and the 
lowest population percentages. In addition, both southeastern and eastern regions where the 
population is predominantly Kurdish are characterized by police harassment, torture, 
unidentified murders and village evacuations which caused more than 2 million people 
internally displaced people to migrate to the Western cities throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. 
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Figure 3.  Total Number of Associations in Turkey (2000-2012)198 
 
 
The research conducted as part of this thesis demonstrated that the number of associations in 
Turkey significantly varies among different minority groups. According to the data collected, 
the total number of Roma associations is around 210 with 11 different federations199, whereas 
the Alevis have three different federations and the number of member associations in total is 
over 200 together with the branch organizations.200 The Caucasian groups, also one of the most 
populated groups, established two federations with member organizations up to 80.201 In 
addition, the Circassians recently established a separate Circassian Federation with 6 member 
associations.202 In addition, nine Abkhaz organizations established the Abkhaz Federation in 
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2011. The Laz associations comparatively are only four, whereas the Assyrians have five 
associations and there is only one Hamshen association that was recently established. In 
addition, there are also organizations that do not denote themselves as representing any 
minority group although they mainly focus on the issues of the Kurdish population living in 
the southeast. In fact, even though the Kurds have the biggest population in Turkey, the number 
of organizations that include the word “Kurdish” in their names does not exceed 20. In the 
same line, the number of Circassian organizations is 59 but most of them call themselves 
Caucasian organizations and the members include Georgian and Abkhazian groups as well. 
According to a recent decision given by the Caucasian Federation, the local Circassian 
organizations started changing their names from Caucasian to Circassian however the name of 
the federation stayed as the Caucasian Federation.203  
 
According to a study conducted in 2011 by the Turkish Third Sector Foundation (TUSEV) as 
part of a Civil Society Index Project (STEP), the total number of associations constitute 56.01% 
of the total number of the major civil society organizations defined by the Turkish legislation 
where as the total number of foundations correspond to 2.96%.204 These include both the newly 
established foundations and the non-Muslim minority foundations that will be discussed below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Telephone interview with Bursa Circassian Cultural Association President Filiz Celik on 25.08.2011.  
204 Icduygu et al. 28. 
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Table 2. Civil Society Organizations in Turkey205 
TYPE OF CSOS TOTAL NUMBER % OF THE TOTAL  
Associations 86,031 56.01 
Chambers 4,749 3.09 
Foundations 4,547 2.96 
Trade Unions 94 0.06 
Civil Servant Trade Unions 93 0.06 
 
The difference in the number of associations and foundations can be tied to the differences 
between the conditions for establishing an association and a foundation. Foundations can be 
founded by real or legal persons, on the condition that private resources are allocated to public 
benefit.206 Therefore in order to establish a foundation, the founders are required to register a 
certain immovable property under the name of that foundation. The foundations in Turkey can 
be divided into two groups: new foundations established after 2002 and non-Muslim minority 
foundations that were established prior to 1923.207 Furthermore, the new foundations cannot 
be established with the aim of supporting a certain racial or religious group.  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Ibid, 28.  
206 Law No. 4721 of 22 November 2001, The Turkish Civil Code, Resmi Gazete (R.G.) (Official Gazette of 
Turkey), 08 December 2001, No. 24607. 
207 Law No. 4721, Article 101. 
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Table 3. Total Number of Foundations in Turkey (1999-2011)208 
YEAR (1999 – 2011) NUMBER OF FOUNDATIONS 
1999 4,471 
2000 4,556 
2001 4,563 
2002 4,530 
2003 4,501 
2004 4,443 
2005 4,416 
2006 4,402 
2007 4,404 
2008 4,450 
2009 4,471 
2010 4,526 
2011 4,603 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Directorate General of Foundations, New Foundations Statistics, “New Foundations Across Years”, 
http://www.vgm.gov.tr/icerik.aspx?Id=192. First downloaded on 24.01.2012.  
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Figure 4. Total Number of Foundations in Turkey (1980-2011)209 
 
 
As evident from Table 3 and Figure 4, the total number of foundations increased during the 
last 30 years even though the slope of the line is much more steep between 1987 and 2002. The 
foundations demonstrated in these figures are established after 1980 in accordance with the 
Turkish Civil Code. In addition there are also non-Muslim religious minority foundations 
established in line with the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The non-Muslim 
minority foundations refer to those foundations that were established by the Greek Orthodox, 
Armenian, Jewish, Bulgarian, Maronite, Chaldean and Assyrian minorities prior to the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey. After the Turkish Republic was founded, these 
foundations went under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of Foundations with the adoption of 
the new Law on Foundations in 1935 and they were registered with the Directorate through a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Ibid.  
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declaration stating their private resources and the list of immovable property in 1936.210 They 
are legal entities and they can acquire property. They can also hold their own elections for 
board members. As mentioned above, currently the Law on Foundations does not allow the 
non-Muslim minority groups to establish new foundations in the same manner as it is still 
forbidden to establish foundations with the aim to support any racial or religious group.  
Table 4. Total Number of Non-Muslim Minority Foundations in Turkey211 
City Name Maronite Assyrian Chaldean Armenian Greek Orthodox Jewish Bulgarian 
Mersin 1       
Ankara      1  
Canakkale     6 1  
Sirnak  1      
Bursa      1  
Diyarbakir  1 1 1    
Mardin  6 1 1    
Edirne       1 
Kirklareli      1  
Antakya    3 7 2  
Istanbul  1 1 47 63 12 1 
Izmir      1  
Kayseri    1    
Elazig  1      
Total 1 10 3 53 76 19 2 
 
As shown in Table 4, the total number of non-Muslim minority foundations currently registered 
with the Department of Foundations is 164. The Greek Orthodox foundations have the highest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Grigoriadis, 33; Law No. 2762 of 5 June 1935, Resmi Gazete (R.G.) (Official Gazette of Turkey), 13 June 
1935, No. 3027. 
211 Directorate General of Foundations, Religious Minority Foundations Statistics, “Minority Foundations 
According to Type of Minority and City/Towns”, http://www.vgm.gov.tr/icerik.aspx?Id=192, first downloaded 
on 24.01.2012. 
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number, making up approximately 46% of the total number of non-Muslim foundations. The 
Greek Orthodox foundations are ranked just above the Armenian foundations with 32.3%. 135 
of these non-Muslim foundations are established in the Marmara region, 13 in the 
Mediterranean region and 12 in the southeastern Anatolia. These numbers can be explained by 
looking at the current situation of non-Muslim minorities. As it will be elaborated further in 
the second section of this chapter, almost 90% of the non-Muslim minorities living in Anatolia 
left Turkey mostly involuntarily between 1915 and 1965 as a result of the oppressive practices 
of the Turkish state including the executions during the 1915 Armenian Genocide. Most of the 
remaining population either originally resided in Istanbul or migrated to Istanbul following the 
attacks and looting by the Turkish authorities or the majority Turkish population in the cities 
where they originally lived.212 
Figure 5. Total Number of Non-Muslim Minority Foundations in Turkey213 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 The critical junctures for the mass deportation of non-Muslim minorities can be summarized as the 1915 
Genocide, 1933 attacks on Jews in Trachia, 6-7 September 1955 attacks on Greek Orthodox, 1948 foundation of 
Israel and escalating anti-Semitism throughout 1940s, 1945 Tax Law and labor camps of Askale, 1933 and 1968 
attacks towards the Assyrians living in Mardin.  
213 Directorate General of Foundations, Religious Minority Foundations Statistics, “Number of Non-Muslim 
Minority Foundations across Geographical Regions”, http://www.vgm.gov.tr/icerik.aspx?Id=192, first 
downloaded on 24.01.2012. 
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Finally, the other types of civil society organizations included in this research are federations, 
confederations, platforms, initiatives, networks, trade unions, professional unions, chambers, 
business associations and think tanks. According to the Law on Associations, federations are 
legal entities that can be established when five organizations come together with same 
objective. Confederations can be formed when three or more federations sharing the same 
objective come together. Both the federations and the confederations have the same legal status 
with the associations. Currently in Turkey there are around 19 confederations and 432 
federations, with 7348 member associations.214 The Law on Associations and the Law on 
Foundations also state that the associations, foundations or other civil society organizations 
may come together with other civil society organizations to form platforms in order to realize 
a common objective.215 However, platforms are not legal entities therefore they are identified 
as temporary organizations.  
 
Unlike the foundations, human resources and membership numbers determine the 
characteristics of the associations in Turkey. In fact, most of the associations especially the 
branch organizations reported membership fees as their main source of income during the 
interviews conducted as part of this research. Nevertheless, the percentage of members of an 
association is extremely low when compared with EU member states such as Sweden where 
more than 85% of the population is a member of a civil society organization.216 In Turkey the 
total percentage of the members of associations to the population of Turkey is 11.85% and of 
these 2.15% are women and 9.7% are men.217  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Icduygu et al., 42.   
215 Ibid, 29. 
216 Government Offices of Sweden. “Policy for civil society: Research and Statistics”, 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/14291/a/173356. First downloaded on 25.01.2012. 
217 Department of Associations, “Statistics for Associations in Turkey: The Ratio of Association Members to the 
General Population in Turkey”, downloaded at 
http://www.dernekler.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=52&Itemid=12
&lang=tr. First downloaded on 24.01.2012. 
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Figure 6. Membership in Associations218  
 
According to the TUSEV survey conducted with members of different civil society 
organizations, the membership of women and minorities as well as lower income groups in 
civil society organizations is much more limited when compared with higher income groups.219 
57.4% of civil society representatives surveyed described the membership levels of different 
ethnic minorities as below normal where as 13% think they do not exist at all and that they are 
marginalized from the civil society spectrum.220 According to the same study, 52.9% of the 
surveyed civil society organization representatives think that the membership levels of 
religious minorities are below normal where as 15.1% think that they are marginalized and are 
almost invisible within these organizations.221 
 
On the other hand, according to a World Values Survey (WVS) conducted in 2007 with a 
sample group of 1346 people, the majority of the population in Turkey does not actively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Data gathered through the official response of the Department of Associations, Ministry of Internal Affairs in 
response to the request to obtain information about associations in Turkey upon the Law on the Right to Obtain 
Information. Official reply received from the Department of Associations on 18.05.2012. 
219 Filiz Bikmen and Zeynep Meydanoglu, eds. 2006. “The Civil Society in Turkey: An Era of Transition.” 
TUSEV. Istanbul: TUSEV Publications, 48.  
220 Bikmen and Meydanoglu, 51.  
221 Ibid, 51. 
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participate in the civil society.222 The data collected show that the levels of volunteering, 
membership, activism and engagement are fairly low. According to the surveys conducted with 
the minority organizations as part of this thesis, an important portion of the minority 
organizations surveyed stated that they do not have paid employees but rather operate on a 
volunteer basis and almost 90% of their annual budget is composed of membership fees and 
donations. In other words, the levels of membership in minority organizations are 
comparatively higher when compared with other civil society organizations. This might be tied 
to the fact that most of these organizations represent a certain group and their members are also 
the members of that particular minority group. Moreover, the CIVICUS Country Report 
published in 2011 shows the level of engagement of ethnic minorities in civil society 
organizations in Turkey. The data within the study reveals that ethnic minorities prefer to 
participate in civil society activities in an individual capacity and therefore demonstrate high 
levels of involvement in solidarity organizations.223  
 
The civil society organizations in Turkey are not only fragmented in terms of their types but 
also in terms of their concentration areas. Table 5 shows the different concentration areas for 
the associations and the changes in their numbers over the years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 For more see World Values Survey. 2007. “Turkey Online Data Analysis, Section Perception of Life” at 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeIndex.jsp. First downloaded on 28.03.2011. 
223 Icduygu et al., 46-47 
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Table 5. Concentration Areas of Associations (1999-2012)224 
Concentration Area 1999 2004 2007 2012 
Social services to enhance religious services 13774 14143 14590 15890 
Social solidarity associations 4718 8303 12760 15881 
Sporting clubs 8703 10279 13187 15708 
Development 5924 8215 8547 10266 
Professional Associations and Education  5314 7000 7671 9215 
Improving and Supporting Social Life 12470 9258 5921 6468 
Friendship associations 1423 2096 3577 4181 
Culture 1630 2552 2805 4000 
Health 2059 1812 1824 2071 
Environment 473 781 1192 1671 
Social 760 920 1139 1665 
Construction 1674 1675 1515 1377 
Civil rights and advocacy 396 641 744 854 
Youth 90 207 495 780 
Other 2263 1192 256 445 
Women’s organizations 60 82 150 358 
Student organizations 180 210 284 339 
International activities 27 45 68 76 
 
On the other hand, most of the foundations in Turkey focus on social solidarity and education 
while the number of foundations concentrating on democracy and human rights is as low as 
0.6%. This might be related to the pressure exerted by the government on those organizations 
that work on human rights and also the fact that only recently, as a result of the reforms it was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Data gathered through the official reply of the Department of Associations, Ministry of Internal Affairs in 
response to the request to obtain information about associations in Turkey derived from the Law on the Right to 
Obtain Information. Official reply received from the Department of Associations on 18.05.2012. 
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possible to establish civil society organizations that can concentrate on the minority issue. In 
fact, during the fieldwork most of the organizations refrained from describing themselves as a 
minority organization but rather claimed that they concentrate on cultural issues.  
Table 6.  Concentration Areas of Foundations225 
CONCENTRATION AREA NUMBER OF FOUNDATIONS 
SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 2540 
EDUCATION 2236 
HEALTH 1029 
CULTURE 997 
RELIGION – RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 749 
ARTS 378 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 371 
SPORTS 355 
SOCIAL SERVICE 329 
ECONOMIC 255 
SCIENCE – TECHNOLOGY 234 
SOCIO HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL 202 
ENVIRONMENT 186 
EMPLOYEE SUPPORT 156 
TOURISM 96 
DEMOCRACY – RULE OF LAW – HUMAN RIGHTS 59 
DISABLED GROUPS 49 
AGRICULTURE 45 
CHILDREN 38 
FAMILY 29 
KEMALIST PRINCIPLES AND REFORMS 27 
PRESS – JOURNALISM 24 
WOMEN 14 
MARITIME 12 
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 11 
ARCHITECTURE – ENGINEERING 10 
TRAFFIC 9 
MARTYRS – VETERANS 8 
LIBRARIANSHIP 6 
HUNTING 3 
MINING 3 
CONSUMER PROTECTION 3 
 
In addition to this, both the Department of Associations and the General Directorate of 
Foundations do not distinguish between minority rights and human rights, the numbers of civil 
society organizations working on minority rights or representing different minority groups are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Directorate General of Foundations, New Foundations Statistics, “The Distribution of New Foundations 
According to Their Aims”, http://www.vgm.gov.tr/icerik.aspx?Id=192. First downloaded on 24.01.2012. 
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not fully accurate.226 Moreover, there are no extensive studies concerning the membership 
levels in these organizations. As part of the surveys conducted for this thesis, the data 
concerning the number of volunteers in the organizations surveyed is provided in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis demonstrating the participation levels among different minority groups.  
 
The type of activities organized and the projects implemented by civil society organizations 
differ according to their concentration areas. For example, while social solidarity or charity 
organizations mostly prefer to organize social gatherings and activities, advocacy organizations 
hold press conferences and petition drives. According to a study conducted by the Yasama Dair 
Foundation (YADA) between 2007 and 2010, the type of activities organized by different civil 
society organizations and their percentage levels are shown in Table 7. The minority groups 
surveyed within this research mostly expressed that the type of activities they organize aim to 
preserve and promote the culture, language and the identity of their communities. In order to 
achieve this objective, the type of activities includes concerts, language courses, cultural 
activities, demonstrations, press conferences, publications and festivals. In addition, they also 
reported organizing panels, conferences and meetings with European civil society 
organizations, delegations, journalists and politicians.  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 The findings related to the number of minority organizations in Turkey will be provided in the Fifth Chapter 
of this thesis. The data presented are collected throughout the fieldwork conducted between June 2011 and 
February 2012.  
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Table 7. Types of Activities Organized by Foundations and Associations227 
Type of Activity Percentage (%) 
Social activities 66.1 
Dinner party for members 63.1 
Meetings with renowned people 50.1 
Meetings with local newspapers 41.6 
Meetings with parliament members 39.3 
Panel, conference, symposium events 38.3 
Meetings with local TV channels 33.7 
Press conferences 30.0 
Sending activity reports to public authorities 27.2 
Meetings with national TV channels and 
newspapers 
24.8 
Sports activities 24.8 
Commemorations 24.6 
Arts and culture activities 18.9 
Scientific publications 17.7 
Scientific research 15.5 
Charity sales 13.3 
Petition drives 12.3 
Constructing schools, mosques, parks 10.1 
Demonstrations and marches 9.2 
Other street events 6.7 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Mesut Yegen  et al. 2010. “Civil Society Culture in the Voluntary Organizations”, YADA Publications: 62-63; 
Icduygu et al., 100. 
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For civil society organizations in Turkey, the lack of financial capacities and human resources 
may be identified as the most important problem. Not only the financial resources are scarce 
and hard to obtain but also the number of paid employees is really low. According to the 
Department of Association Statistics of 2009, 57% of civil society organizations do not have 
any paid staff.228 The number of civil society organizations with 1-5 paid staff is 23% where 
as only 14% of the total number of organizations stated they employ paid staff between 6-20.229 
Almost all minority representatives interviewed for the purposes of this research suggested that 
they only operate on principles of volunteerism and that they do not have any financial 
resources to hire paid staff. In addition to this, most of the grant-giving institutions do not allow 
civil society organizations to use the allocated funding for human resources.230 Therefore, the 
organizations are particularly dependent on volunteers and members.  
 
Following this, it should be highlighted that perhaps the most urgent problem faced by the civil 
society organizations is the issue of sustainability. The main source of funding for the Turkish 
civil society organizations is the European Union. As it will be elaborated further in the 
following sections, the EU grants are hard to obtain as they require certain skills including 
competence in English, previous experience and capacities that would ensure the effective 
implementation of the project activities such as paid project coordinators, treasurer, project 
advisors etc. Secondly, the financial resources other than EU funds are really scarce and the 
process for grant applications is not transparent as indicated by many interviewees.231 Thirdly, 
the lack of human resources and limited experience is a major disadvantage during the 
application process that turns into a vicious circle as expressed by many civil society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Icduygu et al., 40-44. 
229 Ibid, 44. 
230 Personal interview conducted in Istanbul with Mesopotamia Culture Association, 25 September 2012.  
231 Personal interviews conducted in Diyarbakir with the mayor of Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality Osman 
Baydemir and the mayor of Sur Municipality in Diyarbakir, Abdullah Demirbas. 11 January 2012.  
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representatives.232 In order to overcome these challenges, some civil society organizations hire 
external advisors or consulting companies to prepare project applications but these external 
companies charge between 2000 and 5000 Euros, which makes it harder for civil society 
organizations to pay their fees. In addition to this, the qualified staff competent in English and 
that has in-depth knowledge of EU processes demand high salaries that the civil society 
organizations are again unable to pay.  
 
According to the results of a survey conducted by TUSEV with 146 civil society organizations 
within seven cities around Turkey, it was discovered that 34% of their financial resources are 
membership fees, 18% are individual donations, 18% are received from foreign donors, 8% are 
private sector funds, 6% are government funds and 5% are service fees.233 Similarly, according 
to the findings of the YADA survey, 44.6% of the voluntary organizations surveyed indicated 
that their annual budget is below 5,000 Euros while 28.3% of the organizations stated their 
annual budget is between 5,000 and 25,000 Euros.234 According to the surveys conducted with 
minority organizations as part of this thesis, the minority associations and foundations except 
the major federations and those organizations that obtained one or more EU grant from the 
European Commission denoted their annual budget as below 10.000 Euros. In addition to this, 
since the local branches of Alevi or Caucasian federations are required to send 70% of the 
collected membership fees to their main branch office while some of these organizations are 
not allowed to apply for EU funding.235 Therefore, most of the time their human resources and 
financial resources remain below the average numbers and their activities are confined to 
advocacy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Personal interviews conducted in Adana, Mersin, Mardin and Diyarbakir with civil society organizations.  
233 Third Sector Foundation (TUSEV). 2010. “Sivil Toplum Değerlendirme Raporu Ekim 2009 – Eylül 2010” 
(Civil Society Evaluation Report October 2009-September 2010), TUSEV Publications: 3. 
234 Mesut Yegen et al., 147.   
235 Personal interview with Isa Elagoz, Adana Circassian Cultural Association on 20.07.2011 and with Adana 
Alevi Cultural Association on 18.07.2011. 
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The funds available for civil society organizations in Turkey can be classified into two groups: 
national and international grants. International grant giving institutions provide a significant 
amount of funding for the civil society organizations in Turkey. In fact, the total amount of 
foreign funding obtained by the associations in Turkey between 2008 and 2009 is 31 million 
Euros, 1.48 million US Dollars, 4.300 Norwegian Krone, 40.500 Australian Dollars, 376.000 
British Pounds, 142.000 Swiss Francs, 1.8 million Swedish Krona, 4.9 million Danish Krone 
and 291.000 Canadian Dollars.236 In addition to this, the total amount of foreign grants secured 
by the foundations in Turkey is approximately 34 million Euros in 2009 and around 15 million 
Euros in 2010.237 For the Turkish case, the highest amount of funding to the Turkish civil 
society is allocated by the European Union. In addition to the European Union, various 
embassies and consulates, private international foundations including the National Endowment 
for Democracy based in USA or the German foundations such as Freidrich Ebert Foundation 
or Konrad Adenauer Foundation, United Nations, the World Bank and other international grant 
giving institutions (Olof Palme Center, Open Society Institute, Anna Lindh Foundation, Global 
Dialogue Foundation etc.) are among the organizations that provide large scale funding to the 
civil society organizations in Turkey.  
 
The total amount of EU funding provided to the foundations and associations within the 
framework of civil society dialogue between 2003 and 2010 is 11.264.479,82 Euros,238 while 
the EU allocated a total of 21.5 million Euros within the framework of the Civil Society 
Dialogue Program since 2006.239  Comparatively, in 2011 only nine civil society organizations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Ersen et al., 38-39. 
237 Ibid, 38. 
238 Ibid, 35-36. 
239 Delegation of the European Union to Turkey. “EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue.” Downloaded from 
http://www.avrupa.info.tr/de/eu-and-civil-society/civil-society-dialogue/eu-turkey-civil-society- 
dialogue.html, on 06.01.2012. 
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were provided with direct funding by American private foundations and grant giving 
institutions in the amount of 1,550,776 US Dollars.240 Among these organizations there are 
women’s human rights organizations, research institutes, organizations working on arts and 
culture and even charity organizations. The total amount of funding received by Turkish civil 
society organizations between 2003-2012 from the grant-giving organization located in USA 
is 4,282,531 US Dollars.241 As mentioned previously, some of the funding granted to the 
Turkish civil society organizations is from the foreign embassies and consulates in Turkey. 
Among these, the most prominent are the Matra-Kap program of the Dutch Embassy, Swedish 
Development Agency and the smaller scale grants given by Japanese, Australian, American, 
Canadian, Finnish and British Embassies.  
 
There are significant regional differences in terms of the diversity of foreign funds. While the 
Marmara region is highest in terms of receiving foreign funding and scores visibly higher than 
the country average, the Mediterranean region receives the lowest amount of foreign funding. 
The Black Sea region ranks the second highest due to the funding provided through additional 
programs such as European Neighborhood Policy or the Black Sea Basin Program in addition 
to the EU funds generally available.  As shown in Figure 5, the lowest percentages of EU 
funding are received by the civil society organizations in the Aegean and the Mediterranean 
regions. One explanation for such a discrepancy might be the type of funding provided by the 
EU. The main programs under the EU funding schemes for Turkey focus on the strengthening 
of the civil society in order to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. Moreover, most of the civil 
society organizations obtain grants targeting issues such as environment, human rights, 
minority rights, rule of law, democracy, culture and arts, women’s rights and civil society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Foundation Center, Interactive Map of Direct Grants by US Grantmakers to non-US recipients, Turkey, 
http://fconline.foundationcenter.org/maps/CountryNumber.php?map=TR&unit=Turkey&y0=All. First 
downloaded on 01.02.2012. 
241 Ibid. 
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dialogue. Given this, the civil society organizations concentrating on social and political 
problems become the recipients of the core amounts of EU funding whereas smaller 
organizations that tend to focus on social services, vocational training, educational activities, 
youth and solidarity remain disconnected from these programs. Another explanation related to 
this might be the EU’s emphasis on human rights and democratization as it is one of the major 
barriers before Turkey’s accession and therefore there are specific funding programs dedicated 
to these issues. Most of the time, the EU funds are received by those organizations that 
represent the different minority groups or other disadvantaged groups or concentrate on 
minority rights that can satisfy the necessary conditions and minimum requirements. As 
minority groups in the Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia are more populated and diverse than 
those in the Mediterranean and Aegean regions, the civil society organizations located in these 
regions receive grants either as principal organization or partner and associates. In addition to 
this, the level of relations with international organizations and especially with European Union 
representatives are much higher for civil society organizations located in southeastern and 
eastern Anatolia when compared with other cities except Istanbul and Ankara.  
Figure  7. Geographical Distribution of Foreign Funding242 
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Figure 8. International Relations243  
 
As demonstrated in Figure 6, the highest percentages of international linkages are of those 
organizations located in Ankara, Southeastern Anatolia and Istanbul. The civil society 
organizations with the highest capacity and highest levels of financial and human resources are 
located in Ankara and Istanbul therefore the results obtained for the civil society organizations 
located within these cities are not surprising. However, the most striking result is of 
Southeastern Anatolian region that scored lower than the country average for the levels of 
foreign funding but has the second highest level of dialogue with foreign institutions. The high 
levels of human rights violations in the region as well as the demographic diversity can explain 
this. In terms of minority groups, Southeastern Anatolia is the most diverse region hosting 
minority groups such as the Kurds, Ezidis, Arabs, Mhelmis, Alevis, Zaza, Doms, Mitrips, 
Assyrians, Armenians and Protestants. Moreover, the Christian minorities, Kurds, Ezidis and 
Alevis settled in the region have close contacts with diaspora organizations in Europe. In 
addition to this, since the human rights violations in the region are reported to be much higher 
than other regions since the 1960s, most of the time European delegations and political party 	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representatives visit the civil society organizations located in the region for the purposes of 
obtaining objective and realistic information pertaining to the situation of minorities and the 
Kurdish question. For instance, in December 2010 ambassadors and delegations of various EU 
countries visited the civil society organizations in Southern and Southeastern Anatolia for 
obtaining information about the current problems in these regions.244 In light of these, it is 
plausible to conclude that the levels of international linkages of the civil society organizations 
in Southeastern Anatolia might be higher than most of the other regions. In fact, according to 
an article published in 2011, the mayors of Diyarbakir and Sur, Osman Baydemir and Abdullah 
Demirbaş were the most visited two political figures in Turkey, which was also criticized by 
Prime Minister Erdogan.245 
 
Apart from foreign funds there are also smaller amounts of national grants provided by 
different state and governmental institutions. The most infamous among these is the Prime 
Ministry Social Beneficiary and Solidarity Fund provided under the auspices of the Prime 
Ministry for those foundations providing services to distribute social aid. The second type of 
funding provided by the Prime Ministry is the Social Support Program (SODES), which 
allocates funding to the civil society organizations and the state institutions registered in eastern 
and southeastern Anatolia. Within the framework of the SODES program 64.686.785 TL was 
granted for 516 different projects implemented by civil society organizations between 2008-
2010.246 However, there are many problems related to the SODES program. First of all, the 
obvious discrepancy between the beneficiaries (public institutions and civil society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Personal interview conducted with the Minority President of the Jewish Community in Adana, 09.12.2011 and 
personal interview with Osman Baydemir.  
245 “Yabancilarin en cok sevdigi ikili (The pair loved most by foreigners)”, Gazete Diyarbakır, 10 January 2012 
downloaded at http://www.gazetediyarbakir.com/haber-2324-Yabancilarin-en-cok-sevdigi-ikili.html, on 
10.01.2012. 
246 SODES Statistics based on cities and the total amount of funding, available at 
http://www.sodes.gov.tr/SODES.portal. First downloaded on 05.02.2012. 
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organizations) makes it harder for small-scale civil society organizations to obtain funding 
from the program. Secondly, the decision making process is not transparent given that the first 
elimination is conducted by the Governorships in those cities where the application is made. 
As underlined by many interviewees, those organizations that have close relations with the 
government and the local governorships tend to get more than one of their projects accepted 
whereas those organizations including municipalities that are held by the pro-Kurdish party 
cannot benefit from the program at all.247 The data also shows that only 22% of the total funding 
was received by the civil society organizations between 2008 and 2010 whereas the rest was 
received by the public institutions such as the provincial directorates for education or police 
departments as well as mosques, elementary schools and even the governorships themselves.248  
 
Other funding provided by national public institutions include grants given by the Ministry of 
Family and Social Policies, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Affairs, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce as well as the Regional 
Development Agencies. Nevertheless most of the time, a significant portion of the funding 
provided by these bodies is granted to other public institutions instead of civil society 
organizations. In addition to these, some of the EU grants provided within the framework of 
the IPA program are granted through the Central Finance and Contracts Unit under the auspices 
of the Prime Ministry Undersecretary of Treasury and the ministries mentioned above. In these 
cases, civil society organizations are obliged to apply to the national institutions responsible 
for allocating the funds instead of applying directly to the European Commission or the 
European Commission Delegation in Ankara. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Personal interview conducted with Abdullah Demirbas. 
248 SODES Statistics. 
	   110	  
The relations between the civil society organizations and the state are still limited due to the 
history of hostility and oppression towards the civil society organizations. First of all, there are 
significant problems before the freedom of associations in practice including high rates of fines, 
the random use of the Anti-Terror Law, problems concerning the inspections of civil society 
organizations as well as continued harassment of civil society organizations by the police, army 
and other state institutions. According to a survey conducted by TUSEV for the assessment of 
the civil society in Turkey, 50% of the organizations surveyed claimed that the state conducts 
unjustifiable inspections from time to time.249 In the same study, only 13% of the participating 
organizations described the civil society in Turkey as free and 26% indicated that they came 
across illegal restrictions by state institutions during their establishment. In fact, to give an 
example during the interviews conducted as part of this thesis both the representatives of a 
Circassian organization in Northwestern Turkey and a Mhelmi organization in Southeastern 
Turkey were being tried for including the words ‘Circassian’ and ‘Mhelmi’ in their founding 
statutes even though such a use does not breach any of the laws that govern civil society 
organizations.250  
 
According to the TUSEV study, 68% of the participating organizations stated that state-civil 
society dialogue only exists between the state and some civil society organizations.251 In the 
same survey only 3% indicated that there was institutionalized and large-scale civil society-
state dialogue.252 The situation is even more complicated for minority organizations. Among 
the minority organizations surveyed only Arab and some Roma organizations expressed high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Ersen et al., 27. 
250 Interviews conducted with Gulay Dogan, Sima Foundation President on 26.08.2011 and Mehmet Ali Aslan, 
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251 Ersen et al., 27. 
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rates of cooperation with state institutions.253 Other organizations such as non-Muslims, 
Caucasians, Laz and Pomaks pointed to a very limited dialogue mostly at the local level, while 
others representing Alevis or Kurds claimed that they had no contact at all with state 
representatives or governmental bodies. Finally, there are significant problems concerning the 
tax laws applied to the civil society organizations. Only 0.5% of the civil society organizations 
in Turkey are exempt from paying taxes since they are classified as working for the public 
interest. Given this, an important amount of the funding received by the civil society 
organizations is being reduced for taxation purposes while there are high fines for failing to 
comply with the rules related to tax regulations.  
 
As it has been discussed in this section, the scholarly focus on civil society as an agent of social 
change in the post-1980 period gradually increased due to the factors explained above. These 
academic works ranged from the analysis of the sociological aspects of civil society to 
membership levels in civil society organizations, from the impact of international donors to the 
specific influence of the EU accession process as well as the different segments of Turkish 
civil society sphere.254 These studies consider the civil society as separate from the state and 
most of them tend to focus on the civil society as a key stakeholder in social and economic 
development of Turkey parallel to the EU accession process. In terms of the challenges faced 
by the civil society organizations in Turkey, the previous literature mostly concentrates on the 
autonomy and capacity of these organizations by evaluating the resources available to them, 
their impact on the legislation, their relations with other organizations, European and 
international actors, local, regional and national governments as well as their levels of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Interviews conducted with Sukru Kirboga, Arab Association President on 08.05.2012 and Mediterranean Roma 
Associations Federation Representative in Adana on 15.12.2011. 
254 For more see Gole 1994; Toprak 1996; Yerasimos et al. 2000; Kubicek 2002 and 2005; Keyman and Icduygu 
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Jacoby 2005; Icduygu 2007; Alemdar 2008; Toros 2007; Kaliber and Tocci 2010; Onbasi 2010; Ketola 2011, 
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institutionalization. In all of these studies, civil society and state are considered as distinct from 
each other as forces of representation. However, as argued by Ruzza and Buzzini, also in the 
Turkish case, the institutional and representation capacities of civil society organizations and 
their approach towards the national and international actors vary. For example, while trade 
unions and business associations find it more useful to establish direct relations with the 
national government, most of the minority organizations examined in this thesis, find it useful 
to approach European actors. In contrast, some of the minority organizations such as the Arabs 
in Urfa and the Roma in general prefer to contact the national government about their problems. 
Another important critique of the civil society in Turkey was the vague use of the concept by 
different set of actors. This is also relevant to the criticism of the EU’s civil society policy, 
which considers all civil society organizations as homogeneous. The civil society sphere in 
Turkey is highly fragmented and heterogeneous in terms of ideological preferences, aims, 
attitudes towards the Turkish state and the EU as well as their institutional and representation 
capacities. While some organizations are merely established as hometown associations with 
the aim to disassociate themselves from political parties255, other organizations such as the 
Human Rights Association or Turkish Human Rights Foundation have specific objectives to 
change the legislation regarding the human rights policies in Turkey and therefore try to get 
involved in politics.256  
 
In relation to the autonomy problematique, while Gole argued that an autonomous civil society 
points to the eradication of state power leading to a political sphere that is not identical to state 
actors only, Navaro-Yashin proposed that the growth of civil society in Turkey might not 
necessarily mean autonomy from the state but a change in the form of the relationship between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Hersant and Toumarkine 2005, p.5. 
256 Personal interview with Human Rights Association in Adana and Turkish Human Rights Foundation in 
Diyarbakir. 
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the state and civil society.257 This argument is relevant for the purposes of this thesis and the 
Turkish case because it prioritizes taking the way that these actors mobilize as the basis of the 
assessment of the relationship between state and civil society. Following this, I argue that the 
civil society in Turkey especially with respect to minority organizations should be considered 
from the perspective of the mobilization of these minority actors and their engagement with 
European actors. This entails focusing not only on the state-civil society relations but also on 
the EU as an additional axis influencing this relationship therefore leading to the inclusion of 
civil society organizations in decision-making through consultation and lobbying. This is why 
the minority issue constitutes a good example because of the state’s historical stance against 
the minorities. Such a position requires looking at the mobilization of minority organizations 
not only focusing on their relations with the state but also with other actors, national or 
international. Secondly, examining minority organizations in Turkey constitutes an interesting 
case because of the cleavages and stratifications within these minority organizations. Even 
though existing studies concentrate on human rights organizations258, women’s 
organizations259, environmentalist organizations260 as well as Kurdish organizations261 and 
religious minority organizations262, there is still a need to reflect upon the mobilization of 
minority groups through the civil society sphere as a result of their increased engagement with 
the EU and their role in decision-making, which varies across minority groups. I argue that the 
cleavages among those civil society organizations working on the same issue, which is minority 
rights in this case, would contribute to understanding which factors determine the levels of 
mobilization, the scope of the relations with national and international actors and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Gole 1994, 203; Yashin-Navaro 2002, 132. 
258 Plagemann 2000. 
259 Arat 1994. 
260 Adaman and Arsel 2005; Adem 2008.  
261 Kaliber and Tocci 2010. 
262 Grigoriadis 2009. 
	   114	  
participation in decision-making for these minority civil society organizations as a result of 
their engagement with the EU.  
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This thesis is based on the assertion that a greater role for civil society has been the main 
component of the EU accession process. In this chapter, I identified the conceptual and 
historical development of the civil society, especially in the European context and how this 
framework is related to the role of civil society organizations that aspire to be a part of the 
decision-making processes. The increasing role of civil society are particularly significant 
given that the EU itself sees civil society and non-state or private actors as a mechanism that 
facilitates the diffusion of European norms to the domestic level much faster. Such an enhanced 
role of the civil society organizations is also evident in the White Paper on Governance 
published by the European Commission in 2001. In this regard, this chapter identified the 
distinguishing characteristics of civil society organizations that have emerged; particularly, in 
the 2000s to overcome the legitimacy and democratic deficit problems of the EU. 
 
The mobilization of the civil society organizations in Turkey is particularly relevant to the 
availability of new political resources as a result of the Europeanization process. In this sense, 
the EU tries to generate change and transformation in Turkey through the mobilization of civil 
society organizations by providing them with the financial, political and the professional 
capacities. In this context, the issue of minority rights provides an opportunity to illustrate the 
empowerment of civil society organizations and whether these organizations have a practical 
role within domestic interactive processes. Derived from this, the empirical findings provide a 
good case to test for the transformative effect of Europeanization in Turkey and its impacts 
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particularly for the mobilization of and increased role for civil society organizations. The 
minority issue is especially of relevance given its controversial character and the diversity of 
the actors within the civil society spectrum.  
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Chapter 3  
Minority Rights in the Context of Modern Turkey 
 
The first time that the term ‘minority’, which in essence refers to linguistic, ethnic, religious, 
or racial groups, was mentioned in an international setting was at the 1919 Paris Peace 
Conference. However, the minority issue could gain a universal character only after the Second 
World War following the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. Nevertheless, none of 
these developments were able to produce the outcomes that would lead to the creation of an 
international minority rights regime until the end of the Cold War, when the salience of the 
subject increased once again. Despite such a historical background that can be traced back to 
the beginning of the 20th century, the international minority protection rules and standards are 
still much less developed in comparison to other human rights issues.  
 
By contrast, the attempts to develop new minority protection mechanisms particularly across 
Europe during the 1990s along with the increased deliberation on the minority issue in Eastern 
Europe did not have an immediate impact on Turkey. Instead, the oppressive attitude of the 
Turkish state continued contradicting the common practices in Europe. Even though the new 
instruments to guarantee minority protection were being built across Europe, the pressure 
towards the minorities in Turkey increased visibly resulting in violent clashes between the 
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Turkish military along with continued discrimination 
in all aspects of everyday life.263 The contrast of the advancement of new minority protection 
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tools in the European context with the repressive minority policies of Turkey as an aspiring EU 
candidate was especially significant after the introduction of the Copenhagen political criteria 
in 1993, which made EU membership conditional upon the respect for and the protection of 
minorities.264 Faced with harsh criticisms during the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, it was only 
after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 when Turkey was granted candidacy status that the 
minimum level of formal compliance with minority protection norms could be achieved 
through legislative changes and reforms packages adopted between 1999 and 2007.265  
 
Given this background, I set out to examine minority rights in the context of modern Turkey 
in this chapter. Drawing on an important strand of the literature exploring minority rights, I 
investigate how the introduction of new mechanisms for minority protection within Europe 
was reflected in the transformation of the domestic context in Turkey in the form of civil 
society activism. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the impact of Turkey’s integration and 
interaction with the European minority rights regimes at civil society level. The overarching 
objective of this chapter is to clarify how minority rights are used in this thesis and analyze 
why and how the minority issue has been critical both in Turkey and Europe to the extent that 
it provides a good opportunity to measure the transformative power of Europe. Therefore, I 
first discuss the relationship between the current situation of minority rights and the 
mechanisms providing minority protection in Europe, as well as the turning points that can be 
identified as significant for this relationship. Secondly, I present a chronological overview of 
the development of these mechanisms and instruments by introducing the different approaches 
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and debates that characterized the minority rights analyses. In other words, I will investigate 
the previous literature to support the argument that the developments in Europe concerning 
minority rights shaped the understanding of minority rights in Turkey principally after Turkey 
was granted candidacy status. I examine whether the domestic construction of the EU’s 
minority protection norms empowered the civil society organizations in Turkey in such a way 
that they were able to challenge the monolithic understanding of Turkish citizenship. I highlight 
the use of conditionality by the EU to ensure compliance with minority protection norms within 
candidate countries even though the EU does not provide clear definitions, demands, or 
templates on minority rights and there is no unified minority standard within the Union itself. 
The third part constitutes an assessment of the contemporary situation of minority groups in 
Turkey and the existing legal instruments in Turkey for the respect for and the protection of 
minority rights. I investigate the overlooked aspects of the previous research on minority rights 
in the context of modern Turkey, especially in regard to the impact of Europeanization in order 
to discuss the changing behaviour of civil society actors in the realm of minority rights through 
the availability of different political and financial resources as would be presented in the final 
section of this chapter.  
 
3.1 Minority Rights: Global Developments 
Ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity are a common aspect of many countries around the 
world. Therefore, the domestic debates on the treatment of national, ethnic, religious, or 
linguistic minority groups are heavily influenced by the international organizations, such as the 
United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or 
the Council of Europe (CoE). This is mainly due to the challenging character of the issue, 
particularly as it manifests itself in the efforts of the minority groups to redistribute power 
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resources so that some degree of multilevel governance can be attained.266 The international 
character of minority rights is based on the objective to secure stability and avoid 
majority/minority conflicts, while in return the minority groups are expected to give up their 
claims for self-determination and secession.267  
 
Nonetheless, despite the efforts to establish a universal minority protection regime, the national 
practices are quite divergent even within the EU. The particular difficulties encountered when 
trying to come up with universally accepted standards for minority protection are especially 
related to the lack of a definition for the term ‘minority’. The lack of a legal definition also 
allows some states to deny or limit minority rights, while also feeding into the individual and 
collective dilemma. Granting collective rights is particularly an issue of disagreement, as most 
states fear that the recognition of collective rights will fuel the separatist ambitions. 
Furthermore, the content of the rights granted to the minority groups across different countries 
differ significantly. In accordance with this, domestic legislations aiming to protect minorities 
vary significantly across states depending on the characteristics of the minority groups in that 
country and whether they are ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities.268  
 
Despite the challenges and the absence of a universally agreed definition of minority, the 
efforts to establish an international set of rules for minority protection were not abandoned 
completely. Since the domestic legislations diverge significantly, the international instruments 
adopted by the UN, the OSCE, and the CoE make up the only possible common platform for 
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creating a minority protection scheme on a global scale. The first of these international attempts 
was Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that was 
adopted in 1966.269 Following the adoption of the ICCPR, the CSCE published the Helsinki 
Final Act in 1975, which stated that the participating states of the CSCE should respect the 
rights of people belonging to minority groups in terms of equality before law and are obligated 
to provide them with the opportunity to fully exercise their fundamental freedoms.270 However, 
it was after the end of the Cold War that the OSCE’s commitment to the protection of minorities 
extended. At the beginning of the 1990s, the OSCE started to refer to minority rights in all of 
its official publications. The OSCE also established the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM) that would help OSCE member states to resolve minority problems 
through the adoption of the acknowledged minority protection rules. In 1990, the OSCE 
published the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE and in addition to the provisions of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act, the 
Copenhagen Document required states to adopt the necessary measures that would ensure full 
equality before the law for people belonging to national minorities.271 With the Copenhagen 
Declaration, positive measures targeting minority groups were introduced for the first time as 
part of an international instrument. The Declaration also contained specific rights to be 
exercised individually or collectively with other members of the minority group.272 These 
specific rights included the “right to use mother tongue freely in private and public sphere, the 
right to establish and maintain educational, cultural and religious institutions, organizations, or 
associations, the right to profess and practice their religion freely, the right to establish and 
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maintain cross-frontier contacts with citizens of other states with whom they have a common 
ethnic or national origin, a common cultural heritage or common religious beliefs, the right to 
disseminate, have access to and exchange information in their mother tongue, to establish 
organizations and associations in their own countries, and to participate in non-governmental 
organizations”.273  
 
The CoE in the 1990s adopted three important consecutive instruments for the protection of 
minorities: the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 1992, 
Recommendation 1201 on an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1993, and the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) in 1995. The main reasoning behind the attempts 
of the CoE was the idea that the minority issue impeded the democratic, economic and social 
development of the CEE countries while there were concerns that these problems would spill 
over to other European countries.274 The FCNM is clearly a result of the CoE’s active 
engagement in the efforts to prevent conflicts and constitutes one of the most comprehensive 
documents on minority protection. It is the first legally binding multilateral treaty that 
addresses the protection of national minorities in general.275 Its characteristic as a framework 
convention implies that it will be adopted by the states and translated into their own domestic 
legislation. However, at the same time, member states are not bound to apply the provisions of 
the FCNM directly within administrative and judicial frameworks.276 National minorities are 
the beneficiaries of the Framework Convention while it emphasizes the exercise of individual 
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rights together with the other members of the minority group. The European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages adopted in 1992 on the other hand specifically aims to 
preserve and promote regional or minority languages.277 However, the Charter only encourages 
states to protect the status of the languages in question rather than granting specific rights to 
the members of the linguistic minority groups.278  
 
The abovementioned international documents determine the international minority protection 
standards that can be applied universally for guaranteeing minority rights and the instruments 
offered by these organizations shape the international minority rights law and the scope of the 
rights. The most commonly highlighted theme within these documents is the necessity to 
preserve and promote the distinct identity of minority groups.279 It is underlined on several 
occasions that such a task is only achieved if the minorities enjoy the same rights as the majority 
and if their equality before law is guaranteed. In addition to this, these international documents 
point to the obligation to ensure full and effective equality for minorities, as well as the support 
to enable them to develop their identity. Articles 4, 5, 6, and 16 of the Framework Convention 
dictate the obligations of the states to protect the existence of national minorities.280 Article 4 
requires states to prohibit any discrimination directed towards minority groups on the grounds 
that they belong to a national minority.281 Non-discrimination is the most contemplated theme 
within both international and European documents and is included in the Framework 
Convention with the intention to reinforce equality before law regardless of race, religion, and 	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ethnicity. Article 6 requires states to take the necessary measures to protect members of the 
national minority groups against threats or acts of discrimination, hostility, or violence based 
on their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious identity.282 This article is aimed to prevent “any 
acts that would constitute a threat to the existence of the minorities including extermination or 
expulsion”283. Article 5 on the other hand requires states “to promote the conditions necessary 
for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to 
preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions, and 
cultural heritage”.284 Similarly, Article 4.1 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities prescribes states to take 
the necessary measures to ensure that members of minority groups can exercise their legal 
rights and fundamental freedoms fully and effectively.285 This is also reiterated in the OSCE 
Copenhagen Document and added the phrase “equal rights and equal status for all citizens”.286 
Besides in attempt to preserve those areas commonly inhabited by national minorities, Article 
16 of the Framework Convention obligates states to abandon any attempts to demarcate the 
minority populations from those areas where they reside as a community.287 
  
Religious freedom encompasses both the freedom to manifest one’s belief or religion and the 
protection against discrimination on the basis of beliefs or religious association. Freedom of 
religion is usually perceived as a universal right when it is used within international documents 
instead of being applied to religious minority groups as a collective right.288 Article 18 of the 	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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 18 of the ICCPR both affirm 
“every individual’s right to change their religion or belief and the right to manifest their religion 
or belief individually or in community with others, both in public and private sphere in 
teaching, practice, worship, and observance”289. As for those international documents 
specifically referring to national minorities, Article 2.1 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities states that 
persons belonging to minority groups should be granted the right to profess and practice their 
religion while Paragraph 32 of the Copenhagen Declaration also includes the right to establish 
and maintain their own religious institutions.290 Article 8 of the Framework Convention 
reiterates the right to manifest religious beliefs and to establish religious institutions, 
organizations, and associations.291 In addition, the prohibition of discrimination against any 
religion or belief is underlined within all of these documents as well as with a separate 
document, the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 
 
Freedom to use minority languages is essential for the preservation of identity for minorities, 
but it is also the subject of many conflicts. Linguistic rights are not only linked to the freedom 
of expression but they are related to the demands for instruction and education in mother tongue 
languages. Freedom of information is considered as one of the fundamental freedoms of the 
persons belonging to minorities and the right to use minority languages forms an integral part 
of the right to information. The Framework Convention obliges states to recognize the freedom 
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of expression and the freedom of information in the minority language with Article 9 and the 
right to use the minority languages freely in private and public sphere, both orally and in writing 
with Article 10. Article 2.1 of the UN Declaration and Paragraph 32 of the Copenhagen 
Document each affirm the provisions of the previous documents on linguistic rights and 
recognize the right to use mother tongue languages freely in public and private spheres. 
 
Another generally recognized concept within these international documents is the freedom of 
association. The Copenhagen Document and the UN Declaration both recognize the right to 
participate in public life along with the right to establish and maintain educational, cultural, 
and religious institutions, organizations or associations, whereas CoE does not grant any 
collective rights with the Framework Convention. Article 15 of the Framework Convention 
acknowledges the right to effective participation in cultural, social, and economic life and in 
public affairs while Article 17 provides the right to take part in the activities of national and 
international non-governmental organizations. In addition to these generally acknowledged 
freedoms and rights, there are other specific rights granted for the accommodation of minorities 
in a particular country on which general consensus could not be reached. These include the 
right to representation, the right to use names and surnames in the minority language, the right 
to display topographical information, street names, and place names in minority languages, and 
finally the right to establish and maintain schools operated by the minority groups. 
 
Even though minority protection became an essential element of the EU’s democracy 
promotion that is reiterated within the official documents of the CoE and the OSCE in the 
1990s, the question of a definition for the term minority still remains controversial. Today, 
there is still no universally agreed definition of the term minority and most of the international 
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documents on minority rights do not provide a general definition.292 Therefore, in most cases 
it is not possible for the minority groups to claim that they are entitled to the rights included 
within these documents. At the same time, it was difficult to categorize all minorities into one 
single, uniform group.  
 
However, there had been efforts by the international community to come up with a standard 
definition in the past. The first of the attempts to draft a definition was by the Sub-Commission 
on Human Rights under the UN Economic and Social Council. However, soon these efforts 
were abdicated given the intricacy of the issue and as a result, the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities that was adopted 
by the same Sub-Commission did not contain a definition of the term ‘minority’. Around the 
same time, another international intergovernmental organization, the OSCE tried to come up 
with a definition, but similar to the experience of the Economic and Social Council it was soon 
abdicated.293 Likewise, during the drafting of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, it was concluded that obtaining a consensus on a definition that would be 
supported by all of the member states was impossible at this time; therefore, given that it might 
hinder the real task of drafting the Convention, such an attempt was discarded.294 The European 
Commission for Democracy through Law, also known as the Venice Commission, included a 
definition of minority groups within its Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection 
of Minorities in 1991.295 Article 2.1 of the Proposal defined minorities as “a group which is 
smaller in number than the rest of the population of the State, whose members, who are 
nationals of that state, have ethnical, religious, or linguistic features different from those of the 
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rest of the population, and are guided by the will to safeguard their culture, traditions, religion, 
or language”.296 
 
The only definition included in an international document was within Recommendation 1201, 
an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European Convention on 
Human Rights prepared by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. However, 
the Committee of Ministers rejected Recommendation 1201 without granting it a binding 
character. Nevertheless, the Parliamentary Assembly requires that the legislation of member 
states and of those states aspiring to become members of the CoE conform to the Protocol.297 
The additional protocol defines a national minority as “a group of persons in a state who reside 
on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof; maintain longstanding, firm, and lasting 
ties with that state; display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics; 
are sufficiently representative although smaller in number than the rest of the population of 
that state or of a region of that state; are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which 
constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion, or their 
language”.298  
 
The definition adopted by the CoE within the additional protocol to the ECHR reiterated the 
criteria proposed within the working definition by the Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco 
Capotorti, with the only exception being the Protocol’s restriction of minority groups to 
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national minorities.299 Capotorti defined minorities as “a group numerically inferior to the rest 
of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members—being nationals of 
the state—possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest 
of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving 
their culture, traditions, religion, or language”.300 However, the UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities did not endorse the definition drafted 
by Francesco Capotorti.301 Another member of the Sub-Commission Jules Deschenes drafted 
a second definition in 1985, which defined a minority group as “a group of citizens of a State, 
constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that state, endowed with 
ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics, which differs from those of the majority of the 
population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a 
collective will to survive, and whose aim it is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and 
in law".302 During the fifth session of the UN Working Group on Minorities in 1999, it was 
concluded that coming up with a definition was not possible due to the disagreements over 
issues including the dilemma of including non-citizens or phrases such as the “collective will 
to survive”.303  
 
Both the objective criteria including numerical size, ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
characteristics, the non-dominance of the group in question, and the subjective criteria 
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including the will to preserve group identity used in these definitions are problematic. 
Numerical criterion is problematic because of the population numbers for some groups are 
really low as in the case of the Ezidis in Turkey and for some highly populated groups as the 
Alevis. Moreover, identifying minorities through ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics 
automatically excludes other minority groups, such as economic and sexual minorities or non-
citizens and immigrants. The subjective criterion may also be criticized since the shared will 
to preserve collective identity mentioned within these definitions cannot be measured 
quantitatively and there is no criteria determined as the benchmark. Moreover, the concept of 
a ‘national minority’ mostly used within the documents prepared by the CoE also varies due to 
the divergent use of the term ‘nation’ by states.  
 
Such a disagreement on the definition of the term minority and the lack of an encompassing 
definition provides the individual states with their own interpretations of who would constitute 
a minority; thus, leading the way to the denial of ethnic and linguistic minorities as in the case 
of Turkey. Following the OSCE’s Moscow, Copenhagen, and Helsinki Meetings and after the 
adoption of the Copenhagen document and the Helsinki Decisions, the Turkish state declared 
that all citizens are equally treated in Turkey and exercise their rights on an equal footing.304 
Contrary to the formal definition of minorities as used by the Turkish state, the concept of 
minority used in this thesis will reiterate the definition proposed by Capotorti and Deschenes 
and refers to those citizens of Turkey that “represent a numerical minority and are in a non-
dominant position, showing different ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics than the 
Turkish majority and have a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated by a collective will 
to survive, and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law”305. 
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In conclusion, one can say that the international minority rights instruments originated within 
multilateral treaties and international documents and expanded to the global arena. The most 
dominant organizations in this sense were the UN, the OSCE, and the CoE. Among these, the 
only legally binding minority rights document is the Framework Convention of the CoE. 
Moreover, the OSCE broadened the scope of minority protection to a wider region other than 
Central Europe and HCNM addressed the issues within the participating states related to the 
accommodation of minorities and assisted them in their efforts to establish effective minority 
protection regimes within their territories. Nevertheless, the Council of Europe still contains 
the most comprehensive minority rights standards especially after the adoption of the European 
Charter on Regional and Minority Languages and the European Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities.  
 
3.2 Minority Protection in Europe 
For a long time, the universal rights claims and the focus on non-discrimination within 
international human rights documents were used to justify the attempts to avoid the recognition 
of minorities within the EU as well. It was clear that when universal human rights rules failed 
to enforce the adoption of the standards that ensures equality and the protection of minority 
rights, it was necessary to launch an encompassing and universally acknowledged minority 
protection scheme. Especially the EU candidacy of the CEEC and in response to the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements, the minority protection issue became an essential element of the EU’s 
external relations. The enlargement of the EU required the adoption of the norms and values 
that the EU is based on by the candidate states in order to attain further democratization in 
these countries. Within the official documents of the EC, there isn’t any reference to minority 
rights and there are limited provisions governing fundamental freedoms and rights. However, 
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particularly during the accession of the CEE countries, compliance with democratic criteria 
became one of the essential conditions for EU membership. Such a substantive policy shift 
with respect to EU’s policies on minority protection especially came to the fore after the 
introduction of the Copenhagen political criteria. Copenhagen criteria not only determined the 
EU’s new stance towards candidate countries, but also provided the EU with the power to 
examine minority issues within candidate countries more closely. However, the EU’s appeal 
to promote democratic values and minority rights did not lead to a clarification of EU standards 
and benchmarks or the establishment of firm legal bases for minority protection.  
 
Even though the EU’s concerns about minority rights predominantly increased after the end of 
the Cold War, there were still some efforts by the European Parliament (EP), the European 
Council, and the European Commission for setting standards in relation to minority rights prior 
to the introduction of the Copenhagen criteria. The main driving force during the 1980s was 
the EP and most of the resolutions passed were prepared by the EP Committee of Culture and 
addressed cultural issues. There were two serious attempts between 1979 and 1989 to adopt a 
comprehensive charter of minority rights by the EP’s legal committee; however, these were 
abandoned before they could become a part of the legal context.306  The resolutions passed by 
the EP Committee of Culture were more focused and touched upon issues such as linguistic 
rights, non-discrimination, promotion of regional cultures, freedom of education, and freedom 
of information. To name a few, the “Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional 
Languages and Cultures and on a Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities” was passed in 1981, 
the “Resolution on Measures in favour of Minority Languages and Cultures” was passed in 
1983, and a more comprehensive resolution entitled the “Resolution on the Languages and 
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Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities” was passed in 1987. Consequently, as the 
perspective of Eastern enlargement became clearer, more pronounced EU policies were 
adopted at the EP, the Council, and the Commission. The most important step in this sense was 
the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993, which included the necessity of the “respect 
for and the protection of minorities”. The minority clause within the Copenhagen Criteria 
revealed that minority issues had become an integral part of the EU’s Accession Strategy and 
that minority groups living in candidate or applicant countries were also of concern for the EU 
member states. In addition to this, the minority issue gained a legal dimension in the context 
of enlargement as Copenhagen Criteria were reiterated in official accession documents. Parallel 
to this, increasing emphasis was placed on the effective participation of minority groups in 
public and political life and the prohibition of social and economic exclusion.307  
 
The first years following the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria, the norms related to minority 
protection remained vague. However, the Agenda 2000 adopted in 1997 emphasized that 
minority problems were a threat to the democratic stability of the Union and therefore 
protection of minorities should be ensured in candidate countries before full accession takes 
place.308 Moreover, the Agenda 2000 presented a broad analysis of the minority issues in 
applicant countries as well as other official documents adopted by the CoE providing a 
benchmark for the minority protection rules that need to be included within domestic 
legislations. To be more precise, it refers to the Framework Convention and Recommendation 
1201 highlighting the recognition of collective rights. It also underlines the problems of 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia with regard to linguistic rights and the absence of sufficient 
efforts to prevent the exclusion of Roma minority within candidate states.309 	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The EU’s conceptualization of minority protection touches upon a number of issues critical for 
both candidate and member states. Most of the time, the minority rights clauses are not spelled 
out explicitly but different concepts and provisions that can be used as a guarantee for minority 
protection are included within the official documents. A core concept that is reciprocated 
within the European minority protection documents is the principle of non-discrimination. As 
one of the EU’s fundamental norms, non-discrimination forms an integral part of many 
internationally recognized human rights documents. The non-discrimination principle was 
extended to encompass ethnic and racial discrimination after the adoption of the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1999 while two framework directives, the Framework Directive on Equal Treatment 
in Employment and Occupation and the Directive on the Prohibition of Discrimination on the 
Basis of Racial and Ethnic Origin also known as the Race Directive govern the practices related 
to full equality in fact and in law. The framework directives adopted by the Council required 
the states to implement the remedies in order to assist those persons that were subjected to 
discrimination.310 The Race Directive addresses discrimination and contains provisions related 
to employment, education, social protection, and social advantages. It mainly targets racism 
and xenophobia, but also includes articles on discrimination based on ethnic origin, which is 
especially significant for minorities. 
 
One year after the accession of the CEE countries, the European Commission underlined the 
necessity to include the policies other than the prevention of discrimination for ensuring the 
protection of minority groups.311 Simultaneously, the EP published the Resolution on the 
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Protection of Minorities and Anti-Discrimination Policies in an Enlarged Europe in 2005.312 
This resolution was the most comprehensive EP resolution to date that dealt with minority 
protection and especially highlighted the necessity of more efforts in the realm of minority 
rights in response to the demands of the 2004 enlargement. The resolution also stressed the 
vague character of EU’s minority strategy. It stated that even though respect for and protection 
of minorities is included in the Copenhagen criteria, there is no definitive policy that outlines 
the rights to be granted to minority groups and a general definition to distinguish the members 
of a minority group is lacking. More significantly, the EP proposed that a definition of the term 
‘minority’ that will be acknowledged by all member states should be adopted along with the 
basic principles and aims included within Recommendation 1201. In addition to the issues of 
non-discrimination and social integration, the official documents also emphasized the 
protection of and the respect for linguistic rights particularly within educational institutions, 
media, and public administrative bodies in addition to other cultural and political rights. A key 
development, in this regard, was the establishment of the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). 
The FRA was known as the European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) 
until 2007. FRA is not an institution designed with the purpose of minority protection and its 
conclusions are not binding, but its main task is to assist member states and the candidate 
countries as well as the EU bodies on a number of human rights issues including minority 
rights.313 Another body of the EU, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), also took an active role 
for addressing the issue of cultural identity within its judgements on several cases. However, 
as the EU minority protection documents until very recently were part of the EU’s secondary 
law, ECJ rulings were concerned with those issues that were indirectly related to minority 
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protection but were still part of the community law, such as free movement or non-
discrimination.  
 
The ratification of Lisbon Treaty or the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) is particularly 
significant as the persons belonging to minorities are for the first time explicitly mentioned 
within the primary law.314 Prior to the TEU, there wasn’t any reference to the minorities in the 
legal context and firm legal bases were lacking to coerce member states to adopt minority 
protection provisions. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the protection of human rights; 
however, even though it stressed the significance of democracy and human rights for the EU, 
it did not explicitly mention minority rights. Since there were no legal provisions dealing with 
the minority issue previously, minority groups could only benefit from secondary law with a 
more general scope and they relied mostly on universal human rights provisions. Moreover, 
around the time the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, 
National Communities, and Languages was established at the European Parliament. The 
Intergroup aimed to translate the legal provisions designed to ensure minority protection into 
European legislation. Article 2 of the TEU states that the “Union is founded on the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity 
and equality between women and men prevail”.315 The second article not only mentions the 
respect for persons belonging to minorities but also refers to discrimination separate from 
minority rights. This article fulfils the European Commission’s aim to go beyond the anti-
discrimination principle for creating a separate minority protection legislation; furthermore, 	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Article 6 of the TEU grants the European Charter of Fundamental Rights a legally binding 
character, declaring that the rights, freedoms, and principles contained in the Charter are 
recognized by the EU and that the Charter shall also be legally binding as other EU treaties.316 
Article 21 of the Charter also includes “membership in a national minority” as part of the 
prohibited areas of discrimination. Moreover, Article 22 of the TEU indicates that the Union 
shall respect its cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.317  
 
Nonetheless, the EU does not provide an extensive and comprehensive set of instruments that 
will ensure the resolution of minority issues within diverse settings. In fact, historically, the 
EU’s focus has been more on the principles of discrimination and social integration rather than 
specific minority rights. Therefore, the EU mostly deals with its shortcomings by referring to 
the provisions contained in other international intergovernmental documents prepared by the 
UN and the CoE. As all of the EU member states are also the members of the CoE, the CoE 
treaties, resolutions and conventions are politically and legally binding for all EU member 
countries. Secondly, most of the time when dealing with the minority issue or issues related to 
the promotion of democracy, the EU relies on definitions, instruments, and experiences of other 
European institutions. Similarly, EU bodies frequently refer to the documents adopted by the 
CoE within their accession documents.318 Additionally, the CoE and the EU co-finance joint 
programs and initiatives including those that support national minorities. An example of such 
programs is the joint initiative of the CoE and the Directorate-General for Democracy and 
Political Affairs for a program entitled “Promoting Human Rights and Minority Protection in 
South East Europe”.319 This way, the EU arguably tries to set minimum objectives and 
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standards for minority protection while at the same time avoiding conflicts between member 
states.  
 
3.3 EU Minority Policy: Challenges and Shortcomings 
Until the TEU, the EU’s minority strategy mainly relied on documents adopted by other 
European institutions and secondary community law. The Maastricht Treaty, which entered 
into force in 1993, introduced the general human rights provisions into EU primary law but 
refrained from including minority protection rules, whereas the Treaty of Amsterdam that 
entered into force in 1999, included all of the Copenhagen political criteria bringing them to 
the level of EU primary law except the minority protection clause. As a result, neither within 
the EU nor within applicant states did these instruments yield full and effective minority 
protection standards.  
 
Even though the new TEU introduces the minority issue into EU primary law, the 
implementation of the EU’s minority policies is mostly problematic. A major setback in this 
regard is the lack of any generally accepted legal definition of the term ‘minority’. The TEU 
refrains from any discussion in relation to a general definition or the criteria to identify the 
members of a minority group. Moreover, Article 1a of the TEU only mentions persons 
belonging to minorities instead of categorizing them as old, new, ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
or cultural minority groups. The Framework Convention comparatively refers to national 
minorities, but does not provide a clear definition of what a national minority is nor does it 
answer questions such as what is the minimum or maximum population numbers for it to be a 
considered a national minority, whether these groups have to reside within a specific region 
within a state or whether they have to practice a separate religion or speak a different 
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language.320 In addition to these, none of the EU bodies or organizations treats minority 
protection as one issue nor do they offer clear guidelines, explicit demands, or specific models 
to be adopted by the candidate countries or member states leaving the relations between the 
state and the minority groups to the sole discretion of the national authorities. At the same time, 
such a lack of clear guidelines for minority protection makes it harder to enforce minority 
integration within applicant states. 
 
The EU lacks the legal enforcement mechanisms to monitor the situation of different minority 
groups within member and candidate states. The CoE has the most elaborate minority 
protection instruments; however, unlike the EU it cannot offer rewards and incentives such as 
financial assistance for formal compliance. The EU treaties encourage positive state support 
for minorities but such a support is not dictated as a requirement. The ambiguity coupled with 
the diverging practices in member states causes a double-standard problem between the 
member states and the candidate countries. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that a certain 
degree of compliance is achieved in the pre-accession period. Moreover domestic actors’ 
involvement in the reform processes creates a domestic consensus on minority protection, 
which can continue after accession takes place. Other shortcomings of the EU’s minority 
policies include the individual and collective rights dilemma, the group rights issue, which still 
remains unresolved, the inconsistent application of minority protection standards among 
different member states, lack of a specialized monitoring institution for the implementation of 
minority protection mechanisms, and the citizenship criteria, which still remains contested as 
the adopted instruments cannot be applied to non-citizens and immigrants.  
 
3.4 Minority Rights in the Context of Modern Turkey 
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Article 88 of the 1924 Turkish Constitution, which was adopted just a year after the foundation 
of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and was the founding Constitution of the Turkish Republic, 
stated that “the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would, in terms of 
citizenship, be called Turkish”.321 This article recapulated the Turkish state’s desire to 
conceptualize the notion of citizenship based on ethnic Turkishness, contrary to practices in 
the Ottoman Empire. The millet system of the Ottoman Empire provided self-governing 
arrangements for Jewish, Christian, and Muslim communities, which were ranked in a 
hierarchical manner.322 The multicultural millet system coupled with the separatist inclinations 
motivated the government during the early days of the Republic to Turkify these minority 
groups without leaving any space to the recognition of distinct identities. However, such an 
objective proved to be extremely difficult triggering even more oppressive and discriminatory 
policies towards the ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority groups. It is safe to say that 
throughout the history of the Turkish Republic and still today, minority groups cannot enjoy 
their universal rights equally as the ethnic Turkish majority. 
 
The minority issue is critical in Turkey both from a historical and a contemporary perspective. 
Historically, it is significant, because the minority issue has always been an issue of priority 
for the Turkish state. It is also central to the domestic politics because the history of the Turkish 
Republic is filled with official policies aiming to oppress the minorities to the degree that it 
reaches total assimilation. Marginalized minority groups have been banned from using their 
mother-tongue languages and from exercising their religious rights, or they were subjected to 
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severe repression aimed at homogenizing the population and in consequence eliminating 
different languages, cultures, and religions. From a contemporary perspective, the minority 
issue is critical for Turkey because it is one of the most significant stumbling blocks before its 
accession to the EU. The minority protection rules including non-discrimination, freedom of 
religion, and freedom of expression are among the criteria that the EU most frequently gives 
reference to within its progress reports and other accession documents. It is also vital given 
that the minority protection has been one of the few issues that triggered the increased civil 
society activism and mobilization as a result of the interaction of the civil society organizations 
representing different minority groups with the EU and their use of the political and financial 
resources provided by the EU. When compared with other areas, such as agriculture or 
fisheries, the funds provided by the EU in relation to the minority issue is utilized by the civil 
society organizations more frequently. 
 
3.5 Turkish State Policies Towards the Minorities 
The minority rights standards included within various European documents all highlight the 
necessity of state support for the minority groups to maintain and develop their culture, identity, 
religion and language. Such a task requires freedom of religion, freedom of language, freedom 
of association, freedom of expression, adoption of anti-discrimination policies and full equality 
before law, prohibition of assimilation, right to education, right to representation, freedom of 
movement, and finally social and economic integration. When compared with such a wide 
range of minority rights, one can see that the current legislation in Turkey only covers a very 
small portion of these rights and freedoms. The assimilation policies were so intense especially 
in the early days of the Republic that most of the minority groups left or were forced to leave 
Turkey before the 1950s. Such policies were systematically adopted and were required to be 
executed by state authorities and local administrations. It was in light of this during the single 
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party period (1923-1945) that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) adopted some of the most 
discriminatory laws in the history of the Republic towards the minority groups in Turkey. 
 
The era that aimed total homogenization of the newly founded Republic started with 1922-
1924 Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey. Following the agreement between 
Turkey and Greece on the exchange of populations, 1.2 million Anatolian Greek Orthodox 
were deported from Turkey leaving behind their lands, houses, and property.323 In exchange, 
around 350.000 Muslims residing in Greece at the time were sent to Turkey as part of the 
agreement.324 Suddenly, the areas, which were dominantly occupied by the Greek Orthodox 
population, were emptied, waiting to be filled with Turkish or other Muslim groups including 
Bosnians and Albanians. However, there were still significant numbers of non-Muslim 
minority groups residing in Istanbul and some parts of Anatolia as well as the two Aegean 
islands Imros and Tenedos. Since the Population Exchange Agreement mainly targeted the 
Greek Orthodox population living in Anatolia, the Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul as 
well as Imros and Tenedos were excluded from the process. Following the population 
exchange, the Turkish state concentrated on the ways to ‘Turkify’ the remaining non-Muslim 
minority population along with all other non-Turkish Muslim minority groups. The population 
exchange was not the only way the state played with the population proportions in order to 
prevent majorities of minority groups to inhabit the same areas. To give an example, in June 
1923 the non-Muslim minorities were forbidden from travelling from one place to another 
within the borders of Turkey.325 The law was adopted so suddenly that some members of non-
Muslim minority groups, mainly Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish, and a small portion of 
the Assyrians, who were at the time in other cities, were prohibited from going back to their 
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own city where they originally resided. Following this, in September 1923 again with a law 
adopted by the Parliament the Armenians, who migrated from Cilicia, mainly from Adana, and 
Eastern Anatolia, were prohibited from returning to these cities.326 Around the same time, in 
December 1923 the Jewish population of Corlu, a small town in the Thrace region, was forced 
to vacate the city in 48 hours. The Ministry of Internal Affairs deferred this decision following 
an application by the Chief Rabbi of Turkey; however, this did not stop a nearby town to 
enforce a similar practice and hundreds of Jews were deported from Catalca in 1923.327 All of 
these decisions and actions mainly had one objective: to change the population compositions 
of those areas whose inhabitants were mostly minorities. However, none of these random acts 
at the time were reiterated within official documents and soon after the Turkish state issued a 
broader law entitled 1934 Settlement Law of 2510. The first article of the Settlement Law 2510 
granted the Ministry of Interior Affairs the right to manage the geographical distribution of 
minorities based on the loyalty of these minority groups and their historical attachment to the 
Turkish culture.328 Article 11 of the Law prohibited non-Turkish speakers to establish villages 
and districts. The Ministry was also able to apply certain methods such as relocating those 
persons who did not try to integrate with the Turkish society and insisted on maintaining their 
culture or speaking other languages.  
 
According to the 1934 Settlement Law 2510, “foreign Kurds, Arabs, Albanians; other Muslims 
who speak languages other than Turkish, and all foreign Christians and Jews would be deprived 
of national citizenship documents and would be given the same status as non-citizens”329. This 
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clause of the Settlement Law was a clear indication of the Turkish state’s attitude towards the 
minority groups during the transition period from the Ottoman Empire. It was obvious that the 
central authorities perceived them as foreigners instead of citizens of the newly established 
Republic who were not entitled to enjoy the same fundamental rights and freedoms with the 
rest of the population. At the same time, the law asserted that Muslim Georgian, Lezgi (Laz), 
Chechen, Circassian, Abkhazian, and other Muslims would be issued Turkish citizenship.330 
The reason for the double standard between Muslim Caucasian groups and the other minorities 
is based on the belief that these groups had traits that were closely connected to the ethnic 
Turks. It could be that the Turkish state at the time believed since the Caucasian groups were 
mainly immigrants, they would be more inclined to be assimilated into the Turkish culture, 
whereas other groups such as Kurds, Jews, or Christians who lived in Anatolia for centuries 
and had their own forms of self-government during the Ottoman Empire, would be resistant to 
accept the new form of citizenship that was closely tied to ethnic Turkishness during the early 
days of the Republic.  
 
The second article of Law 2510 dictated that the country would be divided into three parts, also 
called settlement zones, where the residents were selected based on their commitment to the 
Turkish culture, Turkish language. As the Turkish majority was Muslim, it also depended on 
their loyalty to Islamic principles.331 To be more specific, according to the Settlement Law the 
first zone consisted of those places composed of populations possessing the Turkish culture, 
whereas the second zone would be used for those inhabitants whose Turkification processes 
could still not be fully achieved particularly in relation to the use of the Turkish language.332 
Finally, the third zone referred to those places where settlement was forbidden due to a number 	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of factors including culture or security.333 In the same manner, Article 12 dictated that those 
persons that could not speak Turkish within the first zone to be relocated to central areas where 
the majority was Turkish.334 Such an undertaking provided for a further assimilation of these 
minority groups, as they were exposed to the Turkish culture at the highest level, surrounded 
by the Turkish-speaking majority. The Settlement Law 2510 does not mandate a specific 
location where the law should be applied however an official circular published in 1939, 
‘Decree Concerning the Acceptance of an Instruction about Land Distribution in Zone One’ 
designates the eastern provinces as where settlement of non-Turkish speakers should be 
omitted.335 By limiting settlement in the eastern provinces, the Turkish state wished to control 
and to suppress the Kurdish revolts. The 1939 Decree stayed in force until 1951 and settlement 
in these regions remained prohibited until that time. At the same time, between 1925 and 1950, 
a state of emergency was declared at the southeastern and eastern provinces, while foreigners 
were not allowed to enter these regions until 1964.336 The resettlement laws reached the point 
that non-Turkish speakers were obliged to reside at a certain distance from highways, railroads 
and natural resources. In addition to these, according to the Settlement Law the total number 
of foreigners in a certain settlement area could not exceed 10% of the population of that 
municipality and non-Turkish speakers were not allowed to establish chambers or unions based 
on concerns over security.  
 
A close investigation of the 1934 Thrace Pogroms suggests that similar homogenization 
policies were also applied to the Thrace.337 The anti-Semitic violence that ended with the 
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exportation of the Jewish population first commenced in Canakkale.338 The wave of attacks 
quickly spilled over to other cities in the region and in Edirne, the events heightened turning 
into a pogrom on 3-4 July.339 As a result thousands of Jews were expelled from the region and 
escaped to Istanbul.340  
 
The Turkification policies basically targeted two areas: the first was the cultural policies such 
as the laws on language, religion, and education, whereas the second targeted economic 
policies including areas of employment, taxes, and participation in public life. The policies in 
relation to economic affairs mainly aimed to exclude minority groups to the extent that the 
national economy could be totally Turkified. To begin with, as early as 1923, foreign 
companies were stipulated to hire employees, of which 75% had to be Turkish Muslim.341 This 
was usually instructed orally either by the police or the local administrators.342 The companies 
faced closing down if they did not comply with this condition. In order to comply with this 
new rule, most of the foreign companies were forced to fire their Christian and Jewish 
employees.343 At the same time, the non-Muslims were not allowed to work as public 
servants.344 In addition to this, a new law was passed in 1924, which stipulated that a pharmacy 
could be opened only if it was owned and operated by a Turkish citizen of Turkish origin.345 
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In the same vein, the law on lawyers in 1924 required a morality assessment for lawyers, which 
resulted in the cancellation of the work permits of 460 non-Muslim lawyers.346  
 
Following on the efforts to Turkify the capital and the workforce, Statistics Department under 
the Ministry of Trade sent a survey to all foreign representations of insurance companies in 
1926 asking about the capital structure of their companies, the countries where their 
headquarters were based and the original foreign company they represented.347 The second part 
of the survey included questions on the salary rates of the employees and asked for a detailed 
classification of these employees as Muslim Turks, non-Muslim Turks, and Foreigners.348 
Again in the same year, another law was passed at the Turkish Parliament, which required all 
companies within Turkey to keep their books and accounts in Turkish as well as conduct all 
communications in Turkish. This was obviously an attempt to pressure foreign companies into 
hiring Turkish employees.349  
 
As for the public sector, the hiring of non-Muslim employees were first obstructed with a law 
passed in 1926. The law stipulated that opportunities to work in the public sector would be 
provided only to ethnic Turks or those groups who may be Turkified. The law did not imply 
citizenship but rather made a direct reference to ethnicity and this law was in force until 1965. 
However, the law only applied to non-Muslims while other groups such as Kurds, Bosnians, 
Laz, and Caucasians were classified as Turks. In 1928, a new law was issued, which stated that 
only Turks could become a doctor. As a result, non-Muslims were forbidden from practicing 
medicine in Turkey. In addition to this, another law was issued in 1932, which dictated that 
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only Turkish citizens could practice certain professions.350 These professions included a long 
list ranging from photographers to translators, from construction workers to pilots, and even 
from drivers to waiters. The category of foreigners as referred to within this law mainly 
intended to exclude the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul who were only given work and residence 
permits after the 1924 Population Exchange. The law stipulated that the foreigners working in 
these jobs were required to quit their jobs within six months.351 As a result by the end of 1935, 
17,642 Greek Orthodox left Turkey for Greece because of unemployment and economic 
hardships.352 All of these reflected the policies of the government at the time, as echoed in a 
report entitled “The Reform Plan of the East” prepared by the Minister of Internal Affairs in 
1925. The report advised the state to adopt policies that aim to transfer the commercial and 
trade enterprises in and around Diyarbakir owned by non-Muslim and foreigners to Turks 
living in the area.  
 
The propositions by the Minister of Internal Affairs in the report along with the attempts for 
the economic exclusion of non-Muslims and foreigners were gradually adopted throughout the 
1930s and reached the most detrimental stage in 1942 with the adoption of the Wealth Tax. 
However, it was applied randomly mainly targeting minorities in order to take away any wealth 
they may have acquired. Non-Muslims were taxed almost three times more than the Muslims 
as a final step to Turkify the economy and those non-Muslims who were not able to pay the 
taxes, were sent to forced labour camps in eastern Turkey.353  
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The cultural policies on the other hand targeted fundamental freedoms aiming to preserve and 
promote the cultural identity of minority groups, such as freedom of language, freedom of 
religion, freedom of education, and freedom of expression. Freedom of language is one of the 
many fundamental freedoms violated by the Turkish state throughout the history of the 
Republic until the very recent reform process initiated after the Helsinki Summit. All minority 
groups living in Turkey suffered gravely from the policies that pursued to eliminate the use of 
all other languages except Turkish, both in public and private life. In this regard, the first 
attempt was the prohibition of Kurdish by the municipalities in eastern towns and cities where 
the majority of the population was still pre-dominantly Kurdish-speakers.354 In the midst of 
major Kurdish revolts in the eastern provinces, the government forbade speaking Kurdish, both 
in public and private spheres, after the publication of the Reform Plan for the East in 1925. 
Article 14 of the Reform Plan stipulated that Kurds were actually of Turkish origin and had 
been assimilated into Kurdishness and therefore speaking Kurdish would be prohibited in both 
public areas and in private.355 The punishments were determined as five pennies for every 
Kurdish word. Around the same time, discussions about the population in the eastern provinces 
escalated within several governmental and non-governmental organizations highlighting the 
concerns in relation to the inability to break the Kurdish resistance towards integration with 
the Turks, especially with respect to language. Soon enough, these demands were met when 
the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaigns started in 1928.  
 
The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaigns significantly increased the tension between Turkish 
and non-Turkish speaking inhabitants of Turkey. Fights would break out frequently in major 
cities, which ended with the physical beating of non-Turkish speakers most of the time.356 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Aktar, 130.  
355 Vahap Coskun et al. 2011. Scar of Tongue.  Disa Publications: Diyarbakir, 27. 
356 Rifat Bali. “Citizen, Speak Turkish!”, downloaded at 
http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/turkce_konusma_birgun.pdf on 21 April 2012.  
	   149	  
“Citizen, Speak Turkish” banners were hung up in various places and the minority members 
who took them down or tore them were taken into custody.357 Following these campaigns, the 
Jews of Istanbul, who had suffered significantly, were forced to take an oath and to sign a 
contract stating that they will speak Turkish in synagogues at all times.358 The “Citizen, Speak 
Turkish” campaigns escalated during the early 1930s but were terminated with the end of the 
singular party period. Simultaneously, the Law on the Unity of Education was issued in 1924 
and the number of Turkish classes in minority schools was increased substantially while the 
non-Muslim minority schools were closed except those that belonged to the Greek Orthodox, 
Jewish, and Armenian minorities. To give an example, two Assyrian schools in Mardin and 
Diyarbakir were closed based on the fact that they were not recognized as official minorities 
within the Lausanne Treaty and in 1927 Greek education was banned at the Greek Orthodox 
schools in Imros and Tenedos islands.359 The policies were once again at the top of the agenda 
after the 1980 military coup. The 1982 Constitution prohibited the use of languages other than 
Turkish in public and private spheres, and it was strictly forbidden to argue that there are 
minorities living within the territories of Turkey and to engage in activities aiming to promote 
and preserve minority culture, identity, religion, or language.  
 
Policies restricting the freedom of religion were fundamentally part of the state policy towards 
minorities since the early days of the Republic. In January 1925, the newly elected Patriarch of 
the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was sent back to Thessaloniki on the grounds that he was not 
eligible to work in Turkey.360 Following this, faced with tremendous pressure the Assyrian 
community moved the Assyrian Patriarchate to Damascus in 1933 and claimed that “it was 
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found necessary” as stated by the Patriarchate officials.361 The restrictive policies towards the 
freedom of religion continued throughout the 20th century. Other non-Muslim groups, such as 
Ezidis, Christians, Jews, or Alevis, faced prosecution for practicing their religion or were 
simply forbidden to do so. The Christians and Jews were forbidden from building new churches 
and synagogues or simply repairing the old ones. The Ezidis were not and are still not 
recognized by the Turkish state; therefore, were not provided with any means to profess their 
religion. Today, Alevism is still not accepted and the Alevis of Turkey are not allowed to 
practice their religion in their places of worship or Cem houses, because they are not allowed 
to build or establish Cem houses in the first place.  
 
The minority issue is contested within Europe, but it is particularly challenging in the case of 
Turkey as the Turkish state only recognizes three religious minority groups in an official 
capacity and grants certain privileges to these groups. However, not only the recognized 
minority groups are extremely limited but also the rights granted are very constrained. Turkey 
recognizes other religious, ethnic and linguistic minority groups as full and equal citizens of 
the Turkish Republic. However, the most problematic issue is that while doing this, the Turkish 
state tries to homogenize all of the different identities forcing them either to accept the Turkish 
identity or excluding them totally if they cannot Turkify.  
 
3.6 Minority Groups in Turkey 
The issue of minority rights has always been a controversial issue for the Turkish state and 
society but following the 1999 Helsinki decision and particularly the introduction of the 
Copenhagen political criteria, contrary to the past, it has become an issue of priority in Turkey. 
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The historical background to explain the current situation of different minority groups in 
Turkey can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire. Even though Sunni Muslim Ottomans 
governed the Empire, it had a specific governance system providing limited autonomy for 
different religious groups living within the Empire.362 The millet system consisted of a ranking 
of different millets or religious groups, while Sunni Muslims retained the highest rank.363 
Following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, its founding agreement Lausanne 
Treaty was signed in 1923.364 The Lausanne Treaty is the main document that determines 
Turkey’s policy with respect to minority rights and through which it grants certain rights to 
Jews, Armenians and Greek Orthodox. However, since the beginning the Turkish state 
excluded the remaining non-Muslim groups while all other remaining Muslim groups were 
categorized as Turks even though they were not ethnic Turks.365  
 
Following the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, as a result of the discriminatory practices 
and oppressive laws, different minority groups left Turkey either involuntarily or because they 
felt forced to escape throughout the rest of the 20th century. In the end, the population numbers 
decreased significantly especially in cities other than Istanbul. Against such a historical 
background, Turkey faced the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria that explicitly referred 
to minority protection. Pursuant to the aspirations for full accession to the EU, Turkey was 
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forced to comply with the international norms and standards related to minority rights that was 
neglected for almost 80 years since the foundation of the Republic.  
 
The Turkish constitution or other legislations in Turkey do not address the issue of minority 
rights at all. In fact, there is no mention of the word minority within the Constitution and Article 
3 of the Constitution states that Turkey is indivisible with its state, country and nation and the 
language of the Turkish state is Turkish.366 Until 1991 it was forbidden to express thoughts in 
a language other than the first official languages of the states recognized by the Republic of 
Turkey.367 The first article of Law No 2932 prohibited the dissemination of any ideas in other 
language except Turkish, while the second article stipulated that “no language can be used for 
the explication, dissemination, and publication of ideas other than the first official language of 
countries, recognized by the Turkish state.”368 Given this, minority languages such as Kurdish, 
Lazuri, Zazaki, and Aramaic were forbidden from use in both public and private spheres for a 
long period in the history of the Republic. Perhaps the most problematic Article of the 
Constitution is Article 66, which stipulates that everyone bound to the Turkish state through 
the bond of citizenship is a Turk.369 Article 66 still remains valid today even though there is 
significant pressure from various democratic forces to change this ethnic categorization of 
citizenship.  
The minority rights regime given its exclusive character, recognizing only three religious 
minority groups can be discussed from the perspective of the United Nations instruments. In 
this regard, one of the legal documents that would be relevant for the minority rights regime in 
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Turkey among others is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948.370 As 
Turkey has become a member of the United Nations in 1945 and it is a party to UDHR.371 
Article 2 of the UDHR states that, “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, 
no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status 
of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty”372. This article which prohibits all 
forms of discrimination and grants rights and freedoms to everyone is interpreted in the Turkish 
context through the comprehensive character of the Turkish citizenship and Turkish ethnic 
identity. In fact, the Turkish constitution prohibits all kinds of discrimination based on 
language, race, color, sex, political opinion or religious beliefs and guarantees before the law 
in Article 10.373 However, while doing this, the Turkish state refrains from granting any other 
linguistic or cultural rights to the minority groups living in Turkey. This article in the Turkish 
constitution regarding the equality before law and the obligation to treat everyone equally are 
also reiterated in articles 3, 6 and 7 of UDHR. Even though these articles of UDHR dictate 
equality for everyone as part of customary international law, the Turkish state failed to apply 
them in practice for the minority groups in Turkey based on the argument that “Everyone bound 
to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk”374. Therefore, while disregarding 
other minority groups in Turkey, the Turkish state grants the same rights and freedoms to the 
minorities in Turkey as the other ethnic Turks. This in turn yields several contentious issues. 
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First of all, such an ethnic definition of citizenship implies that the mother tongue language of 
these minority groups is Turkish and therefore they will not be granted any other linguistic 
rights. Secondly, the first Constitution stated that the religion of the Turkish state is Islam 
however this was taken out in 1928.375 Even though, there are no constitutional restrictions 
before granting religious freedoms to minority groups, as the only religious minority groups 
recognized are Armenians, Jews and Greek Orthodox, other religious minorities are deprived 
of these rights. Moreover, these minority groups are not allowed to build new places of worship 
as stated in the Lausanne Treaty. Similarly, Article 18 of UDHR states “Everyone has the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance”376. 
This is also not applied in practice in Turkey to other minority groups that are not officially 
recognized as they are not allowed to even open Cem houses as in the case of Alevis or 
construct any churches, synagogues and other places of worship. In light of increasing UN 
activity with regard to human rights instruments and the protection of minority rights, Turkey 
refused to sign and ratify the 1954 UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 
the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1965 UN International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 1966 UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.   
 
The different minority groups in Turkey can be classified into two groups: ethnic and linguistic 
minorities and religious minorities. Most of the time there are overlaps between these two groups 
as most of the ethnic and linguistic minority groups may also be classified as religious minorities. 
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As mentioned above, Turkey only allows the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty to be applied to 
Greek Orthodox, Jewish and Armenian minorities. However, if one considers the internationally 
accepted definitions of minority groups as provided in Chapter II of this thesis, it is possible to talk 
about several groups that may be identified as a minority and that should be granted special rights 
with respect to their religion, language or ethnic background. In this respect, this thesis examines 
and classifies the minority groups in Turkey based on their population levels, the variation in their 
associational structures, diversity of their activities and funding sources and location, whether they 
are predominant in one city or across different cities. With regard to population, since 1990 the 
Turkish state stopped asking individuals about their ethnic background, mother tongue or religious 
denomination during the official censuses. Therefore, the numbers of individuals belonging to 
these minority groups and their geographical distribution are not officially known. The censuses 
conducted until 1990 continued collecting data in relation to the mother tongue languages and 
religious affiliations however the results after 1965 are not disclosed to the general public due to 
security concerns.377 Given these, the information concerning the minority groups identified in this 
research was mostly obtained from the interviews conducted with civil society organizations and 
non-state actors. However, there is no accurate information concerning the distinctions among 
these groups, their population numbers or self-identification patterns. Therefore, the list of 
minority groups provided in this research is non-exhaustive and irrespective of their self-
identification as minorities.  
 
In terms of location, while some of the minority groups such as the Alevis or Caucasians are 
dispersed across Turkey with organizations established almost in every city, other groups such as 
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Lom among Roma or Assyrians are predominantly concentrated in one city or region, mainly 
owing to the low levels of population. These groups also display variation in their associational 
structure, whereas some groups including the Alevi and Caucasians have set up many and different 
types of organizations, others such as the Greek Orthodox or Protestants have only few 
organizations that do not show any variation in terms of structure or location. In addition to this, it 
was revealed as a result of the research that some of the minority groups behave differently across 
different cities. For example, while the Roma organizations in Western cities and Thrace378 have 
closer relations with the national government, those in southeastern and eastern Anatolia stated 
that they do not have any contact with the national representatives and that they are instead in close 
contact with local administrators and especially BDP municipalities.379 Finally, the minority 
groups were selected and classified based on the sources of funding and the types of activities that 
their civil society organizations obtain and carry out. While some minority civil society 
organizations receive funding only from national sources such as the Arab organization in 
Sanliurfa or the Roma Federation in Kocaeli380, other organizations receive funding from both 
national and international sources such as the Caucasian Federation. Additionally, other minority 
groups which have stated that they have no contact with the national and local officials such as the 
Kurds or Assyrians, indicated that they can only secure funding from international sources and 
primarily European sources. With regard to the types of activities organized by these civil society 
organizations, data were collected on those civil society organizations that have branches all across 
Turkey such as the Human Rights Association (IHD) or the Union of Educators and Scientists 
(EGITIM-SEN) which organize various conferences, seminars and publish books and other 
publications related to minority rights along with advocacy activities. Moreover, it was found that 
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379 Personal interview with the Ezidi representative in Diyarbakir. 
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interview with Zana Farqini, the head of the Istanbul Kurdish Institute on 20.08.2012; Telephone interview with 
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some of the minority organizations only organize advocacy activities or act as solidarity 
organizations while others also publish academic studies on demographics of the minority group 
that they represent. The following section examines the ethnic and linguistic minorities and 
religious minorities in Turkey from the perspective of these selection criteria.    
 
3.6.1 Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in Turkey 
The ethnic and linguistic minority groups that were examined as part of this thesis include the 
Kurds, Arabs, Georgians, Abkhazians, Circassians, Roma, Laz, Hamshen, Mhelmis, Molokans, 
Bosnians and Albanians and Pomaks. Some of these minority groups are also fragmented among 
themselves based on religion or language such as the Zazaki and Kurmanji speakers among the 
Kurds or Sunni, Alevi and Ezidi Kurds, Muslim and Christian Arabs or Alevi, Sunni, Christian 
and Ezidi Roma. However, none of these are officially recognized as a minority by the Turkish 
state. The lack of recognition by the Turkish state implies that none of these minority groups are 
provided with a minority status and therefore they are not granted the rights related to mother-
tongue education, property acquisition and freedom of association as in the case of the three 
religious minority groups officially recognized by the state. These minority groups are only able 
to exercise the rights related to freedom of religion, freedom of association and linguistic and 
cultural rights granted with the reform packages adopted after Turkey was given official candidacy 
status by the EU in 1999.  
 
Based on the selection criteria provided above, the ethnic and linguistic minority groups that 
will be discussed in more detail as they show variation and represent different dynamics include 
the Kurds, the Caucasians which include the Circassians, Abkhazians, Georgians and 
Ossetians, Arabs and Roma. These groups vary with regard to their population levels, 
associational structures, sources of funding obtained and activities organized by their civil 
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society organizations and the location where they are concentrated. Kurds represent the highest 
population number in Turkey however their civil society organizations are mostly concentrated 
in the southeastern and eastern Anatolia region where they are the predominant population. 
Moreover, unlike the Caucasian groups which have solidarity associations established almost 
in every city where these groups live, Kurds are mostly represented through the branches of 
the Human Rights Organization (IHD), MEYA-DER or TUHAD-FED and the pro-Kurdish 
political party BDP. In comparison, Arab organization which stated that they do not establish 
any contacts with European and western organizations because they oppose the enlargement 
process, are concentrated mainly in southern and southeastern Anatolia but unlike the Kurds, 
they have close relations with the national government and obtain funding only from national 
sources. Kurdish organizations on the other hand, obtain funding for their activities from a 
variety of international organizations and mainly the EU and European sources, claiming that 
their relations with the national government are almost non-existent. In contrast, the Roma 
organizations can be found across Turkey in various cities where there is a Roma population 
however their demands and associational structure are completely different based on their 
location. For example, the Roma organization in Edirne which also receives funding from the 
EU, supports the AKP government in the Roma opening whereas the Dom civil society 
organizations mostly located in southeastern Turkey claim that they are marginalized by the 
state officials and they prefer to discuss their problems with the local municipalities. In light 
of these criteria, the main minority groups representing different dynamics and other ethnic 
and linguistic minority groups, will be presented in the following sections of this chapter.  
 
Georgians 
Georgians are one of the Caucasian groups that migrated to the Ottoman Empire at the end of 
the 19th century following the Ottoman-Russian war. According to the census numbers in 1965, 
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the total number of people who stated their mother tongue as Georgian was 34,330 whereas 
48,976 people declared speaking Georgian as a second language.381 In line with this, the total 
numbers of Georgians reported in 1965 was 83.306 where as other studies indicate 60,000 
people in 1979 and 1982.382 The president of the Georgian Cultural Association indicated that 
they believe there are currently 2-3 million Georgians living in Turkey.383 Most of the Georgian 
minority are Sunni Muslims however there is also a very small population of Catholic 
Georgians living in Istanbul as well.384 90% of the Catholic Georgians are believed to have left 
Turkey after the 6-7 September 1955 pogroms targeting the non-Muslims of Istanbul and Izmir. 
The language used by the Georgian minority is Georgian, which belongs to the Southern 
Caucasian language family. The Georgians of Turkey mainly live in the cities spread along the 
Black Sea coast starting at the Georgian border. According to research conducted with respect 
to Georgian villages, the main settlement places include the Black Sea, Marmara and Aegean 
regions.385  
 
The problems of the Georgian minority are mainly related to reversing the effects of the 
assimilationist policies exerted by the Turkish state.386 Today as a result of the bans on the use 
of, publishing and education in minority languages, most of the Georgians only speak 
Turkish.387 Even though there are language courses organized by civil society organizations, 
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they are not sufficient to revitalize the language. There isn’t any legislation mentioning the 
Georgian community or referring to the Georgian culture, language and ethnicity. The main 
demand in this sense is public education in mother-tongue languages and equal citizenship 
discourse within the new constitution. They also demand the return of the Georgian place 
names and the recognition of their ethnic identity. Moreover, they also highlight that even 
though there is a state television channel broadcasting in Kurdish, the same right is still not 
given to the Georgian community. Despite these, as part of the new law passed in 2012, the 
minority languages can be taught as elective classes given that there are 12 or more students 
that demand such classes, and the Georgian community is also applying for this right. 
 
Circassians 
There are many conflicting views with respect to the origin of Circassians and other Causasian 
groups including Ossetians, Abkhazian, Dagistanis, Ingush and Chechens. The first point of 
view is that Circassians are one of the indigenous peoples of North Caucasus and they are 
originally called Adiges.388 Secondly, Circassian is the name given to the indigenous peoples 
of North Caucasus that includes Adige and Abkhaz peoples. The third and final point of view 
indicates that Circassian is the general name for the peoples of Caucasus including Adige, 
Abkhaz, Balkars, Dagistanis, Ossetians and Chechens. The generally accepted view is that the 
Circassians is the name given to the Adige people.389 It is argued that 90% of the Caucasian 
groups in Turkey are composed of Circassians while the remaining 10% are Abkhaz.390 
However, in line with the field research conducted concerning the Caucasian peoples 
Circassian population is almost the same if not less than the Georgian population in Turkey. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 Aytek Namitok. 2003. Cerkeslerin Kokeni (The Origins of Circassians) translated by Aysel Ceviker. Ankara: 
KAF-DAV Publications. 
389 Arsen Avagyan. 2004. Cerkesler: Osmanli Imparatorlugu ve Kemalist Turkiye’nin Devlet Iktıdar Sisteminde 
(Circassians: Within the State-Power System of Kemalist Turkey and Ottoman Empire). Istanbul: Belge, 204.  
390 Minority Rights Group International 2007, 13. 
	   161	  
Therefore, it would be wrong to argue that the Caucasian groups in Turkey are only composed 
of Circassians and Abkhaz.  
 
During the 1965 census 58,339 people declared Circassian as their mother tongue where as 
55,030 declared speaking Circassian as a second language.391 However some indicate that the 
number of immigrant Caucasians is between 1-1.5 million.392 As a result of epidemics, wars 
and catastrophes the population numbers are believed to have dropped as low as 500.000. 
Recent population numbers point to numbers between 1.5-2 million.393 In addition, there are 
around 750 Circassian villages around Anatolia. Circassians were originally settled all around 
Anatolia except eastern and southeastern regions and Thrace. Circassians are predominantly 
Sunni Muslims belonging to the Hanefi sect. Their language is Circassian (Adigebze), which 
belongs to the Northwestern group of the Caucasian family.394 The Circassian population in 
Turkey mostly speaks Turkish, even though as in the case of Georgians, there are efforts to 
propagate the Circassian language among the youth.  
 
Adiges originally settled in Central and Western Anatolia and the Black Sea region. The 
greatest settlement is in Central Anatolia.395 The problems of the Circassian minority are also 
similar to those of the other Caucasian groups. The most problematic issue is the assimilation 
policies that caused most of the Circassian population to be Turkified and lose their language 
to a significant degree.396 The levels of the use of mother-tongue language are especially low 
among the youth and there is still discrimination directed against these groups both in private 
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and public spheres.397 However, the Circassian minority is more fragmented in terms of self-
identification and political views when compared with other minority groups. There are groups 
that demand mother-tongue education whereas there are others who describe themselves as 
Turkish-nationalists and are mostly supportive of the status quo.398 Given this, the more 
progressive groups reject the official views related to the Circassian history that humiliate and 
stigmatize the Circassian minority. Secondly, as declared by the Circassian Rights Initiative, 
Circassians in Turkey demand mother-tongue languages to be protected both de facto and de 
jure allowing the Circassian minority to name their children in Circassian as well as the return 
of the old village and town names in Circassian.399  
 
Abkhazians and Other Caucasian Groups 
Similar to the Circassian minority, Abkhazians are also one of the peoples of the Northern 
Caucasus that were exiled to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century from Russia.400 According 
to the 1965 census, the number of persons declaring Abkhaz as their mother tongue or second 
language is approximately 12.600 where as according to a research conducted in 1975 the 
number of Abkhazians living in Turkey was found as 39.572.401 Today there are various claims 
related to the numbers of Abkhazians living in Turkey ranging from 200.000 to 700.000. There 
is no fully accurate information with respect to the population numbers however it is argued 
that the number of Abkhazians living in Turkey today is more than the Abkhazians living in 
Abkhazia itself.402  
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Similar to the Circassian minority, Abkhazians are also Sunni Muslims and their language is 
Abkhaz, which is nowadays written in an enlarged Georgian alphabet.403 Abkhaz language is 
almost extinct in Turkey as most of the Abkhazians in Turkey only speak Turkish. Abkhazians 
mostly live in the Marmara, Mediterranean, Aegean and the Black Sea regions. The problems 
and demands of the Abkhazian minority are different than those of the other Caucasian groups. 
The main problem for the Abkhazian community in Turkey is the lack of diplomatic relations 
between the Republic of Turkey and Abkhazia. In a recent meeting with the Foreign Minister, 
Abkhaz representatives demanded direct flights to Abkhazia, permission for Abkhazian TV 
channels to be broadcasted in Turkey, allowing the Republic of Abkhazia to open a consulate 
general in Ankara and progress with respect to the fostering of diplomatic and economic 
relations between the two countries.404  
 
Another smaller Caucasian group living in Turkey are the Ossetians. In fact, the population of 
Ossetians in Turkey is the least when compared with other Caucasian groups. According to the 
civil society representatives, the population of Ossetians living in Turkey today is around 15-
20.000.405 Ossetians also migrated to the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century and they 
were placed in cities such as Kars, Erzurum, Mus, Van, Kahramanmaras, Kayseri, Tokat, Sivas, 
and Yozgat. Ossetians most of the time identify themselves as Circassians to the outsiders. 
Their religion is Sunni Islam and their language is Ossetic language, which belongs to the Indo-
European family.  
 
Arabs 
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The Arabs in Turkey are usually grouped into three categories by researchers: Sunni Arabs, 
Alevi Arabs and Christian Arabs.406 In addition to their religious differences, these three groups 
also designate themselves as separate from each other. Today around 1 million Arabs or Arab-
speaking groups are estimated to live in Turkey predominantly in Southern and Southeastern 
provinces such as Antakya, Mersin, Mardin, Urfa and Siirt.407 According to the 1965 census 
365,340 people declared Arabic as their mother tongue language, of these 179,309 were 
registered in cities known to have Sunni population while 170,418 declared speaking Arabic 
as mother tongue in Antakya and Adana and 9,430 in Mersin of whom most are believed to be 
Nusayris.408 Finally, Christian Arabs or Arab-speaking Christian groups cannot be 
distinguished within the 1965 census as the questions did not include any designation with 
respect to religion. However, according to other studies the Arab-speaking Christians 
predominantly living in Antakya and Istanbul are believed to be around 7000.409  
 
Sunni Arabs 
As evident from the title, Sunni Arabs are Sunni Muslim mainly from the Shaafi’i tradition. 
Their primary language is Arabic however different dialects were reported in cities where they 
lived.410 As in the case of the other minority groups, they cannot use Arabic in official 
communications, however its private use is much more common and easier when compared 
with other minority languages. The largest groups of Sunni Arabs live in Mardin, Urfa and 
Siirt.411 Also smaller groups are claimed to exist in Bitlis, Mus, Antep and Diyarbakir.412 There 
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are also Arab populations living in urban cities including Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir however 
their numbers are unknown to the academic community.  
 
Nusayris 
Nusayris are Arab-speaking Alevis believed to have come from Syria to the cities located at or 
close to Syrian border. The majority of the population lives in Antakya, Adana and Mersin. 
Smaller groups also live in bigger cities such as Istanbul and Ankara. Even though Nusayris 
also belong to the Alevi faith within Islam, they differ from Turkish and Kurdish Alevis with 
respect to the doctrines they follow. Their primary language is Arabic, generally Syrian dialect 
among older generations whereas younger generations primarily speak Turkish with a mixture 
of Arabic words.  
 
The problems Nusayris face are mostly similar to the challenges faced by other Alevis in 
Turkey. The main problem is the high levels of discrimination by the majority Sunni 
population. Discrimination against the Alevi population is most evident within history and 
religion books. Moreover, Alevis often face verbal or physical attacks by the Sunni majority. 
Secondly, there are significant obstructions before their religious freedoms. As it will be 
discussed in more detail below, Alevis are not allowed to open Cem Houses where they can 
pray and worship. In addition, they would like to hold their funerals at the Cem houses however 
they are obliged to hold the funerals at the mosques.413 The Directorate of Religious Affairs 
does not represent Alevis and they are not exempt from attending high school religion classes 
where the teachings are only related to Sunni Islam.  
 
Arab-speaking Christians 
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The Arab-speaking Christians primarily live in Southern Turkey. The largest population is in 
Antakya and the surrounding towns and villages while a smaller population lives in Mersin. 
There are even smaller populations living in Adana, Ankara and Istanbul. Most of the 
population today lives in European capitals.414 The Arab-speaking Christians of Antakya are 
exclusively Greek Orthodox and their primary language is Arabic. The Patriarchate of Antioch 
that is based in Damascus, Syria represents them. The Patriarchate of Antioch was historically 
based in Antakya however after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, it was closed down 
and transferred to Syria.415  
 
Roma, Domari and Lomari 
The general perception in Turkey with respect to the Roma population is that they are Sunni 
Muslim and live in Eastern Thrace. However, the reality is that Roma populations are dispersed 
around Turkey; they are not concentrated in any specific location and are significantly 
fragmented with respect to religion and language. The history of Roma in Turkey can be traced 
back to Byzantium times and it is believed they have existed in Anatolia and Thrace ever 
since.416 After the founding of the Turkish Republic, many Greek and Greek Orthodox Roma 
were forced to leave Greece for Turkey as part of the Population Exchange between Greece 
and Turkey in 1924. However, the Roma realized that they were not welcome in Turkey as 
well following the Settlement Law of 1934, which stated that “those that are not bound to the 
Turkish culture anarchists, migrant gypsies, spies and those that have been deported are not 
recognized as migrants”417 and that “nomads and Gypsies are to be settled in sites designated 
by the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance with a view to ensure their loyalty to Turkish 
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culture and improving the establishment and distribution of the population”418. The 1934 
Settlement Law remained in force until 2006.419 The Settlement Law of 1934 suggested that 
Roma groups should be treated with suspicion and should not be awarded citizenship without 
sufficient investigation. However, the Law on the Movement and Residence of Aliens 5683 
still remains in force today, which states that the Ministry of Internal Affairs is authorized to 
expel stateless and non-Turkish citizen gypsies”420. 
 
The Roma population in Turkey includes the Roma, Domaris and Lomaris. Each of these 
groups has a distinct culture and language as in the case of Domaris and Lomaris. There are no 
official census numbers with respect to the population of Roma in Turkey and therefore it is 
still an issue of debate. However according to research conducted by various academic and 
civil society circles, the numbers are estimated to be between 2-5 million across Turkey.421 The 
Roma groups identify themselves as Turkish citizens even though there is an emphasis on 
Roma identity. Most of the Roma are Sunni Muslims, but there are also reports about nomadic 
or settled Alevi Roma and smaller populations of Ezidi Roma living in Eastern Anatolia.422 At 
the same time, there are also Christian Roma groups among those populations living in Thrace 
region.423 They are socially and economically excluded and live in isolated neighborhoods, 
segregated from the rest of the Turkish society. Their primary language is Romani, which 
includes some Turkish loan words as well. The Doms are descendants of Doms in the Middle 
East and currently live in the southern and eastern Turkey and are primarily musicians. Their 
primary language is Domari while they are also proficient in Kurmanji or Zazaki dialects of 
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Kurdish as well as Turkish. Some Doms were also reported to use Arabic. Most of the time, 
they are described as Kurdified Roma and like the Kurds suffer from random discrimination of 
the security forces. Most Doms are of Islamic faith; their population is estimated around 
500,000. The majority of the population is nomadic. There is not enough research on the origin 
of Loms but they are believed to have arrived in Turkey from the Caucasus in the 19th century. 
They are mainly established in Northeastern Turkey and the Black Sea region. Unlike the 
Doms, they are predominantly settled. Their primary language is Lomavren, which is only 
spoken by some elderly Lomaris. The numbers are estimated around 150,000 but this 
information is not fully accurate as it is hard to estimate their population.424 
 
The most significant problem of the Roma population in Turkey is related to the prejudices and 
negative attitudes of the rest of the population and the state. They claim that they experience 
more discrimination in comparison to other minorities causing them to live in segregated and 
isolated neighborhoods. They are also constantly facing evictions from their houses due to the 
urban development projects implemented by the municipalities all around Turkey. Secondly, 
Roma population is highly prone to violence both by non-Roma populations and state security 
forces as they are seen as petty criminals by the majority of the non-Roma population. The 
Roma children are also marginalized in education not only because of the lack of financial 
resources, but also because of the discrimination by their teachers and other parents.425 Roma 
children are frequently forced to sit at the back of the class, in a group that receives little or no 
attention. To give an example, the Roma association in Adana in cooperation with the public 
kindergartens tried to implement an EU project for encouraging Roma parents to send their 
children to kindergarten. Following an inspection visit to the school by the project coordinators, 
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it was realized that the Roma children were segregated from non-Roma children and were 
placed in a dark, dirty room with broken windows.426 In addition to discrimination in access to 
housing and education, there is also significant prejudice by the employers. They are either not 
employed because of their identity or are not provided with the social security benefits that the 
Law requires.  
 
Kurds 
Considering all ethnic Kurds in the Middle East, their homeland or Kurdistan is described as 
the region divided into four between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Perhaps the population 
numbers of Kurds is the most contested issue among all debates concerning minority 
populations. There is no accurate information with respect to the total number of Kurds 
currently residing in Turkey. There are studies that give their population numbers as low as 12 
million where as there are also studies claiming that the numbers are as high as 28 million.427 
The more general consensus among academics is that the Kurdish population in Turkey is 
estimated between 15 million and 22 million. The numbers can be higher if those children with 
one Kurdish parent are taken into account.  
 
With respect to their religious differences, Kurds can be classified into three groups; Yezidis, 
Alevis and Sunnis. Pertaining to their linguistic characteristics, Kurds can be grouped into two 
groups; Kurmanji speakers and Zazaki speakers.428 Zazaki speaking Kurds or Zazas are also 
divided into two groups Alevi Zazas and Sunni Zazas. There are also other Kurdish speaking 
groups such as the Doms, which are the Kurdish speaking Roma populations in eastern and 
southeastern Turkey. Some studies consider the Zaza as a distinct ethnic identity and Zazaki as 	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a separate language but that they did not identify themselves as separate from the Kurds given 
their original homeland being in the Kurdish region.429 In fact, they talk about Zazaistan, 
described as the region where Zaza is spoken.430 On the other hand, other studies describe Zaza 
people as part of the Kurds that speak a different dialect that is called Zazaki.431 There is no 
distinct research with respect to the population numbers of these different groups. However, 
the Zaza population is estimated around 3 million whereas Alevi Kurds are estimated between 
3-4 million of the total number of Kurdish population.432 Kurdish population is predominantly 
concentrated in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. Sunni Kurds are dispersed all around the 
region, whereas Alevi Kurds mostly live in Bingol, Tunceli, Erzincan, Sivas, Maras, Malatya, 
Elazig, Adiyaman and Antep. Sunni Zazas mostly live in Diyarbakir, Mus, Bingol, Bitlis and 
Malatya whereas Alevi Zazas are concentrated in Tunceli, Sivas, Diyarbakir, Erzincan and 
some groups in Erzurum.433 There are also high numbers living in Western cities due to the 
village evacuations and forced migration in the 1990s as well as economic hardships as a 
consequence.  
 
During the 1990s, especially between 1992 and 1994, as the armed conflict escalated between 
the PKK and the Turkish army, the Turkish state forced around 3700 villages to be evacuated 
and at least 1 million and possibly over 2 million people were internally displaced.434 The main 
objective of the state was to prevent the logistical support given to PKK guerillas by these 
villagers however the state officials blamed PKK for the evictions as well as economic 	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hardships.435 The state sources gave the total number of internally displaced people as 378.335 
people from 905 villages.436 According to a study conducted by Hacettepe University Institute 
of Population Studies, the majority of the population settled in the Marmara, Mediterranean 
and Aegean regions and in cities such as Mersin, Adana, Antalya, Istanbul, Kocaeli, Izmir and 
Manisa as well as the capital city Ankara.437 Not only, the internal displacement created 
widespread human rights violations but also it triggered a myriad of social problems. The 
problems experienced by the internally displaced Kurds included widespread poverty, 
unemployment, access to healthcare, access to education, housing along with discrimination 
by the Turkish majority.438 In a similar vein, a study conducted by the Prime Ministry Office 
of Family Affairs states that poverty and unemployment are the most common problems faced 
by the IDPs.439 
 
The primary language used by the Kurds in Turkey is Kurdish and its Kurmanji and Zazaki 
dialects. In addition, Turkish is also widely used especially among the younger generations 
however the elderly and rural populations do not speak Turkish at all. Surprisingly even though 
Kurdish was banned both in public and private spheres almost throughout the 20th century, the 
Kurds could not be assimilated and Turkified as much as the other groups. This might be tied 
to their high population numbers, the use of oral tradition among Kurds and to the fact that the 
primary source of identification for the Kurds is language. Language is a major source of 
identification for the Kurds to the extent that some call themselves ‘Kurmanjis’.  
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The problems faced by the Kurdish population in Turkey are multifaceted. The human rights 
violations including ill treatment, torture, unidentified killings, psychological abuse, missing 
persons, random detainees and many more are a common practice by the state security forces 
in the region.440 The state of emergency that was declared in 1987 in the Kurdish cities was 
only lifted in 2002.441 The state of emergency laws and practices mostly pointed to severe 
human rights violations and still today mass graves within old police department buildings are 
found during excavation works.442 According to the Human Rights Association data, it is 
argued that the total number of mass graves in southeastern and eastern Turkey is 253 and the 
total number of bodies buried is more than 3000, however only 29 of these mass graves have 
been opened until today.443 Another system introduced by the Turkish state with the intention 
to form a local security force was the village guards system that was established in 1985.444 
The village guards were selected in each village and were provided with the means to fight the 
PKK guerillas. The total number of village guards, still active today, is around 80.000, of which 
59.000 are temporary and around 23.000 are volunteers.445 Between the 1990s and the 2000s, 
the Turkish constitutional court closed down 5 pro-Kurdish political parties, HEP, OZDEP, 
DEP, HADEP and DTP.446 In addition to these, the 10% election threshold forces Kurdish MPs 	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to run in the elections as independent candidates as the threshold does not apply for the 
independents. The 10% threshold results in much lower numbers of Kurdish MPs than they 
would have if the threshold were lower.   
 
At the time this research was conducted, the pro-Kurdish political party, Peace and Democracy 
Party (BDP) held 32 seats at the National Parliament. In addition to this, 4 elected MPs from 
the BDP group were in prison due to allegations for participating in terrorist activities. 
Furthermore, the BDP held 99 municipalities in the region and 1 municipality in Mersin that is 
located outside the Kurdish region.447 Kurdish demands are mostly related to bringing an end 
to the armed conflict, which brings along a vast number of human rights violations by the state 
security forces. Following the peace talks between PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and the 
Turkish government, the PKK announced a ceasefire in April 2013 and the PKK guerillas 
started to move out of Turkey as of 8 May 2013. In this process, formal talks between BDP 
parliamentarians and Abdullah Ocalan continue and one of the main demands of the Kurdish 
political elites is Abdullah Ocalan’s freedom.448 The issue of Ocalan’s freedom is one of the 
most sensitive issues in Turkey both for the Kurds who demand freedom for him and for the 
Turkish ultra nationalists as they strongly reject the idea of his release and want the death 
penalty brought back. The Kurds claim that there are still assimilationist policies being applied 
towards the Kurdish language and the main obstacle is the lack of public education in Kurdish. 
In fact, even though a state TV channel that broadcasts in Kurdish was opened in 2009, the 
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government also dictates the way Kurdish is spoken within the programs broadcasted in that 
TV, forbidding some of the words.449 The main demand concerning language is public 
education in Kurdish starting at the kindergarten level. It can be argued that the Kurds are the 
pioneers among other minority groups for the public education demands in mother tongue 
languages. As voiced by many Kurdish politicians and actually declared by the Democratic 
Society Congress (DTK) as well as the PKK, the Kurds demand democratic autonomy.450 
Autonomy for the Kurds symbolizes establishing their own regional courts, security forces, 
electing their own local administrators and education in mother-tongue languages and 
multilingual public services. They would like the notion of citizenship to be changed in a way 
that is becomes inclusive of all groups living in Turkey and they want Kurdish to be included 
in the new Constitution as one of the official languages of the Republic of Turkey.451 Finally, 
they want rehabilitations centers for the full integration of PKK guerillas into the society once 
peace is established.  
 
Other Ethnic and Linguistic Minority Groups 
Apart from the groups discussed in the preceding section, other ethnic and linguistic minority 
groups, examined as part of this thesis, include the Mhelmis, Molokans, Africans, Laz, Pomaks, 
Bosnians, Albanians and Hamshens. These minority groups have comparatively smaller 
population numbers or they have only a few minority organizations established. Molokans are 
a group who arrived in Turkey in the 19th century founding approximately 35 villages in Kars, 
a city in Eastern Anatolia.452 Today there are only a few families living in Kars as around 
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10.000 Molokans left Turkey due to pressure from the Turkish state. Molokans are Christian 
and their mother-tongue language is believed to be Russian. There was only one Molokan 
organization established in Kars that was dissolved in 2011.  
 
The Hamshens are a minority originally settled in the Black Sea region in Rize and Artvin as 
well as the surrounding towns and cities. Hamshens in Turkey are divided into two groups: 
Eastern and Western Hamshens. The language used by the Hamshens depends on their 
location.453 The eastern Hamshens speak the western dialect of Armenian called Homshetsma 
as well as Turkish while the western Hamshens speak Turkish only. Today the Hamshens in 
Turkey predominantly live in the Black Sea region while smaller populations live in the 
Marmara and Central Anatolian regions.454 Hamshens are Sunni Muslims while some of them 
are claimed to be converts, who converted to Islam from Christianity. Today the numbers are 
estimated between 80.000 and 100.000.455 As the civil society organizations are almost non-
existent, the problems of the Hamshen minority are not often voiced. However, the main 
demands and problems are close to the problems faced by other minority groups. The basic 
demand as expressed by the Hamshen Culture Research and Promotion Association (HADIG) 
President is to preserve and protect the Hamshen culture and language. There are also some 
demands voiced by HADIG recently for mother-tongue education in solidarity with other 
minority groups.456 Bosnians and Albanians are Muslim immigrants from Balkan countries 
who arrived in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th century. According to the 1965 census, 
17,627 people declared speaking Bosnian. However, today the numbers are estimated much 
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higher than 17.000. The total number of Balkan immigrants today is believed to be around 5-7 
million. Unlike other minority organizations examined in this thesis, their only purpose is to 
ensure solidarity between the Bosnians and Albanians in Turkey and in other countries.457 
When asked about minority rights and the demands of other minority groups, the civil society 
representatives stressed that they do not have any demands with respect to minority rights and 
in fact when approached by the government for a state television channel broadcasting in 
Bosnian, they rejected the offer claiming that they are Turks.458  
 
Pomaks are also described as Muslim immigrants from Balkan countries that sought refuge in 
the Ottoman Empire towards the end of the 19th century.459 According to the 1965 census, 
50.148 people declared speaking Pomak as their mother tongue or second language in Turkey 
while 51.180 people declared speaking Bulgarian as their mother tongue or second language.460 
Given this, the total number of Muslim immigrants from Bulgaria was registered as 101.328 
based on language only.461 There are also estimates by various sources that the numbers are 
around 320.000.462 The primary language used by the Pomaks of Turkey is Turkish. 
Nonetheless, they prefer to talk to their close relatives and family members in Pomak, which 
is a language described as Bulgarian spoken by Pomaks because of its similarity to Bulgarian. 
It is argued that the Laz minority shares the same origin with the Migrels that live in Caucasus 
today.463 According to the 1965 census, 85108 people declared speaking Laz as mother tongue 
or second language whereas a German linguist Feurstein claims that the number of Laz-
speakers in 1983 in Turkey was over 250.000.464 According to one source the number of the 	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Laz living in Turkey is estimated between 750.000 and 1.5 million whereas a Laz researcher 
claims that the objective studies conclude that the population numbers of Laz are around 400-
500.000.465 Given these it would be safe to say the numbers are between 500.000 and 1 million. 
The Laz are Sunni Muslims even though it is also claimed that previously they were Christians 
who converted to Islam during the 16th century. The primary language of the Laz minority is 
Lazuri nena, which is categorized within the same group as Mingreli and is related to Georgian.  
 
Mhelmis are one of the ancient peoples of Anatolia originally settled in Mardin and Batman. 
There isn’t any extensive research on the Mhelmis but the population living in Turkey today is 
estimated between 500-800.000.466 The primary language of the Mhelmis is the Mhelmi 
language, which is a dialect of Arabic called Qiltu.467 Mhelmis in Turkey are Sunni Muslims 
but there are Jewish or Christian Mhelmis in different countries. There is also a significant 
Mhelmi population that migrated to European cities from Turkey between the 1960s and the 
1980s. The Turkish citizens of African descent as they prefer to call themselves, are people of 
African descent in Turkey. They first arrived in Anatolia through slave trade or other means 
during the Ottoman Empire. There are also some Africans who arrived in Izmir from Crete 
during the 1924 population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Today Africans in Turkey 
mostly live in the Marmara and Aegean regions. The population numbers are around 5000 and 
almost all of them are Sunni Muslims.  
 
3.6.2 Religious Minorities in Turkey 
Unlike the ethnic and linguistic minority groups, three religious minority groups in Turkey are 
officially granted minority status and certain rights by the Turkish state due to Lausanne Treaty 	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of 1923. These are the Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish minority groups. Due to their 
official recognition, they have their own foundations dating back to the Ottoman Empire and 
their own schools providing education in their mother tongue languages. However, other 
religious minority groups such as the Assyrians or Alevis are not granted the same rights. Other 
religious minority groups examined in this thesis include the Protestants, Alevis, Assyrians, 
Latin Catholics and Ezidis. Among these, Alevis have the highest population numbers 
compared to other religious minority groups. They have numerous civil society organizations 
around Turkey and these organizations vary in terms of structure ranging from foundations to 
federations and from associations to initiatives. They also vary in terms of their demands, 
numbers, activities and sources of funding. Other religious minority groups on the other hand, 
have considerably lower population numbers and their civil society organizations are much 
more scarce compared to Alevis. In terms of the selection criteria, the religious minority groups 
that will be examined in more detail are the Alevis and the Assyrians. Even though, the 
Assyrians are concentrated predominantly in the southeastern region of Turkey, they have 
several organizations including a federation and they obtain significant amount of funding for 
their activities from international and European donors. Given the number of Assyrians living 
in European cities, they are also represented through diaspora organizations established in 
various capitals around Europe. In light of these, Alevis and Assyrians have high levels of 
dialogue with European representatives even though their population levels and associational 
structure vary.  
  
Assyrians 
The Assyrians are among the ancient Christian peoples of Anatolia. They are also called 
Syriacs or Syrian Orthodox Christians within some sources. They can be divided into two 
groups, Eastern and Western Arameans. The Assyrians together with Jacobites belong to the 
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Eastern Aramean group while Nestorians and Chaldeans belong to the Western Aramean 
group. The main difference between the two groups is the way Christianity is practiced. They 
are not listed within the 1965 census data. It is believed that there are around 25.000 Assyrians 
living in Turkey today.468 There aren’t any Chaldeans, Nestorians or Jacobites left as they 
migrated from Turkey mainly to Western capitals because of persecution and displacement. 
The Assyrians are historically settled in Southeastern Turkey, in the Turabdin region covering 
Mardin, Sirnak and Hakkari. Today the majority of Assyrians live in Europe while the 
remaining are settled in cities like Istanbul, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Sirnak, Elazig, Malatya and 
Adiyaman. Around 10.000-13.000 lives in Istanbul and the rest in Mardin, Diyarbakir, 
Adiyaman, Elazig, Sirnak and Malatya.469 
 
The Assyrians in Turkey are predominantly Orthodox Christians, but there are also smaller 
Catholic and Protestant groups in Diyarbakir and Mardin. The primary language spoken by the 
Assyrians is Neo-Aramaic as well as Turkish however some of the members of the minority 
also speak Kurdish. The problems faced by the Assyrian minority are slightly different than 
those of the officially acknowledged non-Muslim minorities. The Assyrians are not recognized 
as a minority by the Turkish state. Even though their foundations are still open, most of the 
property that belongs to the foundations were seized by the state and had been transferred to 
the treasury. Moreover, they have difficulty in providing mother-tongue education since they 
are not allowed to establish minority schools. The clergy education is also obstructed most of 
the time, they are not allowed to establish seminaries while frequently they report facing 
discrimination and being subjected to violence and attacks by the state security forces in the 
region. Assyrians are also distinct from other non-Muslim minority groups because during the 
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last elections they were able to elect an Assyrian Member of Parliament from Mardin from 
BDP. Given this, unlike other groups they are represented at the Parliament and with regards 
to the preparation of the new constitution, they were able to conduct a series of meetings with 
the Assyrian MP and his political party (BDP) to explain their problems and point out their 
demands.   
Alevis 
Alevi is the name given to the heterodox Muslim Shi’a communities that have different 
features.470 Alevism is categorized under the Shi’a denomination of Islam however their 
interpretation and practice are visibly different that those followed by Shi’a groups outside 
Turkey. Alevis are the most populated religious minority in Turkey, however there are many 
debates concerning their population numbers. The population estimates are between 7 million 
and 32 million. According to a study conducted in 2006, the numbers are given as 11.4% of 
the total population, which corresponds to a number slightly over 9 million.471 According to 
the Alevi-Bektasi Federation, the numbers of Alevis in Turkey are around 25 million.472 
 
There are four linguistic groups within the Alevi minority; Kurmanji, Zazaki, Turkish and 
Arabic.473 The Kurmanji and Zazaki speaking Alevis are Kurdish including Alevi Zazas, while 
Arabic speaking Alevis are also called Nusayris. Alevis are dispersed all around Turkey, they 
are not concentrated in one major area. However, the Nusayris are mostly concentrated around 
Antakya and Mersin whereas Zaza Alevis are mostly in Tunceli (Dersim) and Diyarbakir.474 
Kurdish Alevis live in various cities around the Eastern and Southeastern Turkey as well as 
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smaller groups in Central Anatolia. There are also reports of Alevi Roma that live in eastern 
Turkey but there is no research conducted on them. 
 
The problems of the Alevi minority are diverse and mostly related to their persecution and 
ignorance by the Turkish state. First of all, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which is a state 
institution, only represents the Sunni Muslims ignoring Alevis and their demands completely. 
The main problem is the state policy that does not recognize Alevism as a faith. Given this, 
Alevis are not granted any religious rights including freedom to open Cem houses where they 
worship and they cannot obtain funds to establish or maintain places of worship. Therefore, 
most Cems take place within their civil society organizations, which is perceived as 
disrespectful by the Alevis.475 The most commonly shared demand by all Alevis regardless of 
their ethnic background or language is the recognition of Alevism by the Turkish state. 
Secondly, they request freedom to open their own Cem houses with the support of state 
institutions. Thirdly, they would like all discriminatory phrases taken out of textbooks and they 
would like their children to be exempt from religion classes. Alevi faith representatives are 
denoted as Alevi dedes. Even though the Alevi dedes are religious leaders of Alevis, they are 
not provided any rights as religious workers. Given this, they would like to have official state 
protection against physical attacks towards their community members and civil society 
organizations.  
 
Other Religious Minority Groups 
As discussed at the beginning of this section, other religious minority groups, whose civil 
society organizations were examined as part of this thesis include the Greek Orthodox, 
Armenians, Jewish, Ezidis, Protestants and Latin Catholics. The Greek Orthodox minority in 
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Turkey consists of the ethnic Greek Orthodox that live in Istanbul, Gokceada (Tenedos) and 
Bozcada (Imros) as well as the Arab-speaking Greek Orthodox Christians that live in 
Antakya.476 According to the 1965 census 73,725 people declared they were Orthodox 
Christians while 48,096 people declared that Greek is their mother tongue language and 82,144 
people declared speaking Greek as a second language. Due to the oppressive policies of the 
Turkish state and the discrimination they face, majority of the Greek Orthodox population was 
forced to leave Turkey between the 1930s and 1980s. Today the population of the Greek 
Orthodox living in Istanbul is estimated between 3000-4000 while the Arab speaking Greek 
Orthodox living in Antakya are believed to be between 8000 and 10000.477 There are also 
around 200-250 Greek Orthodox living in Gokceada and around 20 in Bozcaada.478 The Greek 
Orthodox minority still uses a regional version of modern Greek, mixed with Turkish words 
and most members of the minority including the younger generations are bilingual.479 
 
Armenians like the Greek Orthodox are one of the ancient peoples of Anatolia as well, 
originally settled in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. Under the Ottoman rule, the 
Armenians had a high degree of autonomy and high population numbers until faced with the 
atrocities of the 1915 Genocide. According to the 1965 census 56,286 people declared speaking 
Armenian while 69,526 people identified themselves as Gregorian Christians.480 Today the 
Armenian population is believed to be between 60-80.000. In fact, it is estimated that the total 
number of Armenian citizens is 82.000 however around 10.000 of these live abroad leaving a 
population of 72.000 people in Turkey, of which only 5% live outside Istanbul.481 Primarily 
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they live in Istanbul even though smaller populations exist in cities including Antakya, Adana, 
Ankara, Diyarbakir and Tunceli. The overwhelming majority of Armenians in Turkey are 
Gregorian Orthodox, which have their own Patriarchate in Istanbul.482 There are also smaller 
groups of Catholics and Protestants. 
 
The final minority group granted official minority status by the Lausanne Treaty is the Jewish 
population, which is predominantly comprised of the descendents of Sephardic Jews expelled 
from Spain during the 15th century. There is also an ethnic Ashkenazi population however the 
numbers are much lower when compared with the Sephardic Jews. In 1927 the population 
numbers were around 80.000 while according to the 1965 census 38,267 people declared they 
are Jewish while today the numbers are estimated between 17.000 and 26.000.483 Of these only 
500-700 is Ashkenazi while the rest are Sephardic Jews. There are also reports with respect to 
Karaite Jews however they are dispersed around Turkey and cannot be traced. Following the 
foundation of Israel half of Turkey’s Jews left in the autumn of 1948 and the population fell 
from 76,965 to 45,995 three years later due to the constant physical and verbal attacks they 
faced, as well as the state pressure exerted on them. Today the majority of Jewish minority 
lives in Istanbul while there are smaller groups living in Izmir, Adana, Kirklareli and Antakya. 
They practice Judaism as Sephardic, Ashkenazic or as Karaites. The languages spoken by the 
Jews of Turkey are Ladino, Hebrew and Turkish. Historically there are traces of Jewish 
existence in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia who spoke Neo-Aramaic, Kurdish and Arabic 
however these groups have all left.484 
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The Ezidis are a community that primarily designate themselves through religion and secondly 
through ethnic identity. Ezidi religion is not acknowledged by Islam and therefore throughout 
history they were persecuted, discriminated and isolated by the Sunni Turkish majority.485 The 
Ezidis were not registered during the 1965 census but according to some sources the population 
numbers were around 10.000 during the late 1980s.486 From the 1980s onward, the majority of 
the Ezidi population left Turkey for Europe in order to escape from state oppression and 
persecution. Today the number of Ezidis living in Turkey is believed to be between 300-400. 
They are mostly concentrated in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey in cities such as Mardin, 
Urfa, Batman and Diyarbakir.487 The primary language used by Ezidis is the Kurmanji dialect 
of Kurdish and most of the Ezidis are monolingual as they are a rural population, the majority 
of the elder generation do not speak Turkish. 
 
The Protestants of Turkey are also called the reformist Christians together with Presbyterians. 
They are not listed within the 1965 census data and there is not any accurate information with 
respect to their population numbers. Today the number of Protestants in Turkey is estimated 
as 4000 to 6000.488 They are predominantly concentrated in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir 
whereas there are smaller groups in Eskisehir, Diyarbakir and Kocaeli. There are Protestant 
minorities that overlap with other ethnic and linguistic minority groups such as Assyrians or 
Armenians. The Latin Catholics of Turkey are dispersed around Turkey, mostly in those cities, 
where  the Christian population resides. There is no academic research on the Latin Catholics 
of Turkey but their presence in Antakya may be traced before the foundation of the Republic. 
To give an example, the Latin Catholic Foundation of Antakya was founded in 1922 and was 
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re-opened in 2003.489 There is no exact information about the population numbers but most of 
the population lives in the Marmara and Mediterranean regions. 
 
3.7 Civil Society Organizations and Minority Protection 
Studying issues related to the promotion of democracy, human rights and minority rights entails 
a thorough investigation of the interaction of civil society actors. Civil society actors are 
especially significant because they can act as intermediaries between the state and the 
individuals. They are additionally important in the Turkish case as the minority protection issue 
is an exceptionally contested issue in Turkey and civil society organizations can be effective 
in reaching a societal consensus for the adoption of reforms. In the case of the EU, it does not 
only consult and cooperate with civil society organizations but also provides financial and 
technical support to these organizations to promote and protect minority groups. EU bodies 
such as FRA assist both member countries and applicant countries for complying with minority 
protection criteria. In this regard, the civil society actors are consulted both at the EU and the 
domestic level in order to address the shortcomings in the reform processes, obtain information 
on the progress achieved as part of the accession process, exchange experience between 
member and candidate state governments and facilitate cooperation with the national 
governments and the EU.  
 
The EU cooperates with civil society actors through a number of platforms and instruments. 
The European Commission consults and cooperates with civil society organizations when 
formulating and implementing its policies. The European civil society dialogue scheme 
specifically aims to ensure cooperation and provides direct support to civil society 
organizations to promote minority protection. The EU also supports intermediary actors and 
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epistemic communities to take an active role in fighting discrimination and xenophobia. The 
FRA cooperates with both international and national organizations in European countries in 
order to collect data, conduct analyses, and engage in research activities on minority rights. In 
addition to this, the Fundamental Rights Platform founded in 2008 under the FRA establishes 
contacts with all types of civil society organizations in order to set up partnerships and obtain 
feedback and suggestions.  
 
Apart from these, the European Commission encourages the civil society organizations for 
active participation in EU decision-making processes. An example to such attempts of the EU 
is the EU Platform for Roma Inclusion, which aims to ensure cooperation and knowledge 
sharing between the EU, the national governments, international organizations, and civil 
society representatives. The 9th Principle of the 10 Common Basic Principles for Roma 
Inclusion published by the EU Platform for Roma Inclusion stipulates the involvement of civil 
society organizations for advancing the situation of the Roma.490 In addition to these, civil 
society actors are integral to the reforms implemented in EU candidate states since they help 
EU bodies to oversee the progress in the accession process. Another tool provided by the EU 
for promoting minority protection in candidate countries through the involvement of civil 
society organizations is the pre-accession financial aid. Civil society development and minority 
rights are fundamental among the key areas of concentration for EU financial support to 
candidate countries.  
 
The EU’s scheme on support for civil society dialogue and development identifies three areas 
of concentration. Firstly, the EU prioritizes support to local civic initiatives and capacity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 Council of Europe. “10 Common Basic Principles of Roma Inclusion.” Council of Europe, Strasbourg. 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/Resources/Documents/2011_10_Common_Basic_Principles_Roma_Incl
usion.pdf, downloaded on 14.04.2012. 
	   187	  
building at the grassroots level in order to enforce the civil society’s involvement. Secondly, 
the civil society dialogue programs aim to establish networks between epistemic communities 
and EU bodies. Thirdly, partnerships are to be formed between civil society organizations at 
the local and national level as well as the EU level so that the exchange of knowledge can take 
place and networks can be formed. One of the main tools the EU uses for promoting minority 
protection in candidate and potential candidate countries is the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).491 The EIDHR provides financial support for the 
implementation of projects on democracy, rule of law, human rights, and minority rights. The 
objectives of EIDHR for supporting projects on minority protection include: decreasing social 
disparities between majority and minority groups, improving the quality of life for persons 
belonging to minorities, strengthening social cohesion through the integration of disadvantaged 
individuals, and preventing discrimination.  
 
The role of civil society actors in the promotion of the EU’s minority standards within 
candidate countries can be multi-faceted. One of the most significant aspects of the 
transformative impact of the EU is the internalization of EU norms at the national level by the 
civil society actors. Most of the time, as seen in previous examples, even though formal 
transformation is complete and the necessary legislation is adopted, the implementation of 
those laws at the local level does not occur at the desired levels. To begin with, the civil society 
actors may facilitate the implementation of the minority standards by providing expertise to 
interpret and apply these norms to the domestic context. This is significant because the EU 
does not provide explicit and clear benchmarks with respect to minority protection and civil 
society organizations are particularly essential as they have the knowledge and the expertise in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491 European Commission, Human Rights and Democracy. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-
rights/index_en.htm. First downloaded on 15.04.2012. 
	   188	  
relation to European minority rights standards, which they can disseminate and assist state 
institutions in adopting these rules into the domestic laws. Moreover, civil society actors often 
act as a crucial mediating link between the EU and the candidate state when the formal 
accession negotiations might be blocked. Pertaining to the areas of interest for certain groups, 
minority civil society organizations also act as sources of pressure and participate in decision-
making processes through mutual meetings with national political actors while ensuring that 
some of the issues otherwise ignored by the state are taken into consideration. However, it 
should be noted that for minority rights, the role of civil society actors might be especially 
limited due to the controversial character of the issue and domestic factors such as the high 
political resistance. In addition, the capacity of the EU in terms of enforcement mechanisms is 
also constrained. One of the highly discussed challenges on the part of the EU support for 
minority protection projects is the monitoring process. Most of the time monitoring activities 
of EU projects are delegated to the civil society organizations active in that specific country. 
The civil society organizations are important sources of monitoring during and after the 
implementation of a project. In this sense, these actors not only limit but also legitimize state 
policies and practices by supporting certain activities or disseminating information to the 
general public and the minority groups so that it is easier to reach consensus on contested 
issues. To give an example, it was of utmost importance for the civil society organizations in 
Turkey to disseminate information about linguistic rights prior to the adoption of the law on 
the elimination of the ban on languages other than Turkish. The efforts of the civil society 
organizations and their support to the government provided the general public with an easily 
accessible source of information as well as expert knowledge through their collaboration with 
EU information centres and civil society development centres established by the European 
Commission. The civil society organizations were able to make use of the EU context and the 
new legislation in order to voice their demands for broadcasting in their mother tongue 
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languages. Finally, the civil society organizations provide a platform for minority groups where 
they can be organized as a group. This has proven to be both extremely challenging and 
progressive in the context of Turkey. As discussed in the preceding and proceeding chapters, 
the number of civil society initiatives in Turkey representing the minority groups increased 
significantly following the reforms on freedom of association. Given this, civil society actors 
were able to organize around various types and levels of organizations, which helped them to 
make use of the EU instruments and different political and financial resources. They were also 
able to form networks with other organizations in Europe so that an exchange of knowledge 
could take place. Such a role attributed to the civil society actors further enabled the 
internalization of European norms and standards by these organizations so that in turn they 
could act as pressure groups for their adoption. In addition, it provided the civil society actors 
with the necessary technical knowledge they might need in their negotiations with the Turkish 
state.  
 
However, the engagement of civil society actors does not always yield positive results. There 
are several factors that may impede the transformative impact of the EU on civil society 
activism. The most important factor for the increase of political efficacy of civil society 
organizations is the favourable domestic conditions. To give an example, following the 1980 
military coup and until the end of the 1990s, the civil society organizations in Turkey could 
not obtain funding from international institutions. In addition to this, it was a criminal offense 
to argue that minorities existed within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic. All of these 
legal and political restrictions caused the civil society organizations and other influential actors 
to be marginalized from the political spectrum. However, after the start of the accession 
negotiations and especially following the reforms on the laws governing civil society, more 
favourable conditions formed for the civil society organizations to take part in public and social 
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life more effectively. In the Turkish case, civil society actors were particularly important 
because the formal transformation process did not follow regular pace and sequence and it was 
interrupted on a number of occasions. Therefore, the civil society organizations increased their 
mobilization levels making use of available of EU resources, acted as a monitoring mechanism, 
an important way to disseminate information to the general public and as a means to provide 
expertise to the state institutions as well as a mediating actor between the government and the 
EU.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The civil society organizations in Turkey became a platform for representing the interests and 
for voicing the demands of the marginalized and disadvantaged groups for the first time in the 
history of the Turkish Republic, after the accession negotiations started in 1999. At the same 
time, the 1990s was a period when a major and substantive policy shift was witnessed in Europe 
with respect to minority protection standards. The end of the Cold War was a turning point not 
only for the EU but also for the international community in terms of the recognition of minority 
issues as a way to prevent the further escalation of minority/majority conflicts in Eastern 
Europe. 
 
Still today the EU does not spell out the minority standards explicitly and there are no clear 
instruments or templates that the member or candidate countries can adopt, emulate and act 
upon. However, there is an acknowledgement that the minority issue is integral to the European 
human rights system and is one of the founding principles of the Union. This is evident both 
from the TEU Article 2, which includes the protection of persons belonging to minority groups 
as one of the EU’s founding principles and also the adoption of the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities as a legally binding instrument.  
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CHAPTER 4  
DEVELOPMENT OF EU CONDITIONALITY TOWARDS TURKEY 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of the EU debate in Turkey had been its emphasis on the 
creation of a sufficient minority rights regime. In line with the official stand of the Turkish 
state, the reforms related to cultural rights sparked heightened nationalist reactions from the 
general public as a result of the perception that the EU was meddling with Turkey’s internal 
affairs and harmonization reforms threatened the indivisible unity of the nation. This chapter 
asks how EU conditionality has been developed since 1959 when relations first started between 
Turkey and the EEC, which can best be characterized by its persistence for human rights and 
democracy.  
 
I argue that an inquiry into the critical events that marked EU-Turkey relations from the 
particular perspective of minority rights and the critical junctures in Turkey’s history will shed 
light to this question. Since the beginning of the relations between the EU and Turkey in 1959, 
one can trace the gradual development of conditionality over the minority question, concurrent 
with the changing structure and role of the civil society organizations in Turkey. This chapter 
seeks to show through a detailed examination of the turning points in Turkey’s history related 
to human rights, under which historical circumstances and political conditions EU 
conditionality was employed towards Turkey on the question of minority protection and its 
culmination in the 2000s as well as the legislative reforms adopted by the Turkish government 
as a response to EU conditionality. In other words, I aim to discuss how different events that 
have marked the turning points in Turkey-EU relations, have also changed the use of EU 
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conditionality, while the EU continued pressuring candidate states for the alignment of their 
political and legal structures with the criteria492 laid down in Copenhagen in 1993.  
 
In this regard, I try to show that as the minority protection instruments have gradually evolved 
in Europe, especially after the end of the Cold War, the character and intensity of the political 
conditionality applied to Turkey with respect to minority rights has also changed. This chapter 
highlights that the EU pressure towards Turkish political actors regarding the implementation 
of minority reforms is most evident in the period 2000-2010. Even though the use of 
conditionality by the EU culminated throughout the years, in the case of minority protection in 
Turkey, I suggest that it remained almost inconclusive until the early 2000s. Following this, I 
argue that only after the Helsinki Summit in 1999, where Turkey had been granted candidacy 
status and the implementation of the laws concerning civil society in the early 2000s, EU 
conditionality started yielding substantive results with respect to minority rights reforms. I 
contend that there are two reasons for this: first of all the candidacy status formalized EU-
Turkey relations while concretizing the prospects for full membership, and secondly it changed 
the political efficacy of civil society organizations in Turkey in such a way that they were now 
able to participate in decision-making procedures.  
 
In order to investigate the arguments mentioned above, this chapter aims to provide a detailed 
discussion of EU-Turkey relations based on critical junctures, starting from Turkey’s first 
application to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 until the end of 2009, from 
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Member State must meet three criteria; political which indicates stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; economic implying the existence of a 
functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union; and acceptance of the Community acquis, ability to take on the obligations of membership, including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.  
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a particular perspective of minority rights. The chapter will be divided accordingly into four 
subsections, which elaborate on the critical events shaping the development of EU 
conditionality towards Turkey and the critical junctures that had an impact on EU-Turkey 
relations from the perspective of minority rights. Finally, the concluding section will provide 
the legislative reforms adopted after 1999 as a response to EU conditionality. 
 
4.1 Critical Junctures in EU-Turkey Relations 
Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, the governing elites in Turkey shaped the state 
policies based on the overarching objective of reaching the standards of Western economies 
and democracies.493 In this respect, the first formal attempt to build relations with the West was 
Turkey’s associate membership application to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1959 shortly after Greece applied for membership. It is argued that the Turkish government 
was motivated by the concerns that Greece’s membership might change the scope of the 
bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece.494 It was also based on the idea that reaching 
the modernity levels of the Western civilizations could only be attained if the relations with 
European Community could be strengthened.495  
 
However, Turkey’s aspirations to become an EC member were interrupted on several occasions 
based on the developments in Turkey affecting the human rights situation and the restoration 
of democracy. In this regard, the development of conditionality by the EU towards Turkey was 
particularly impacted by the military coups d’état declared in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Each of 
these military coups were followed by the introduction of certain measures by Europe with 
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494 Spyros Sofos. 2001. “Reluctant Europeans: European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Politics.” 
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495 Ibid, 246. 
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regard to the economic and political relations with Turkey. These measures were grounded in 
the deterioration of the human rights situation and the anti-democratic practices in Turkey. In 
addition to the military interventions, other turning points that also influenced the effect of the 
minority issue on Turkey-EU relations include the Cyprus conflict, formation of the Ozal 
government which came into power after 1980 coup d’etat, signing of the Customs Union 
agreement and the Helsinki Summit of 1999 when Turkey was granted candidacy status.  
 
However, the conditionality applied to Turkey by the EU does not follow the same path 
throughout the course of the relations. Even though the relations were suspended on several 
occasions, the policies adopted by the EEC during the 1960s and 1970s, differ from the 
proceeding decades in terms of the use of conditionality.  During the 1960s and 1970s, for the 
most part, the EEC chose to offer incentives ranging from financial aid to tariff concessions 
and even full membership prospects with the aim to achieve some degree of political and 
economic cohesion. Moreover, the setback in relations during this period mainly resulted from 
Turkey’s self-exclusion due to economic and political crises going on within the country. 
Although there were several instances of political violence, human rights violations, and even 
mass killings of civilians496, the reactions from the EEC were limited. 
 
During the period 1980s, political relations between the EEC and Turkey developed in a 
completely different direction than previous decades. More emphasis was placed on the human 
rights situation in Turkey both by the EEC and the Council of Europe. Moreover, for the first 
time in this period, the EEC referred specifically to the minority rights situation in Turkey 
within its official documents. In this context, the analysis reveals the EU conditionality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 On 1 May 1977 during a demonstration in Istanbul 40 people were killed after fire was opened from a nearby 
hotel.   
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regarding minority rights developed more rapidly in the 1980s when compared with the 
preceding decades even though these mostly remained inconclusive. The rapid development 
can be tied to the increasing number of human rights violations, the waves of immigration into 
Western Europe especially by the Alevis, Kurds, Ezidis and Assyrians and finally more 
emphasis being placed on human rights issues in Europe. The European criticisms regarding 
the political situation in Turkey continued until the end of the 1990s when Turkey was granted 
candidacy status. Although there were several instances where the reward and punishment 
system was used previously, the candidacy status granted in 1999, allowed the EU to apply 
conditionality formally.  
 
In this context, the Turkish state’s attitude towards minorities can be examined from two 
perspectives. The first point of view is related to the continuation of the systematic repression 
that marked the entire 20th century and is directly reflective of the way the Turkish state 
consider minorities, as a potential threat to national unity and interests.497 The second 
perspective is relevant to the events in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy and how the 
developments in EU-Turkey relations had an effect on these policies. In light of these, the 
events concerning the ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities in Turkey during the 1960s 
and the 1970s were mostly disregarded by EEC officials. In addition, even though there were 
many instances of discrimination and physical attacks towards the non-Muslim minorities, the 
EEC failed to express any opinion with regards to these as well. European officials only voiced 
criticisms regarding the military takeover in 1960 and the death penalty rulings for high-level 
politicians in 1961. This supports the argument that the conditionality on minority rights 
developed gradually, and between 1959 and 1979 it was almost inexistent. As will be seen in 
the following subsections of the chapter, the use of conditionality regarding the minority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497 Seyla Benhabib and Turkuler Isiksel. 2006. “Ancient Battles, New Perspectives”, Constellations 13(2), 226.  
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question is more evident in the 1980s and the 1990s especially with respect to the minority 
issue in Turkey. Finally, the 2000s represent the formalization of conditionality towards Turkey 
following the start of the accession negotiations.  
 
4.2 Military Coups D’état 
The history of the Turkish Republic is marked with three military coups d’etat that took place 
in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Each of these military coups had different effects on Turkey-EU 
relations resulting in the deterioration of the human rights situation and the application of anti-
democratic practices. The results varied from the suspension of the relations as a whole to the 
freezing of financial aid and the publication of resolutions criticizing the human rights regime 
adopted by Turkey and calls for the restoration of democracy. In this regard, these military 
interventions represent important junctures in Turkey-EU relations for the development of 
conditionality with respect to minority rights by the EU towards Turkey. They also demonstrate 
how the Turkish state’s attitude towards the EU and the minority groups in Turkey changed 
over time in light of the emphasis placed by the EU on the formation of a sufficient minority 
rights regime in Turkey.   
 
1960 Coup D’état 
1960 military coup resulted in the suspension of the negotiations regarding Turkey’s 
association membership application in the short term. The 1960 military coup is significant 
because this disruption in relations can be regarded as the first use of conditionality by the EEC 
towards Turkey. It also signaled that the future of EU-Turkey relations would be determined 
to some extent by the respect for human rights and the promotion of democracy in Turkey and 
that the EEC would react to and take action against the anti-democratic practices in Turkey. 
Membership negotiations between the EEC and Turkey restarted after a short period and the 
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talks continued throughout 1961 and 1962. Although the Turkish state was determined to prove 
that Turkey still retained its aspirations to become a member, two groups that were in favor of 
or that opposed EEC membership formed among the political elites. On the one side, the State 
Planning Organization (SPO), which was an outcome of the military regime, was strongly 
against membership on the grounds that it would hinder economic growth and regarded 
membership attempts as treason.498 On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry continued pushing 
for membership, as they believed that membership would foster economic and social 
modernization and at the same time prevent the changes in the geopolitical balance in Greece’s 
favor.499  
 
In March 1961, Greece signed an association agreement with the EEC, and around the same 
time, the Council of Ministers, following a recommendation by the Commission, proposed two 
options including a five-year trade partnership followed by a Customs Union agreement on the 
condition that certain degrees of economic growth is achieved and financial aid. As a reaction 
to this, the military government published an official statement declaring that any other option 
besides the Customs Union agreement will not be acceptable.500  
 
In September 1961, the Turkish democracy witnessed a major downturn when three high-level 
politicians, including a former Prime Minister, were sentenced to death and executed shortly 
thereafter. Following this, once again relations between Turkey and the EEC were suspended. 
This was the first time relations were suspended due to the violation of human rights in Turkey 
and thereby the first substantive use of democratic conditionality. The difference with the 
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previous suspension of the relations in 1960 was that in 1960 the EEC preferred to observe the 
domestic developments, whereas in 1961, the EEC reacted to a particular event namely the 
death penalty decisions.  
 
In October 1961, the first general elections were held and the newly formed government 
declared right away that they were committed to the amelioration of the relations with the 
Community and called for the restart of the negotiation talks.501 In March 1962, the Foreign 
Minister of visited France in an official capacity and soon after France lifted its veto over 
Turkey’s membership and official negotiations restarted in July 1962. In May 1963, the EEC 
Council of Ministers decided to grant $175 million as financial aid, which was followed by the 
signing of the Ankara Agreement. As a result Turkey became an associate member of the EEC 
in June 1963. The Ankara Agreement was significant in the sense that it prescribed three stages 
and set the ultimate aim as full accession to the EEC however a definite timetable was not 
determined. The first stage continued until the early 1970s and Turkey was granted certain 
privileges and tariff concessions and in return Turkey was obliged to bring its economy to the 
required standards for moving the next stage.502  
 
The policies regarding the minorities in the 1960s were no different than those implemented 
throughout the history of the Republic. Political and military policies towards the Kurds applied 
throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s were also complemented by economic policies in the 
1960s.503 Also called the 49ers, 50 Kurdish activists and students were arrested in Istanbul and 
Ankara in 1959 on the grounds that they were pursuing separatist activities and because of their 
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support for a prominent Kurdish intellectual Musa Anter.504 Shortly after the military coup in 
1960, 55 Kurdish tribal leaders were exiled to the western parts of the country together with 
their families.505 This was related to the modernization ambitions of the Turkish state, which 
saw Kurdish aghas as elements of backwardness and also wanted to break the Kurdish 
opposition.  
 
The state discourses on the Kurdish minority in the 1960s frequently alluded to regional 
backwardness506 and underlined the concerns for the absence of any kind of cohesion between 
the Kurdish regions and the Turkish economy. This regional backwardness was often 
associated with the Kurds depiction and uncivilized and their inability to achieve desired 
degrees of integration with the Turkish majority. One of the main reasons behind such a 
conceptualization of the Kurds as uncivilized by the Turkish state was their persistence for 
speaking Kurdish in their daily lives. To further assimilate the Kurds, the military regime 
inaugurated the “Citizen, speak Turkish” campaign in 1961 once again, which originally started 
in the 1930s as mentioned in the previous chapter. The military regime of 1961 also 
systematically “Turkified” village names in the northern, eastern and southeastern part of 
Turkey, which were originally Armenian, Kurdish, and Lazuri.507 By the end of the 1970s, the 
Turkish state changed almost 12000 village names from Kurdish, Armenian and Lazuri to 
Turkish.508 Regional boarding schools were established predominantly in the eastern and 
southeastern regions to further Turkify the younger Kurdish populations. 60 out of 70 boarding 
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schools that were established were located in the Kurdish cities.509 The newly established 
registrars were especially preventing the registration of children’s names in Kurdish.  
 
The 1960s represent a new phase for the Kurdish movement in Turkey due to the revival of the 
Kurdish ethnic identity within both popular and intellectual circles. This intellectual 
movement, which mainly focused on the language, specifically aimed to create a unified 
Kurdish language based on the Kurmanji dialect.510 In addition, the Kurdish movement of the 
1960s aligned itself with the Left and the prominent figures in the Kurdish community joined 
the Turkish Worker's Party (TIP). The demands of Kurdish actors mostly concentrated on 
integration with the Turkish society than independence.511 The leftist tendencies were also 
apparent in the formation of the Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East (DDKOs), an 
association founded by Kurdish university students in 1969. However, not all members of the 
Kurdish community aligned themselves with the Leftist movement and the traditionalists 
established their own political party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey (TKDP) in 
1965. The Constitutional Court closed down TKDP in 1968 on the grounds that the party was 
plotting a plan with the political elites in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Syria for the 
declaration of an independent Kurdistan.512 For the Alevi minority, it is possible to speak of a 
better political environment in the 1960s when compared with the Kurds or the non-Muslim 
minorities. In the second half of the decade, there were several political journals published by 
Alevi associations and by the end of the decade the Alevis established their own political 
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party.513 Solidarity Party (BP), founded by the Alevi activists in 1966, won eight seats in the 
Parliament during the elections of 1969. The party participated in active politics until the end 
of 1970s; although, it could not enter the Parliament after the 1969 elections. As the other 
minority groups were highly oppressed and were not organized as in the Kurds or Alevis, they 
were further marginalized from the public and political spheres. However, despite this 
marginalization, systematic repressive policies continued to be exerted throughout the decade. 
 
1970 Coup D’état 
In the 1970s, Greece, Portugal, and Spain became full members of the EEC. Even though 
Turkey and Greece were following similar courses in terms of their relations with the EEC in 
the 1960s514, the relations between Greece and the EEC developed closer than that of Turkey’s 
in the 1970s. The relations took a downturn especially due to the Cyprus issue, which escalated 
in 1974. The relations with Europe deteriorated further following the military takeover in 
September 1980. The first half of the 1970s was marked with political unrest and economic 
hardships both in Europe and Turkey. The economic crises had significant impacts not only on 
the EEC countries due to the oil crisis but also on Turkey.515 Politically, as Europe moved 
towards political integration, Turkey was struggling with another political impasse. On 12 
March 1971, the Chief of General Staff published a memorandum and declared that “a strong 
and credible government be formed that would be able to end the ‘anarchy’ and carry out 
reforms ‘in a Kemalist spirit’”516. Shortly after, the government was dissolved after the 
resignation of the Prime Minister and the military generals formed the new government.  
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Shortly after installing the new government, the military was once again driven by security 
concerns particularly due to the escalation of the armed struggle in the Kurdish region. In April 
1971, martial law was declared in eleven cities around Turkey with the stipulation that it would 
be renewed every two months until 1973.517 Following the proclamation of martial law, the 
military prosecuted and arrested around 5,000 people, including leading Kurdish intellectuals 
and civil society representatives.518 In spite of the human rights violations in Turkey and the 
reactions on the side of the EEC, the economic relations between Turkey and the EEC were 
not suspended and an additional protocol entered into force in 1973.  
 
The military intervention in 1970 took away even the smallest political, cultural, and social 
rights and liberties the minority groups enjoyed. The members of the DDKOs were imprisoned 
due to allegations of treason and attempting to divide the nation.519 Around the same time, on 
21 July 1971, the Constitutional Court closed down TIP again on the grounds that it was trying 
to challenge the indivisible unity of the Turkish state. The Court’s decision declared that the 
party's activities were in violation of Article 81 of the Law on Political Parties; which 
prohibited arguing that minorities exist in Turkey.520 Especially after the prosecution of the 
prominent intellectual figures within the Kurdish movement, two ideological camps formed 
within the leftist groups of Turkey and in return, the Kurdish movement started moving away 
from the Turkish left. At this point, the discourse of the Kurdish movement shifted from 
concerns over integration with the Turkish society and class struggle towards independence 
and particularly demands related to the recognition of their identity.  
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 Such a shift in the Kurdish movement in the 1970s also fed the emergence of the Workers' 
Party of Kurdistan (PKK) as national socialist liberation movement under the leadership of 
Abdullah Ocalan in 1978. The armed struggle between the Turkish army and the PKK 
guerrillas continued throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and the beginning of the 2000s, resulting in 
the displacement of millions of Kurdish families and tens of thousands of casualties. Even 
though the Kurds were particularly targeted by the Turkish military and the political elites, a 
number of independent Kurdish mayors were elected during the local elections of 1977. This 
positive atmosphere lasted until the 1980 military coup, which had one of the most severe 
consequences on the minority groups in Turkey.  
 
At the same time, a decision issued by the High Court of Appeal described minority 
foundations as “foreigner” and therefore found it dangerous for them to acquire property. 
During the 1970s tension between the Armenian minority and the general Turkish public also 
escalated, as the number of campaigns organized by the Armenian Diaspora for the recognition 
of the 1915 Armenian Genocide increased in Europe. However, the actual conflict started after 
1973 when ASALA started organizing attacks against the Turkish state both in Turkey and 
abroad. ASALA, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, continued its 
attacks until mid-1990s, which increased the tension between the Turkish state and the 
Armenian minority and marginalized them further. For the Alevi community, the strained 
relations with the Turkish state that were already tense further deteriorated when a movie 
theater was bombed in Maras in 1978, where the majority of the population was Kurdish Alevi. 
Upon this, the nationalist and right wing groups started violent protests and attacking the Alevis 
causing the death of more than 100 people. As a result, on 26 December 1978, a state of 
emergency was proclaimed in 13 cities including Istanbul and Ankara. The Maraş incident, 
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which represents the highest point of political violence prevalent in the 1970s in Turkey, is 
regarded as a turning point before the 1980 military intervention.  
 
1980 Coup D’état 
By the end of 1970s, both political and financial relations with the EEC were strained until 
another coup d’état was instigated on 12 September 1980. In May 1981 Turkey’s Council of 
Europe membership was suspended and in July 1982 it was declared that an official 
investigation about the human rights violations in Turkey would be conducted.521 The 
economic relations between Turkey and the EEC, on the other hand, were not influenced by 
the impasse in the political relations. The EEC continued to be the most important trading 
partner for Turkey in the 1980s. Human rights violations and anti-democratic practices became 
the main determinants of the direction of the relations between the EU and Turkey especially 
after the military takeover in 1980.522  
 
After the 1980 military coup, the military regime dissolved the Parliament and lifted the 
immunities of all parliamentarians while at the same suspending all political and civil 
organizations and arresting political party leaders. The military generals controlled all social, 
economic and political decisions and activities, including those related to education, media and 
civil society organizations. In the first six weeks after the coup, 11,500 people were arrested 
and by the end of 1982, 122,600 people were prosecuted by the military courts. The issue of 
human rights violations during this decade significantly hurt the relations between Turkey and 
Europe. In 1982, the EC froze all formal relations with Turkey, and suspended all formal 
talks.523 Despite the suspension of relations, the military reaffirmed its commitment to the EC 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521 Clement Dodd. 1990. The Crisis of Turkish Democracy. London: EOTHEN Press, 61; European Commission 
of Human Rights. European Human Rights Report. Vol.4, Part 4. 
522 Sofos, 253.  
523 Muftuler-Bac 2005, 19.    
	   206	  
membership prospects and declared that Turkey would apply for full membership once the 
democratic regime was reinstalled.524  
 
In order to normalize the political order, a constitutional committee was formed in 1982 with 
the task to prepare a new constitution. The new constitution increased the authority of the 
President and the National Security Council excessively. It also limited the freedom of press, 
the freedom of association and the fundamental rights particularly related to linguistic, cultural 
and political rights. The new constitution was put to a referendum vote in 1982, which took 
place under the scrutiny of the military and was accepted with 91.4% of the votes. Following 
the adoption of the new constitution, a new law on political parties entered into force, which 
banned the political actors who were active prior to 1980 from participating in political life for 
10 years. According to this law, the establishment of new parties was conditional on an 
approval obtained from the National Security Council while public workers, students, and 
teachers were prohibited from taking active part in politics. Moreover, it was forbidden for 
political parties to establish women’s or youth organizations, to collaborate with civil society 
organizations, or to open offices in smaller districts and villages. In the end, only three parties 
could enter the general elections held in 1983. The National Democracy Party (MDP) and the 
Populist Party (HP), were established by the military officials themselves, while Motherland 
Party (ANAP) was a right wing party least favored by the military. During the general elections 
of 1983, the Motherland Party obtained over 45% of the votes and formed the first civilian 
government after the military intervention. The EEC published a resolution that condemned 
the elections stating that the elections did not reflect democratic practices. Shortly after, the 
European Commission also announced a declaration that the elections did not demonstrate 
democratic features as only three parties were allowed to enter the elections. 
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The period between 1980 and 1989 was a turning point with respect to the EC's use of political 
conditionality towards Turkey. Not only has it become more visible towards the end of the 
decade, but also its scope widened including democratization, human rights and more 
specifically minority rights by 1989. This was in part due to the increased interest of EC 
member states in Turkey’s internal affairs and in part to the escalating human rights violations 
in Turkey. It was related to the development of minority protection tools in Europe. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, which was marked by another military coup, there was a wave of 
arrests targeting all progressive forces. There were significant and widespread allegations of 
torture in prison. In addition, most of the party closures by the Constitutional Court were 
executed on the grounds that they were trying the challenge the indivisible unity of the Turkish 
state by claiming that minorities existed in Turkey.  
 
After the 1980 military coup, the attempts to assimilate the Kurdish identity was intensified 
through an ideological, institutional, and political emphasis on ethnic Turkish nationalism. The 
leaders of the PKK including Ocalan left Turkey shortly after the 1980 coup, and in July 1981 
the PKK’s first official congress was held on Syrian-Lebanese border. On the order of the Chief 
of General Staff, within the official documents Kurds were described as ‘Mountain Turks’ and 
in 1983 a law abolished the use of Kurdish even in daily life depriving the Kurds of all linguistic 
and cultural rights.525 In 1984, the PKK published its first manifestation stating that it will 
pursue an armed struggle with the Turkish state for secession.526 From 1986 onwards, the 
Turkish authorities introduced additional security measures including the establishment of a 
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‘village guard’ system and counter-terrorism units.527 Throughout the decade, a significant 
number of Kurdish intellectuals fled to Europe, especially to Germany, Netherlands, and 
Sweden, adding a transnational dimension to the Kurdish issue.  
 
Around the same time, ASALA also escalated its attacks towards Turkish diplomats while the 
Armenian diaspora pressured the European governments for the recognition of the 1915 
genocide.528 The emergence of ASALA as well as the international recognition of the 1915 
genocide increased the isolation and marginalization of the Armenian minority. Although 
ASALA was dissolved by mid 1980s, the threats towards the Armenian community continued. 
In the 1980s, following Ozal’s democratization policies, there were some improvements in the 
situation of the Greek Orthodox minority.529 The government eliminated the law that required 
Greek Orthodox groups that were forced to leave Turkey in the 1960s and the 1970s to obtain 
a visa when coming back to Turkey and abolished the ban on the use of the properties that 
belonged to those extradited; however, most of them did not return.530 The 1980s is also the 
decade when most minority migration to Europe took place. In order to escape prosecution and 
the brutal policies of the military, nearly all Ezidis in Turkey and around 50,000 Assyrians 
immigrated to Western Europe, most notably Germany, France, Netherlands, and Sweden by 
the mid-1980s.531 Over the years, these minority groups started establishing diaspora 
organizations in Europe providing another form of representation. These alternative platforms 
were especially useful after the minority organizations in Turkey were allowed to establish 
partnerships with foreign civil society organizations. 
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4.3. Election of Ozal Government  
Even though a new civilian government took over in 1983, the military presence within Turkish 
politics did not disappear. The military followed the actions of the new government through 
the Presidential Council that was composed of military generals. Moreover, the whole country 
was still under martial law, military courts were trying activists through mass trials while there 
were numerous complaints about prison conditions and torture.532 Right before the elections, 
the military government enacted a new law prohibiting the use of all languages that were not 
the first official language of a state recognized by Turkey.533 This was especially targeting 
minority languages such as Kurdish, Armenian, Lazuri etc. 
 
One of the most important aspects of the 1980s was that it saw the reawakening of civil society 
in Turkey. The first social movement in the post-military coup context was the feminist 
struggle. Following this, the Human Rights Association of Turkey was established in 1986, 
which later acquired a Kurdish focused character particularly in the 1990s.534 In 1987, the 
Turkish Parliament ratified the right to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), opening the way for citizens of Turkey to carry cases related to human rights abuses 
into the international sphere.535 The key events regarding Turkey’s minority problem during 
the 1980s mainly determined the frequency and context of EC’s political conditionality towards 
Turkey. First of all, the number of minority groups fleeing Turkey for Western European states 
increased tremendously in the 1980s. This gave the minority question a transnational character. 
Moreover, by the end of the 1980s these groups were acting like pressure groups in Europe 
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putting an additional pressure on the EC for the use of conditionality. Since most of the 
immigrants were of Kurdish, Assyrian, Ezidi, and Alevi origin, and they were inclined to speak 
about the problems of their own communities, and therefore the context of EC’s conditionality 
focused more on the minority issue by the end of the 1980s. Finally, the frequency of the use 
of conditionality increased as the human rights violations escalated. However, in spite of the 
increase in the use of conditionality by the EC, Turkey did not improve the situation of the 
minorities at all. In fact, arguably it could be said that for some it worsened. The 
democratization efforts were inconclusive as a result of the military’s close scrutiny over 
political activities. The international community had to wait until the end of the 1990s for the 
conditionality to yield any results in Turkey.  
 
From the moment he came to power in 1983, Prime Minister Ozal aimed to restore democracy 
and continue the interrupted democratization efforts. The Ozal period is significant in the sense 
that the government was really determined to improve the deteriorated relations with the 
European Community. These aspirations were mostly driven by economic motivations. In this 
regard, the first Ozal government expressed within its program that EC membership was its 
ultimate aim.536 However, relations between Turkey and the EC did not turn back to its normal 
course immediately following the election of a new government. After the suspension of 
relations in 1982, it was clear that the normalization of EC-Turkey relations depended on the 
amelioration of the human rights situation in Turkey. In this period, the EC emerged as a 
significant political and economic stimulant that would shape the human rights policies of the 
Ozal government.537 In other words, the first instance when EU conditionality on human rights 
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yielded results and triggered the implementation of democratic reforms was during the Ozal 
government in the 1980s.  
 
In order to reactivate the frozen relations, a Turkish delegation visited the European 
Commission in January 1984 in order to convey the message that Turkey was willing to 
revitalize the relations. In response the Commission declared that that the normalization of 
relations depended upon the progress for the restoration of democracy and respect for human 
rights in Turkey. At the same time, by the mid-1980s, the European Parliament had become 
the most vocal actor on behalf of the Community for criticizing the human rights violations in 
Turkey. In April 1984, the European Parliament adopted two resolutions: the first one on the 
respect for human rights in Turkey and the second one on the continuing violations of human 
rights.538 The general elections in 1984 were also highly criticized by the European Parliament 
and the Commission on the grounds that the limiting character of the law on political parties 
did not reflect democratic principles.539 All of these criticisms pointed to the significance 
attributed to the democratization of Turkey and determined the pace of the developments in the 
relations. In October 1984, two additional resolutions were adopted that were critical of the 
death penalties and the imprisonment of a former Turkish ambassador who was also a peace 
activist. The European Parliament also declared its decision to abolish the efforts for 
establishing the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee.540 The European Parliament 
issued four other resolutions during the second half of 1984 revealing that the progress in EC-
Turkey relations would be conditional on Turkey’s human rights record even though a civilian 
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government was formed. The content of criticisms also showed that the EC started paying 
closer attention to human rights violations.  
 
In 1985, the European Parliament started criticizing the Ozal government for the way it has 
been dealing with the Kurdish issue, in particular for the implementation of the policies that 
led to a systematic genocide of the Kurdish minority. The Kurdish question was included in a 
number of EP resolutions within the framework of cultural rights. The Parliament adopted 
another resolution in 1985 criticizing the military trials that still continued since the military 
takeover and the adoption of a new draft bill that increased the powers of the security forces 
tremendously. Following this, the EC delegation representative in Ankara stated that the 
adoption of this bill would be detrimental for Turkey’s relations with Europe. By the end of 
1985, the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament announced the Balfe Report, 
which stated that Turkey was still far from complying with the human rights standards and 
recommended extending the suspension of the Joint Parliamentary Committee.541 This report 
was followed by another condemning EP resolution that contained detailed references to the 
violations of the rights of the Kurdish population. The Balfe report and the following EP 
resolution was a major downturn for the efforts of the Turkish government towards the 
reactivation of the Association Agreement. In return, Turkey reacted to these two highly critical 
official documents very harshly that the report included false information. Such a reaction once 
again escalated the tension between Turkey and Europe. 
 
Domestic political developments in Turkey in 1986 eased the relations to a certain degree. 
Finally, in 1986 partial financial aid was released from the EC to Turkey while highlighting 
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the expectation that Turkey would prevent the human rights violations. In September 1986, the 
EC-Turkey Association Council met for the first time since 1980 and the EC representatives 
stressed once again that restoring democracy and respect for human rights were essential for 
the normalization of relations.542 However, the European Parliament adopted another 
resolution in December 1986, declaring that the EC was not yet ready to fully normalize 
relations with Turkey due to the persistent human rights problems.543 By the end of 1986, it 
was clear that any improvement in Turkey's human rights record would be rewarded with 
normalization while any deterioration related to human rights could lead to another suspension 
of the relations. From the 1980s onwards, political conditionality especially with regards to 
human rights had become one of the main determinants in shaping the course of relations.  
 
After almost seven years of impasse in the relations, dominated by the condemnations and 
criticisms from Europe, it was clear to the Ozal government that the Association Agreement 
cannot be revitalized as the human rights violations continued.544 By the beginning of 1986, 
the Prime Minister declared his intention to formally apply for full membership to the EC. Even 
though EC member states were implying that Turkey should not hurry in submitting a 
membership application, Turkey submitted a formal application in April 1987. Through this 
application, Turkey provided the EC with a leverage and formal authority to investigate its 
internal affairs closely than before.545  
 
Following Turkey's full membership application, the European Parliament adopted another 
resolution stressing that, “Turkey's policy towards the Armenians, the Kurds, Greece, and 
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Cyprus, coupled with the lack of true democracy and respect for human rights, were 
insurmountable obstacles for the consideration of Turkey's accession to the Community”546. In 
addition, the Parliament called on the Turkish government to recognize the 1915 Armenian 
genocide on an official capacity and claimed that the Armenian question and the question of 
minorities in Turkey must become an important aspect of the relations.547 This explicit 
declaration underlining the relationship between the minority rights issue in Turkey and 
Turkey-EC relations demonstrates that by the end of 1980s the EC had started to see the 
minority question as a separate issue for shaping the future of the relations. Moreover, one 
might claim that the EC had for the first time openly stated that conditionality on minority 
rights would be employed separately from other human rights and democratization issues. This 
was clearly a turning point for the development of conditionality towards Turkey since from 
this point onwards minority rights had become one of the main conditions for the normalization 
of relations between Turkey and the EC and a major stumbling block before Turkey’s accession 
to the EU. 
 
The 1989 Commission Opinion on Turkey's accession stated that a variety of issues had to be 
resolved before Turkey could be given even a chance of membership.548 The Commission also 
noted that the current situation of individual human rights, social rights of workers, and 
minority rights in Turkey did not comply with European standards.549 Although Turkey's full 
membership application was refused, the Community agreed to renegotiate the Association 
Agreement offering Turkey more incentives including financial aid and trade partnerships.550 
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In Turkey, the EC’s decision to reject the application was highly criticized both by politicians 
and military officials. At this point, political elites started questioning the EC's good faith about 
Turkey's membership.  
 
4.4. Cyprus Conflict 
Following the adoption of an additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement between EEC and 
Turkey in 1973, the positive relations once again deteriorated and took a turn for the worse 
after Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus. The Cyprus crisis broke out in 1974 when the 
military government in Greece instigated a coup against the Makarios government in 
Cyprus.551 As a response Greece’s intervention and the Greek claims to ‘takeover’ the island, 
there were two consecutive interventions by the Turkish military in Cyprus, and in the end 
Turkey took control of 40% of the island. The EEC reacted immediately to the developments 
in Cyprus and two statements were issued in July 1974 and September 1974 consecutively 
following Turkey’s intervention.552 In these statements, the Community expressed its concern 
over the events and called for an immediate cease-fire and cooperation with the UN.  
 
In this respect, Cyprus issue constitutes a critical juncture with regard to its repercussions on 
the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul. The conflict in Cyprus had direct and immediate 
effects on the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey particularly the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul 
and Izmir. As a result of the 6-7 September 1955 pogrom, the property and houses non-Muslims 
were raided and looted and significant damage was given to their property.553 Following this, 
in 1961 a new law was passed that classified minority schools as “private and foreign 
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institutions”.554 In April 1961, a publishing house owned by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate 
of Phanar was closed down on the grounds that the Patriarchate was not a legal person and only 
legal persons or private individuals could own private entities.555 In July 1964, the Ministry of 
Education closed down all the Greek Orthodox schools in Gokceada and Bozcaada, where the 
majority of the population consisted of Greek Orthodox.556 Their properties were confiscated 
and transferred to the treasuries of the local administrations in these islands.557 In addition, a 
new law entered into force, which stated that the vice principles of minority schools should be 
“Turkish citizens of Turkish origin” was enacted in 1965.558 In 1964 Turkey unilaterally 
terminated the Friendship Agreement signed with Greece in 1930, which paved the way for the 
extraditions that would follow. Following this, until the mid-1960s a total number of 12,592 
Greek Orthodox were extradited from Turkey back to Greece.559 In the end, the total population 
of Greek Orthodox in Istanbul dropped from 40,000-50,000 to 3,000-4,000 within two years. 
As a result, along with the extraditions, the censuses showed that approximately 42.000 Greek 
Orthodox left Turkey. 
 
The EEC preferred to remain neutral to the Cyprus issue during the 1970s and pointed to the 
resolution of the problem without an intervention and through the involvement of mediators. 
Nevertheless, Turkey’s relations with the Community were put under strain due to the Cyprus 
crisis and in 1978 Turkey asked for a five-year freeze in regard to its obligations arising from 
the Association Agreement. Political relations, on the other hand, took an interesting turn when 
Greece applied for full membership to the EEC. Most importantly, the EEC suggested in 1978 
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that Turkey should apply for full membership, but Turkey declined mainly due to the 
opposition by the Islamist party and also due to the concerns of the military.560  
 
4.5. Customs Union Agreement  
The new international order in the post-Cold War context significantly altered the European 
discourses on minority rights. In this context, in 1993 the European Community announced the 
Copenhagen Criteria laying down the conditions for EC membership. Throughout the 1980s, 
the EC had harshly criticized the human rights situation voicing the reservations about Turkish 
membership. The EC’s 1989 proposal for the reactivation of the Association Agreement could 
only be realized by the mid-1990s. In March 1995, a Customs Union Agreement was signed 
between Turkey and the EU, which entered into force on 1 January 1996, creating a customs 
free zone between Turkey and Europe.561 However, the Customs Union helped the 
normalization of Turkey-EU relations only up to a certain degree. The Customs Union 
Agreement was accepted in the European Parliament with the condition that in case of a 
deterioration of human rights, the financial aid could be frozen.562  
 
The minority issues that existed during the 1950s were still present in the 1990s. However, 
during the 1990s, new actors including the pro-Islamic political parties who were previously 
marginalized; emerged within the Turkish political sphere. Allegations about torture continued 
while closing down political parties was still a common practice. The Chief of Staff published 
an ultimatum in 1998, which was also regarded as a post-modern coup followed by the 
resignation of the conservative party from the coalition.  
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By the mid-1990s, the Kurdish problem had reached the climax point and the armed struggle 
between the PKK and the Turkish army escalated. States of emergency were declared in many 
Kurdish cities while the number of Kurdish and Turkish casualties reached thousands in 1999. 
Throughout the 1990s, the Turkish army attacked the local civilians living in the Kurdish cities. 
The military presence within Turkish politics changed its content from direct intervention to 
monitoring the civilian politics in the early 1990s. As a consequence, the minority issue became 
a security concern rather than a human rights problem. The 1990s started with the adoption of 
the Anti-terror Law, which defined terrorism as all those actions that challenge the unity of the 
state. The ambiguous wording of the Anti-terror Law allowed it to cover a wide of acts, which 
mounted to the violation of the basic tenets of freedom of expression.563 Following the 
enactment of this law, four Kurdish MPs were arrested for speaking Kurdish during one of the 
official sessions of the Parliament. The Parliamentarians were accused of separatism and 
supporting the PKK and they were prosecuted with 15 years. Following this, the Constitutional 
Court closed down the People's Labour Party (HEP) that the jailed parliamentarians belonged 
to.  
 
Following this, the members of HEP formed a new pro-Kurdish political party called the 
Democracy Party (DEP) in an attempt to avoid losing their seats in the Parliament after HEP 
was banned. Around the same time, the PKK declared a ceasefire for a short term, which also 
increased DEP’s success especially in the Southeast. Another case was opened against DEP in 
December 1993 at the Constitutional Court and on 16th March 1994, they were prosecuted and 
placed under arrest.564 Former members of DEP went on to found a successor party the People's 
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Democracy Party (HADEP), which failed to pass the 10% threshold to enter the Parliament in 
the 1995 elections. In 1994, the European Parliamentary Assembly condemned the Turkish 
Parliament's decision to prosecute the DEP members. The European Parliament immediately 
passed a resolution and on 28 March 1994 suspended the activities of the EU-Turkish Joint 
Parliamentary Committee.565 The EU-Turkey crisis reached a dead-end when the 
Constitutional Court decided to close down DEP in June 1994.566 The criticisms from Europe 
continued in the second half of the 1990s and in 1996 the European Parliament once again 
decided to freeze all financial aid to Turkey with the exception of those that will be used for 
democratization.567 
 
In 1995 general elections, the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (RP) obtained 21.4% of the votes and 
became the leading coalition partner. Throughout 1996 and 1997, the RP was frequently 
criticized by the military as for engaging in activities that did not conform with Kemalist 
principles and secular ideology of the state. In February 1997, military tanks were sent to a 
town in Ankara, following a pro-Islamic demonstration organized by the mayor of that town, 
which resulted in the resignation of the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in June 1997. The 
Constitutional Court banned the RP in 1998.568 
 
The positive atmosphere created through the ratification of the Customs Union agreement was 
reversed already in 1996 when the European Parliament published a declaration that included 
the stipulation that Turkey should issue a general amnesty for political prisoners and start 
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negotiations with all Kurdish organizations, including the PKK569. Around the same time, the 
OSCE adopted a resolution on the Kurdish problem that criticized the Turkish government’s 
policies. Finally in September 1996, the European Parliament decided to freeze the financial 
aid allocated to Turkey except those that will be used for democratization.570 During the 1997 
Luxembourg Summit, a decision to exclude Turkey from the next enlargement round was 
adopted. This decision was based on the Copenhagen Criteria and the Agenda 2000 Proposals 
of the Commission and the EU’s concerns over the human rights violations, ill treatment of 
Kurdish citizens, the existence of Turkish troops in Cyprus and the tensions in the bilateral 
relations with Greece.571  
 
4.6 1999 Helsinki Summit  
The 2000s represent a major shift in Turkish politics and the democratization efforts as a result 
of the start of the accession negotiations, which gained a formal structure in 1999. The political 
agenda along with the dominant actors in the Turkish political spectrum started transforming 
as early as 2001, while the reform process was gaining significant momentum. More progress 
was achieved between 2000 and 2010 than in the 40 years after Turkey's first application to the 
European Economic Community, while the EU became a distinguished and visible driving 
force on the empowerment of civil society actors and their mobilization.  
 
Turkey entered the 21st century highly fragmented and polarized. Alevis felt increasingly 
threatened by the conservative Sunni movements and pro-Islamic parties. During an Alevi 
festival in July 1993, when a Turkish author stated that he was an atheist, a pogrom broke out 
setting the festival participants’ hotel on fire killing 36 Alevi singers, writers, and a Dutch 	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female anthropology student.572 The tension escalated as the threat towards the Alevis 
continued, and in 1995 an attack in one of the Alevi districts of Istanbul led to widespread 
protests, which ended with military control in that neighborhood. During the clashes between 
the residents of the neighborhood and the military 15 people were killed. 
 
The year 1999 marked an important change both for the Kurdish movement and the Turkish 
politics. After the dissolution of the government, the new coalition was formed under the strict 
supervision of the army. During this period, Ocalan was sent out from Syria and in February 
1999, he was captured in Nairobi and brought back to Turkey. Shortly after, he was tried and 
sentenced to death, however his sentence was changed to aggravated life imprisonment in line 
with the reforms for EU harmonization. Prior to his arrest, Ocalan had declared that the PKK 
was now ready and willing to seek a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem, which was later 
reaffirmed by the PKK leadership. The PKK leadership also claimed that Ocalan would still 
be regarded as the leader of the PKK and that the ceasefire declared in 1998 would remain in 
force. The most significant aspect of the 1990s was the start of the accession negotiations, 
which signaled that the Turkish government would implement a number of political reforms 
for democratization and human rights in the coming years. 
  
Due to the two major economic crises Turkey suffered in November 2000 and February 2001 
respectively, the 2000s started with concerns over economic stability. In March 2001, the 
European Council of Ministers adopted the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership, which 
highlighted a number of issue areas Turkey needs to improve including minority rights, torture, 
the role of the military in politics and the Cyprus conflict.573 Again in March 2001, the Turkish 	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government presented its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis. The National 
Program did not propose profound reforms to the dismay of the domestic actors in Turkey and 
the political elites in Europe but rather highlighted the state-centric perspective of the 
government.574 It failed to address the minority problems in general implying that the current 
practices will persist. For many circles, especially the pro-EU non-state actors, the National 
Program was a big failure and destroyed the expectations for Turkey's democratization.575 In 
May 2001, the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) published a 
report entitled “Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey” stressing its support for further 
democratization reforms and the need for a functioning effective civil society.576 Despite the 
disappointment with the National Program, the Commission's 2002 Progress Report 
highlighted the constitutional reforms of October 2001 through which the state of emergency 
for two more cities in the Kurdish region were lifted and the death penalty was abolished in 
peacetime. However, in spite of the reforms, the EU did not provide Turkey with an exact date 
for the start of the accession negotiations unlike other candidate countries. Along with the 
discontent about the abolishment of death penalty shortly after Ocalan’s capture, the lack of a 
definite date for the start of the negotiations had an adverse impact on the public opinion about 
the government and the AKP government was elected with a landslide victory in 2002 
elections. 
 
For the first time since the 1950s, a political party in Turkey won enough votes to form its own 
government. The government established by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
displayed its commitment towards the democratization reforms as prescribed by the EU and 
adopted the required human rights legislation demonstrating its determination to continue the 	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accession process. In total, eleven harmonization packages and two constitutional amendments 
were adopted until the end of 2004. Even though by the beginning of the 2000s a significant 
number of reforms were implemented by the government, continuous criticisms from the EU 
side along with the escalated tension in Cyprus brought Turkey-EU relations to a crisis point 
once again. In 2006, the EU decided to freeze eight chapters within the accession partnership 
agreement especially due to the lack of a solution to the Cyprus problem. Since then, the EU 
officials declared on several occasions that they were not ready to unblock the chapters until 
the Cyprus issue was resolved. During the period between 2007 and 2013, Turkey-EU relations 
and formal progress followed a much slower pace in comparison to informal transformation.  
 
Although the reform process gained considerable momentum by the beginning of the 2000s 
mainly due to AKP’s determination to continue the accession process, progress on minority 
issue has not been groundbreaking. The 2000s started with the escalation of the tension 
between the state that sees minorities as a national threat and the new voices in the political 
sphere like the non-state actors that demanded confrontation with Turkey's past. In 2001, a new 
bill by the French National Assembly was adopted to recognize the 1915 Armenian genocide. 
In reaction, the Turkish Parliament adopted Article 301 that stipulated imprisonment for 
insulting “Turkishness”, integrity of the Turkish state and the Turkish Parliament.577 A 
significant number of people including civil society representatives were prosecuted based on 
Article 301 after its adoption. Moreover, although the ban on education or broadcasting in non-
Turkish languages had been abolished, the Constitutional Court closed down yet another pro-
Kurdish political party HADEP.578  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 Simon Wigley. 2009. “Parliamentary Immunity in Democratizing Countries: The Case of Turkey.” Human 
Rights Quarterly 31(3): 579. 
578 Constitutional Court HADEP Closure Decision, E. No. 1999/1, K. No. 2003/1 of 13 March 2003, Resmi Gazete 
(R.G.) (Official Gazette of Turkey), 19 July 2003, No. 25173. 
	   224	  
After the assassination of the Armenian journalist and activist Hrant Dink in January 2007, 
there was an overwhelming public reaction, particularly due to the connection between the 
murderer and the state. In 2007, the newly established pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party 
(DTP) was able to secure 20 seats in the Parliament and the tension between the DTP and the 
state escalated especially after declarations from the DTP depicting the PKK as the liberation 
movement of the Kurdish nation. In December 2007, the Turkish Army launched a series of 
attacks against PKK camps in Northern Iraq. These operations once again proved that the state 
saw the Kurdish problem as a security threat.  
 
The 2007 general elections ended with a landslide victory for AKP in spite of the controversies 
concerning Presidency elections. Concurrently, the Constitutional Court opened two cases 
against AKP and DTP for their dissolution. Shortly after the elections, both Gul and AKP 
explicitly declared that the reforms would continue and the EU-Turkey relations, which 
suffered a recession since the freezing of the chapters, would be put back on track. Following 
this in February 2008, the new Foundations Law passed from the Parliament remedying some 
of the property rights violations against the non-Muslim foundations. The closure case against 
AKP was finalized in August 2008 in favor of AKP; however, the Court still restricted the 
financial aid the party is entitled to from the Treasury. In January 2009, the first state channel 
that broadcasted in Kurdish, TRT 6 was established. However, there was still a ban on using 
other languages within the Parliament and in February 2009 the state television stopped live 
broadcasting when Ahmet Turk, leader of DTP, started speaking Kurdish in the Parliament.  
 
By mid-2009, the ECtHR concluded several cases in favor of the non-Muslim foundations in 
Turkey for the violation of their property rights by the Turkish state, ruling for the payment of 
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compensation fees.579 In November 2009, the AKP government announced that they were 
determined and committed to pursue a number of reforms under the Democratic Opening 
package, which involved different provisions for all minority groups in Turkey. As part of this 
package in December 2009, a group of PKK members entered Turkey through the Iraqi border 
upon a call from Ocalan. On the verge of this positive development and the increasing hopes 
for a solution to the Kurdish problem, the Constitutional Court announced its decision to close 
down DTP and the prohibition of its three MPs from engaging in political activities for five 
years.580 The banned MPs represented the most prominent and constructive members of the 
party causing this decision to be regarded with even more anger and dismay among the civil 
society and the Kurdish population. The European Parliament and the Council of Europe both 
condemned the decision stating that it hurt Turkey’s democratic legitimacy. Shortly after in 
January 2010, a wave of arrests started targeting Kurdish political activists and the members 
of the Kurdish political party, which ended with the imprisonment of over 12.000 Kurdish 
politicians and activists.  
 
At the beginning of the 2000s, the government in Turkey displayed a commitment and 
determination to continue the EU accession negotiations through a significant number of 
reforms under the harmonization packages although these efforts were interrupted on a number 
of occasions. However, several points demonstrate that these reforms were initiated as a result 
of the combined efforts of the EU and the civil society in Turkey. After the adoption of the 
reforms regulating the activities of civil society organizations, there was a visible increase in 
the number of civil society organizations. In addition to this, major organizations such as 
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TUSIAD started pressuring the government to continue with the EU process and the 
implementation of the necessary reforms. Coupled with the use of conditionality by the EU 
especially through Commission Progress reports and official statements by EU members, the 
Turkish government responded to these pressures by adopting several reforms. This, in turn, 
allowed the civil society actors to have an even more share from the political resources. 
 
4.7  Turkish Legislation: Political Reforms After Helsinki 
The significance of the EU accession process especially in the post-Helsinki period is 
particularly related to the emergence of new opportunities for the civil society organizations in 
Turkey.581 Such a transformation was especially dependent on the reforms, the EU required 
Turkey to implement in order to satisfy the political criteria. In particular, the requirement 
pertaining to the existence of institutions that would guarantee democracy, human rights, rule 
of law and minority rights led to the adoption of the reform packages concerning the freedom 
of association and the removal of the legal obstacles before the development of civil society 
organizations.582 Between 2001 and 2007, important legislative changes concerning civil 
society organizations were implemented. In total eight reform packages were adopted that 
included changes to the most restrictive legislation concerning associations, foundations, 
minority rights, linguistic rights and other fundamental rights.  
 
The first harmonization package entered into force on 19 February 2002 and contained a series 
of amendments to the Penal Code, the Anti-terror Law, Law on the Establishment of and 
Proceedings at the State Security Courts and the Code of Criminal Procedure within the 
framework of the freedom of expression, the reduction of pre-trial detention periods and the 
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rights of prisoners.583 In order to comply with EU requirements on freedom of expression and 
freedom of association, a second harmonization package entered into force on 9 April 2002.584 
The second reform package amended the Press Law, the Law on Political Parties, the Law on 
Associations and the Law on Meetings and Demonstration Marches, the Law on Civil Servants 
and also modified the Law on the Establishment of and Proceedings of State Security Courts, 
and the Act on the Organization, Duties and Competences of the Gendarmerie and the Act on 
Provincial Administration.585 In the context of freedom of expression, the ban on publishing in 
a language prohibited by law was abolished through Article 16.586 Article 5 Clause 6 was 
amended in order to cancel the provision that forbids the establishment of an association with 
the aim "to protect, develop or expand languages or cultures other than the Turkish language 
or culture or to claim that there are minorities based on racial, religious, sectarian, cultural or 
linguistic differences".587 The annulment of Clause 6 is identified as a major step for expanding 
the freedom of association as well as the promotion of minority cultures. 
 
The second harmonization package also modified Article 6 of the Law on Associations and 
cancelled the law that prohibited the use of languages banned by law588 during assemblies, 
meetings, conferences organized, or within any written material including brochures, 
declarations, advertisements, posters and banners as well as visual and audio materials.589 
However it also stipulated that Turkish would remain as the official language of 
communication.590 An amendment to Article 34 granted associations with the right to establish 
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federations and Article 38 was altered to increase the scope of the activities of student 
associations.591 Previously, the associations that were not classified as working for the public 
interest could not establish federations. The amended article also necessitated that associations 
must notify the governorships of the cities where they are located in relation to their 
activities.592 With the amendments to Articles 7, 11, and 12 on the restrictions on international 
activities and activities conducted abroad as well as the activities of foreign associations were 
eliminated and these provisions were substituted with those of the Civil Code.593  
 
The third harmonization package was adopted on 9 August 2002 and abolished the death 
penalty, expanded the freedoms of expression and association, addressed the problems related 
to the property owned by religious minority foundations and amended the provisions on 
education and broadcasting within the framework of cultural rights.594 Articles 11 and 12 of 
the Law on Associations were modified to overcome the problems related to the activities of 
the associations founded in Turkey and the activities of foreign associations in Turkey.595 
Article 15 substituted the police registration requirement to Ministry of the Interior Affairs.596 
Finally Articles 46 and 73 eliminated the police supervision over associations and appointed 
the Department of Associations established within the Ministry of Interior Affairs as the sole 
authority.597 The third harmonization package also amended the Law on Foundations. Most 
importantly, Article 1 of the Law was aligned with Article 14 of the European Human Rights 
Charter and a long awaited problem concerning the property belonging to religious minority 
foundations was resolved.598 Moreover, the Decree on the Organizations and Duties of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591 Law No. 4748, Article 5, Clause D-E. 
592 Ibid. 
593 Law No. 4748, Article 7, Clause D.  
594 Law No. 4771 of 03 August 2002, Resmi Gazete (R.G.) (Official Gazette of Turkey), 09 August 2002, No. 
24841. 
595 Law No. 4771, Article 3, Clause A-B. 
596 Law No. 4771, Article 3, Clause C. 
597 Law No. 4771, Article 3, Clause F, H. 
598 Law No. 4771, Article 4, Clause A. 
	   229	  
Directorate General of Foundations was issued to legalize the activities of foreign foundations 
in Turkey.599 Article 4 of the Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises600 
and the Law on Foreign Language Teaching and Education601 were both modified to eliminate 
the restrictions on broadcasting and teaching in the different languages and dialects used within 
Turkey including minority languages.  
 
The fourth harmonization package was adopted on 11 January 2003 and reformed the issues 
related to the freedom of association, amending the provisions on the prohibition of torture and 
mistreatment, the rights of prisoners.602 In the context of the freedom of association, Article 5 
of the Act on Associations changed the limitations in relation to the founding principles of an 
association.603 Article 6 was modified granting associations with the right to use foreign 
languages with their contacts abroad and in their unofficial correspondences.604 Therefore, it 
was significant in the sense that these minority languages could also be used during the 
unofficial correspondences of these associations. Article 44 was amended as part of the fourth 
harmonization package removing the limitations before publishing declarations and similar 
publications in those languages banned by law.605 Furthermore clauses pertaining to the 
relations with foreign associations in the Turkish Civil Code were amended to facilitate 
cooperation between Turkish civil society organizations and their foreign counterparts and 
their engagement in European and international networks.606 The fourth harmonization 
package also changed the Law on Foundations partially removing the restraints on religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599 Law No. 4771, Article 4, Clause B, Supplementary Clause 3 to the Decree on the Organizations and Duties of 
the Directorate General of Foundations. 
600 Law No. 4771, Article 8, Clause A. 
601 Law No. 4771, Article 11. 
602 Law No. 4778 of 02 January 2003, Resmi Gazete (R.G.) (Official Gazette of Turkey), 11 January 2003, No. 
24990.  
603 Law No. 4778, Article 17.  
604 Law No. 4778, Article 18. 
605 Law No. 4778, Article 21. 
606 Law No. 4778, Article 34-35. 
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minority foundations and their right to acquire immovable property.607 This reform package 
also extended these rights to other civil society organizations besides associations and 
foundations.608  
 
The fifth reform package entered into force on 4 February 2003 and mainly focused on the 
permissions, supervision, fines and imprisonment.609 The sixth harmonization package was 
adopted on 19 July 2003 and contained provisions related to the freedom of expression, 
religious freedom and the right to life and retrial.610 The Law on the Establishment and 
Broadcasts of Radio and Television Stations was amended to eliminate the restrictions partially 
on private and public radio and television corporations to broadcast in minority languages.611 
An amendment to Supplementary Article 2 of the Law on Construction underlined the need to 
establish places of worship of different religions and faiths will be considered by the state.612 
Furthermore, Article 16 of the Law on Census was amended to eliminate the clause, which 
stated that children couldn’t be given names that do not suit the Turkish national culture and 
customs and traditions.613 Historically, prior to the amendment, minorities were not able to 
register their children’s names in their own languages but were only allowed to give Turkish 
names to their children.  
 
The seventh harmonization package was adopted on 7 August 2003 and introduced several 
amendments to the laws concerning freedom of expression, freedom of association, safeguard 
provisions on the rights of prisoners, religious freedoms, the rights of children, cultural rights, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607 Law No. 4778, Article 3. 
608 Law No. 4778, Article 36. 
609 Law No. 4793 of 23 January 2003, Resmi Gazete (R.G.) (Official Gazette of Turkey), 04 February 2003, No. 
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610 Law No. 4928 of 15 July 2003, Resmi Gazete (R.G.) (Official Gazette of Turkey), 19 July 2003, No. 25173. 
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civilian-military relations and the functioning of the executive bodies.614 Article 38 of the Law 
of Associations was amended for the participation of students registered at institutions of 
higher education in associations and activities organized by these associations.615 It also 
eliminated the ban on establishing associations that work on artistic, cultural and scientific 
issues.616 In addition to these, following the amendments associations were allowed to establish 
more than one branch in provinces, towns and villages.617 Supplementary Article 3 of the 
Decree Law on the Establishment and Duties of the Directorate General for Foundations was 
amended to change the permission requirements for foundations to organize activities and 
implement projects abroad.618 The procedure to establish a foreign foundation was also 
shortened making the Ministry of Interior Affairs the final authority instead of the Council of 
Ministers as in the past.619 Article 2 of the Law on Foreign Language Education and the 
Learning of Different Languages and Dialects by Turkish Citizens was also amended to allow 
the teaching of different languages and dialects used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives 
within the facilities of existing language courses, whereas previously such courses could only 
be opened within new premises.620 The condition for obtaining the views of the National 
Security Council when determining the languages to be taught was also cancelled with the 
amendment, making the Council of Ministers the sole authority pertaining to the issue of 
languages.621 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614 Law No. 4963 of 30 July 2003, Resmi Gazete (R.G.) (Official Gazette of Turkey), 07 August 2003, No. 25192. 
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617 Law No. 4963, Article 16 and Article 35. 
618 Law No. 4963, Article 29. 
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620 Law No. 4963, Article 23. 
621 Law No. 4963, Article 23, Clause C. 
	   232	  
The eighth harmonization package entered into force on 14 July 2004622 and abolished the 
death penalty for good replacing it with life sentence623. The Law on Higher Education Council 
was amended to cancel the provision that requires one of the members of the Higher Education 
Council to be selected by the Chief of Staff.624 In addition to the EU harmonization packages 
adopted between 2001 and 2004, a number of constitutional amendments were also enacted. 
Through the constitutional amendments a number of new provisions were adopted to align the 
Constitution with the priorities of the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis. These 
amendments mainly targeted freedom of thought and expression, the prevention of torture, 
strengthening of democracy and civilian authority, the right to privacy, the inviolability of the 
domicile, the freedom of communication, the freedom of residence and movement, the freedom 
of association and gender equality.  
 
In addition to these amendments and harmonization packages, a number of new laws were also 
adopted including the Law on the Relationship of Associations and Foundations with Public 
Institutions and Agencies, which entered into force on 29 January 2004.625 The law laid down 
the basic principles in the relationship between civil society organizations and public 
institutions. Moreover, a new Press Law was enacted on 24 June 2004 and aligned the laws 
concerning freedom of press with Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights.626 
The Law on the Compensation of Losses Resulting From Acts of Terror and Measures Taken 
Against Terrorism entered into force on 27 July 2004.627 The objective of the law was to 
compensate the damages in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey especially those resulting from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622 Law No. 5218 of 14 July 2004, Resmi Gazete (R.G.) (Official Gazette of Turkey), 21 July 2004, No. 25529. 
623 Law No. 5218, Article 1 
624 Law No. 5218, Article 2, Clause B. 
625 Law No. 5072 of 22 January 2004, Resmi Gazete (R.G.) (Official Gazette of Turkey), 29 January 2004, No. 
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internal displacement and the evacuation of villages. In this framework, damage assessment 
and compensation committees were established to reimburse the applicants. In the same 
manner, the Ministry of the Interior issued a circular on 1 July 2005 to facilitate the voluntary 
return of internally displaced persons within the framework of “Return to Villages and 
Rehabilitation Project”.628 Following this, a strategy document titled “The IDP Problem and 
Measures on Village Return and Rehabilitation Project” was adopted on 17 August 2005 by 
the Council of Ministers.629 It aligned the current legislation on the IDPs with the UN Guideline 
Principles. The newly drafted Law on Associations was also adopted by the National 
Parliament on 4 November 2004 and entered into force on 23 November. Furthermore, 
Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the abolition of the 
death penalty was ratified on 12 November 2003 and entered into force on 1 December 2003. 
Concurrently, the International Covenance on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were ratified and entered into 
force on 24 December 2003. 
 
4.8  Conclusion 
Celik and Rumelili argue that the EU has led to important changes at the domestic policy level 
in Turkey with respect to the Kurdish question especially after the acceptance of Turkey's 
candidacy to the EU.630 This is not only true for the Kurdish question but also for the many 
reforms that were implemented by the beginning of the 2000s as part of the EU harmonization 
packages. Moreover, the Civil Society Dialogue, established in 2005 for channeling EU funds 
to the civil society organizations in Turkey, pointed to the redistribution of political resources, 
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as it required the engagement of academics, journalists, thinkers and writers as well as civil 
society representatives in Turkey's democratization aspirations. Not only has it facilitated the 
adoption of the legislative reforms but also allowed the civil society organizations to discuss 
the issues related to minority protection with decision-makers both from Turkey and Europe.  
 
The use of conditionality on minority rights towards Turkey gradually developed throughout 
EU-Turkey relations, which started with Turkey’s application as an Associate member to the 
EEC in 1959. As the EEC developed its own tools regarding minority protection and as the 
relations between Turkey and the EC were formalized, the use and the context of conditionality 
changed. The tools of conditionality ranged from the suspension of financial aid to the total 
suspension of formal relations while the context transformed from the reestablishment of 
democracy to human rights. After the announcement of the Copenhagen criteria and the 
increased emphasis on minority protection in the 1990s, the EU started using conditionality 
more frequently when compared with the previous decades. The changes were also connected 
to the levels of migrations of the members of minority groups from Turkey to Western Europe 
bringing in a transnational dimension to Turkey’s minority problem. 
 
Even though the EU used conditionality on minority rights more frequently over time, this did 
not yield the adoption of all of the necessary reforms by the Turkish government. The use of 
conditionality until the 2000s only yielded partial results similar to those in the mid-1980s 
when the new government needed to speed up the normalization of relations for economic 
reasons. However, the rejection of Turkey’s formal membership application in 1989 
interrupted the democratization process and hurt the relations significantly. Only by the end of 
1990s and the beginning of 2000s, the government passed the reforms required to comply with 
the Copenhagen political criteria. This was a result of both the formalization of relations in 
	   235	  
1999 through granting Turkey candidacy status and the changing behavior of civil society 
organizations in the 2000s through the redistribution of financial and political resources. 
Moreover, the EU now had more instruments for applying conditionality and leverage over the 
internal affairs in Turkey related to human rights. 
 
Currently, EU-Turkey relations are still in recession since the chapters blocked in 2007 have 
not been reopened. However, the activities of the civil society organizations still continue even 
on the most sensitive issues such as minority rights. This is one of the main signs that the EU 
had transformed the role of civil society organizations in Turkish politics providing them with 
the resources to participate in decision-making processes through increased political efficacy 
at the national and the European level. The accelerated reform process of the 2000s that was 
originally triggered by Turkey’s desire to be granted candidacy status allowed the civil society 
organizations to benefit and make use of the EU process especially in the context of minority 
protection.  
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Chapter 5   
Minority Rights and Europeanization in Turkey 
 
This chapter presents the first set of results obtained through the closer examination of the 
impact of interaction of the EU with the civil society actors in Turkey. To be more precise, it 
studies civil society organizations established after the reform packages were adopted in 
relation to the EU harmonization process. The overall aim of the chapter is to study 
transformation in a candidate country like Turkey empirically by mapping out the civil society 
organizations that use the political and financial resources made available as a result of their 
interaction with the EU. Following this, the first section gives a detailed discussion of the civil 
society organizations established by minority groups in Turkey.  
 
The second section of this chapter provides a detailed examination of the minority civil society 
organizations analyzed as part of this thesis. This section will provide an investigation of the 
patterns that can be seen among these civil society organizations with regard to their formation, 
associational structure, the type of minority groups that they represent, location and their 
resources. It will also provide an account of how these factors affect their formation, links and 
influence. Finally, the conclusion will provide a brief discussion of the next empirical chapter 
where the quantitative research findings will be presented and discussed. 
 
5.1 Research Locations 
Given the scope of this research, three major cities, Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakir were selected 
as the pivotal points given that most of the civil society organizations or their headquarters are 
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located in these cities. Additionally, as some of the minority groups are predominantly 
concentrated in one city, smaller cities were also included. These smaller cities were selected 
as Mardin where most of the Assyrian population resides, Edirne where the largest Roma 
population resides and Antakya which is home to a number of different minority groups 
including Latin Catholics, Arab Christians, Nusayris, Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Doms. 
These research locations were selected based on the population levels, the number of civil 
society organizations, the types of minority organizations established in these cities and the 
presence of different minority groups.  
 
Ankara is the capital of Turkey where all state institutions are established. The main offices or 
headquarters of several civil society organizations and minority federations as well as research 
institutes and think tanks are located in Ankara given the proximity to government offices. It 
is also where the European Commission Delegation to Turkey is established. Diyarbakir on the 
other hand is located in Southeastern Turkey and it is the biggest city of the region. Along with 
its population numbers, the significance of Diyarbakir is also related to its multicultural 
character and its historical importance as it is often referred to as the capital of Turkey’s 
“Kurdistan”. The city hosts a number of minorities including the Kurds, Doms, Armenians, 
Assyrians, Protestants, Alevis, Zaza and Ezidis. Moreover, the European Commission 
established the second civil society development center in Diyarbakir allowing for different 
civil society organizations located in the city to enhance their relations with the EU through 
meetings and conferences. Finally, Istanbul is the biggest and the most crowded city in Turkey. 
Its population numbers are estimated to be around 18 million, believed to have increased 
especially due to internal migration or forced displacement from the 1980s onward. The city is 
home to almost all minority groups and the civil society organizations representing almost each 
and every one of these groups are located here. These range from non-Muslim minorities to 
	   238	  
Kurds, from Hamshens to Alevis, from Caucasians to even Assyrians whose homeland is 
originally in the Southeast. In this respect, not only are there organizations such as religious 
minority foundations or Assyrian federation but also other major civil society organizations 
such as institutes or think tanks that implement projects concerning minority rights are located 
here.  
 
With regard to smaller cities selected as the research locations, Antakya is rather a smaller city 
by means of population however its significance is derived from the presence of several 
minority groups that have set up many organizations. It not only hosts Arab speaking Greek 
Orthodox minority but also Armenians, Jews, Latin Catholics, Protestants, Alevis (Nusayris), 
Arabs, Roma (Doms) and Kurds. Edirne on the other hand is located in Thrace bordering 
Bulgaria. Most of the population is Roma and there is also a small Jewish community. The 
most numerous Roma Federation in terms of member organizations, has its headquarters in 
Edirne and the biggest Roma association (EDROM), which implements several European 
Commission projects is also registered in Edirne. The predominant minority group in Edirne is 
the Roma population and even though Roma have several organizations across Turkey, 
EDROM behaves differently compared to these in terms of its structure, international and 
national linkages and sources of funding. Finally, Mardin, one of the smaller yet most diverse 
cities in Turkey, is home to large populations of Kurds, Arabs, Mhelmis, Ezidis, Roma, 
Armenians and Assyrians. Even though, the majority of the population is Kurdish, other 
minority groups have organizations set up and active in the city.  
 
These cities can be classified into two groups based on their population levels, with Ankara, 
Istanbul and Diyarbakir representing higher population levels and Mardin, Edirne and Antakya, 
all home to lower levels of populations. As a result of the high population numbers and the 
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characteristics of the cities, the highest number of civil society organizations are located in 
Istanbul, Ankara or Diyarbakir. Istanbul has the highest population in Turkey and the number 
of associations registered in Istanbul is 21,289.631 The number of active foundations registered 
with the Directorate of Foundations in Istanbul, on the other hand, is 1583.632 Ankara, on the 
other hand, has 10,252 associations registered and 798 active foundations.633 As mentioned 
previously, the higher number of civil society organizations in Ankara are related to the 
government offices being located in Ankara. Finally, Diyarbakir has 35 active foundations and 
1173 associations registered.634 Even though, the number of civil society organizations located 
in Diyarbakir are comparatively lower than Istanbul or Ankara, it is higher than most of the 
other cities across Turkey and in the region. Additionally, the head offices of most of the 
Kurdish organizations are also located in Diyarbakir. On the other hand, there are several 
predominant minority groups in Antakya, Istanbul and Ankara, whereas in Diyarbakir and 
Mardin, the predominant minority group is the Kurds. However, both of these cities are home 
to other minority groups with smaller populations. Edirne, on the other hand, is predominantly 
home to Roma populations.   
 
In addition to these, online or telephone surveys with different minority civil society 
organizations were conducted all over Turkey as some of the minority groups have over 100 
member organizations at various cities. The respondents for the surveys and interviews were 
selected through their websites and the websites of different minority federations. They were 
classified according to the research locations and also based on their activities. The 
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Available at http://www.dernekler.gov.tr/tr/Anasayfalinkler/IllereGoreIstatistik.aspx.  
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organizations that did not organize any activities or acted merely as a place of socialization 
were not included. Moreover, the minority organizations that received EU funding were also 
found on the website of the EU Delegation in Ankara and they were included in the research. 
One of the minority groups representing different dynamics across various cities were the 
Alevis. Even though, Alevis are settled all across Turkey, the civil society organizations 
established by the Alevis residing in eastern and southeastern Anatolia differed from those 
located in the western parts of Turkey. The organizations located in the eastern parts of Turkey 
where the majority of the population is Kurdish, had more frequent contacts with European 
and international organizations acting as advocacy organizations whereas their counterparts in 
western cities, mostly behaved as solidarity associations. Even though in terms of religious 
freedoms, they had the same objectives, their demands with regard to issues such as education 
in mother tongue languages, linguistic and cultural rights showed variation. The final minority 
group that will be examined in more detail, Caucasian groups, have civil society organizations 
set up across Turkey, in those cities where there is a Caucasian population. The data revealed 
that the Caucasian organizations established in major cities were more active in terms of the 
advocacy activities they organized and their associational structure varied as they were mostly 
federations or larger foundations with smaller member associations. Caucasian civil society 
organizations in Istanbul and Ankara are mostly federations and foundations with higher 
budgets which are in close contact with national representatives, whereas those located in 
smaller cities are merely solidarity associations acting under the umbrella of the head office or 
the federation in Istanbul or Ankara.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the minority groups identified in this research except the three non-
Muslim groups, the Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish minority, still remain 
unacknowledged officially. In addition, since 1990 the Turkish state stopped asking individuals 
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about their ethnic background, mother tongue or religious denomination during the official 
censuses. Therefore, the numbers of individuals belonging to these minority groups and their 
geographical distribution are not officially known. In addition to these, access to the military 
archives and the archives of the Foreign Ministry that contain the information related to 
minorities and the policies in relation to the minority groups during the Republican era is 
prohibited by the state.635 Therefore academic research concerning the minority issue cannot 
be conducted using these archives, which makes the academic literature on the minority issue 
in Turkey particularly limited or dominated by official state views. Moreover, the Prime 
Ministry archives, which are open to the researchers do not include the reports or documents 
related to the minority issue at all. Some researchers argue that over the years the Turkish state 
has destroyed these documents that touch upon the most controversial aspects of the minority 
issue including the 1915 Armenian Genocide.636 To give an example, the archival documents 
to be used in a spatial research on regions or cities provides information in relation to only 
those regions where the Turkish majority lives, excluding those sections where the inhabitants 
are minority groups. Given this, most of the academic literature on the historical development 
of the minority issue includes information obtained from the official archives of other 
countries.637  
 
5.2 Minority Presence within Civil Society 
The minority groups in Turkey are represented through various types of civil society 
organizations including foundations, associations, platforms, religious minority foundations, 
movements, federations, confederations, professional organizations, bar associations, 
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institutes, think-tanks, and unions. There are also other types of minority non-state actors, 
including religious leaders, opinion leaders, belief representatives, members of the Parliament, 
and local administrators. Even though a small portion of these organizations existed prior to 
the adoption of the reform packages under different names, the number of minority 
organizations increased significantly after 2002 due to the elimination of the ban on 
establishing organizations that promote minority cultures. In addition to the specific minority 
organizations, there are human rights organizations and other major civil society organizations 
that work on the minority issue including think tanks, research institutes, and business 
organizations. The level of organization differs in relation to each minority group included in 
this thesis;638 however, it was discovered that the types of organizations established by these 
minority groups does not depend on population numbers entirely, but also on other factors 
including financial capacities, relations with the state, existence of other means of 
representation, such as political parties or municipalities, and the problems and the demands of 
the particular minority group in question.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the minority groups that will be examined in more detail in this 
chapter in terms of their organizational structure include the Kurds, Alevis, Arabs, Roma, 
Assyrians and Caucasian groups. The civil society organizations established by these minority 
organizations were found to represent different dynamics and vary in terms of their 
associational structure, relations with national, European and international organizations, 
locations and activities. The following sections will investigate the minority organizations 
established by these groups in more detail with a discussion of the changes in their organization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638 The surveys revealed that some groups such as the Alevis are highly organized with multiplicity of 
organizations whereas others have much lower numbers of organizations.  
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profiles and public and political presence as well as the other means of representation available 
for these groups. 
 
5.3 Minority Civil Society Organizations 
In this respect, even though the Kurds have the highest population, the number of Kurdish civil 
society organizations, aside from the advocacy groups, is visibly lower when compared to other 
minority groups. Given this, the Kurds are mostly represented through the pro-Kurdish political 
party, BDP, holding 32 seats in the Turkish Parliament along with 99 municipalities in east and 
southeast Anatolia. In addition, the Kurds are distinct from other minority groups in the sense 
that they also have an armed guerilla organization, the PKK which heavily influenced the pro-
Kurdish political parties established throughout the 1980s and the 1990s.639 There are also 
smaller pro-Kurdish political parties including HAK-PAR and KADEP.640 However, apart 
from the political parties and the local administrations, the Human Rights Organization (IHD), 
which has its headquarters in Ankara along with 41 local branches and representations in 
different cities around Turkey focused particularly on the Kurdish issue for a long time.641 IHD 
was initially established as a solidarity organization for prisoners and their families by 98 
human rights activists.642 However, due to the high levels of human rights violations in the 
Kurdish region, the Kurdish issue inevitably dominated the agenda of the IHD throughout the 
years. In addition to this, IHD founded the Turkish Human Rights Foundation (TIHV) in 1990, 
which focuses solely on combating issues related to the prevention of torture and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639 Dogu Ergil. 2000. “The Kurdish Question in Turkey”, Journal of Democracy 11(3): 9. 
640 For more on pro-Kurdish political parties see Nicole Watts. 2010. Activists in Office Kurdish Politics and 
Protest in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press.   
641 Adem Caylak. 2008. “Autocratic or Democratic? A Critical Approach to Civil Society Movements in Turkey”, 
Journal of Economic and Social Research 10(1): 123-124; Personal interview with Human Rights Association 
Diyarbakir Branch Representatives on 11.01.2012 in Diyarbakir, Personal interview with Human Rights 
Association Adana Branch Representatives on 10.12.2011 in Adana. 
642 Caylak, 123; IHD. 2001. “IHD 15 Yasinda” (Human Rights Association 15 years old), IHD Publications, p. 
1-3.  
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rehabilitation of torture victioms.643 TIHV has its headquarters in Ankara and branch offices in 
Adana, Diyarbakir, Istanbul, and Izmir. Given this, neither the IHD nor the TIHV branches can 
apply for EU or other international funds on their own.644 The only exception with regards to 
this rule is the IHD Diyarbakir office, which is the only IHD branch that can apply for 
international funding due in part to the urgency and severe impacts of the Kurdish issue in the 
region and also the fact that Diyarbakir office is regarded as representing the region as a 
whole.645 Apart from these, the Kurds in the region also participate in the activities of the 
unions and professional organizations such as the bar association, the Turkish Medical 
Association (TTB), the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK), Public 
Laborers’ Unions Confederation (KESK), and Education and Science Laborers’ Union 
(Egitim-sen). They can also apply for EU funding through these organizations. For instance, 
the Diyarbakir Bar Association organized a project on the levels of access to the justice system 
in the region. The press statements in relation to the Kurdish issue are generally prepared or 
endorsed by union representatives in the region, as they are more actively involved in and vocal 
about the Kurdish issue than their western counterparts.646  
 
The Kurdish organizations established after the adoption of the EU Harmonization packages 
particularly after the elimination of the ban on the use and teaching of languages other than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643 Personal interview with Turkish Human Rights Foundation Adana Branch Representatives in Adana on 
15.12.2011. 
644 Personal interview with TIHV Adana branch in Adana on 15.12.2011 and IHD Adana branch in Adana on 
10.12.2011. 
645 IHD Diyarbakir branch publishes annual reports that document the human rights violations in the Eastern and 
Southeastern regions and implements projects that target the region as a whole including a recent project that 
documents the mass graves around Turkey especially in the Kurdish region. For more on the IHD Diyarbakir 
branch see http://www.ihddiyarbakir.org/Default.aspx. 
646 The press statements concerning the Kurdish issue are most of the time endorsed by a number of civil society 
organizations in the region including the Unions such as TTB, KESK, bars, business associations and human 
rights organizations. To give an example, as part of the recent peace process that started with the negotiations 
between PKK Leader Ocalan and the AKP government in February 2013, 10 civil society organizations in 
Diyarbakir formed a commission that will monitor the retreat of PKK guerillas from Turkey. The commission 
included IHD, KESK, TTB, Southeastern Industrialists and Businessmen Association along with human rights 
organizations and advocacy groups; “Commission established in Diyarbakir to monitor the retreat of PKK”, 
Radikal Daily Newspaper, 06.05.2013. 
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Turkish include those associations that aim to protect and promote the Kurdish language and 
its dialects. The most prominent among these is the Association for the Development and 
Research on the Kurdish Language (Kurdi-der), which has its main office in Diyarbakir and 
has local branches in almost every city in the Kurdish region along with other major cities, 
such as Izmir, Mersin and Adana, where there is a high Kurdish population.647 The Kurdi-der 
in Istanbul is also called the Istanbul Kurdish Institute, which was first established in 1992 as 
a for-profit company engaged in educational activities. Initially, when Istanbul Kurdish 
Institute was founded, it was not legally possible to organize activities and implement projects 
for the protection and the development of the Kurdish language.648 Therefore, they could only 
establish the civil society organization as Kurdi-der after the adoption of the linguistic reforms 
in 2002. In addition to these, the Kurdish organizations include cultural organizations such as 
the Mesopotamia Cultural Center (MKM), which was first established in 1991 to reverse the 
negative impacts of the assimilationist policies by addressing issues related to the promotion 
of the Kurdish culture through arts and culture,649 and also advocacy organizations, such as the 
Mesopotamia Association for Solidarity and Assistance with Mourning Families (MEYA-
DER) and the Federation of Legal and Solidarity Associations for the Families of Prisoners 
and Convicts (TUHAD-FED). However, these associations do not implement projects,650 their 
activities are mostly confined to issuing press statements and organizing panels and 
conferences for raising awareness on the state-led human rights violations in the Kurdish region 
or express their support with Kurdish political prisoners. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647 Personal interview with Kurdi-Der Headquarter Representatives in Diyarbakir on 12.01.2012, in Diyarbakir.  
648 Telephone interview with Zana Farqini, the head of the Istanbul Kurdish Institute, 20.08.2012. 
649 Onder Elaldi. 2011.“Halkın ozgurluk dusleriyle yeniden dogduk” (We were reborn through the freedom ideals 
of our people), Ozgur Gundem Newspaper, 01.09.2011. 
650 Neither TUHADFED nor the MEYADER has websites, however an internet search concerning these two 
organizations reveals a number of newspaper articles relating to their press releases and demonstrations on 
Kurdish political prisoners and unidentified murders including those of PKK guerillas. Such a search also points 
to a close relationship between these organizations and BDP.   
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There is only one Kurdish Foundation, the Kurdish Culture and Research Foundation (Kurd-
Kav), but there are also a number of other bigger organizations located in the Kurdish region 
as well as bigger cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. These organizations mostly 
work on issues including torture, random detainments, internal displacement, discrimination, 
mine clearance, freedom of speech, linguistic rights, cultural rights, children’s rights, and 
women’s empowerment.651 Finally, the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) is an umbrella 
organization composed of a number of different civil society organizations close to the BDP.652 
It acts as a platform for the civil society organizations and organizes conferences, workshops, 
and symposiums in order to address the issues related to the resolution of the Kurdish 
problem.653 However, since it is not registered as a civil society organization, the DTK does 
not initiate projects or obtain funding from any national or foreign donor. Despite the urgency 
of the problem and the high population numbers, the Kurdish organizations do not have a 
federation or any similar umbrella organization; therefore, they mostly implement projects 
through their own municipalities in collaboration with other civil society organizations 
established in those cities. To give an example, the Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality was 
granted funding by the EU for implementing infrastructure projects, landscape planning 
projects, rehabilitation projects, tourism activities, cultural heritage, and intercultural dialogue 
projects, as well as other cultural projects such as the promotion of the Kurdish Dengbej 
tradition, Kurdish culinary tradition, restoration of Armenian and Assyrian churches in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 These organizations include the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Open Society 
Foundation in Istanbul, History Foundation, Diyarbakir Social and Political Research Association (DISA), 
Turkish Economic and Political Research Foundation (TEPAV) and Foundation for Political, Economic and 
Social Research (SETA) among others.  
652 Email correspondence with DTK representative on 25.06.2012; Further information can be found on the DTK 
website, available at www.demokratiktoplumkongresi.com. 
653 During a meeting, the DTK administrators indicated that even though DTK is considered as part of the civil 
society, it is perceived as the local parliament of the region by its founders. In this regard, they emphasize that the 
main objective of the DTK is to determine the ways in which different peoples of Turkey can live together within 
the boundaries of Turkey. The meeting notes are available at http://www.islahhaber.com/diyarbakir-dan-baris-
arayislarina-tam-destek-36301h.htm, downloaded on 10.05.2013. 
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Diyarbakir, architectural research on Diyarbakir, and cultural inventory projects.654 The EU 
funding for these projects was allocated through the Central Finance and Contracts Unit 
(CFCU), which delegates the selection process to the Regional Development Agencies for 
structural funds or allocates the funds itself directly for other subheadings, such as the 
development of cultural rights in Turkey.655 The EU aid obtained is part of the IPA funding 
scheme for regional development as well as the Cultural Initiatives Support Program.656 For 
instance, the Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality implemented a project regarding Dengbej 
tradition in Diyarbakir in collaboration with Dicle Firat Culture Center whereas for projects 
such as the restoration of the Surp Giragos Armenian Church, the Diyarbakir Municipality co-
implemented the project with the Surp Giragos Armenian Church Foundation in Diyarbakir.657 
Apart from these, there is a Zaza association based in Diyarbakir, Ziwan-Kom Association that 
organizes research activities on the Zaza language and culture.658 The activities are constrained 
to culture and arts activities as well as events concerning the development of the Zaza language. 
The Zazas also have two other organizations one based in Bingol, Eastern Anatolia called the 
Zaza Language, Culture and History Foundation and another one based in Istanbul named the 
Zaza Culture and Language Association established in 2011.  
 
Given their high population numbers, as the biggest religious minority, the Alevis are more 
organized in comparison to the Kurds. They have two major and active federations, the Alevi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654 Armagan Tanrikulu and Adnan Aksoy. 2012. “Diyarbakir Culture and Tourism Projects Report”, Karacadag 
Development Agency, 1-119.   
655 Ibid, 2.  
656 Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU), “Support for Cultural Rights in Turkey Cultural Initiatives 
Support Grant Scheme”, Reference Number: CFCU-TR 0401.06.02/CISGS, available at 
http://www.cfcu.gov.tr/tender.php?lng=tr&action=tender_search&status%5B%5D=closed&type%5B%5D=gran
ts&lspage=4. Downloaded first on 15.03.2011. 
657 Tanrikulu and Aksoy, 15. 
658 Personal interview with Bilal Zilan, Chairperson of the Board of Directors of Ziwan-Kom Zaza Association 
on 12.01.2012 in Diyarbakir.  
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Bektasi Federation (ABF) and the Alevi Foundations Federation (AVF).659 The AVF also 
founded the Alevi Associations Federation; however, it is currently inactive and has only eight 
member associations.660 Finally, there is also a newly established Anatolia Alevi Bektasi 
Federation, which is arguably closer to the government; however, it only organizes benefit 
events once a year during Ramadan and does not initiate any projects.661 The Alevi-Bektasi 
Federation has the highest number of member organizations, including the Alevi Cultural 
Association and its 102 branches, the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association and its 61 
branches, and 33 other independent Alevi associations.662 On the other hand, the Alevi 
Foundations Federation has 12 member foundations.663 The data revealed that the levels of 
membership in Alevi associations is higher in contrast to other minority organizations, 
sometimes the number of members reaching 6.000, as in the case of the Mersin Alevi Cultural 
Association.664 This is due to the fact that the Alevi associations are not merely civil society 
organizations but are actually established as belief organizations where the Alevi population 
can organize the Cems along with other religious practices and rituals.665 Therefore, most of 
these Alevi organizations do not implement projects but act as places of worship for the Alevis 
who are not allowed to establish Cem houses in the first place. In addition, unlike other 
minority organizations such as the Circassians, the Alevi organizations usually leave it to their 
headquarters in Ankara or Istanbul as well as the federations to obtain international funding for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 Email correspondence with Dogan Bermek, the head of the Alevi Foundations Federations on 08.04.2012. 
There is no prior academic research on Alevi civil society organizations, information can only be collected through 
the websites of the Alevi federations.  
660 Ibid.  
661 Information on Anatolia Alevi Bektasi Federation is available at http://www.anadoluabf.org, first downloaded 
on 20.12.2011. 
662Member organizations of Alevi Bektasi Federation can be accessed at 
http://www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=222&Itemid=258, first 
downloaded on 20.12.2011. 
663 Member foundations of the Alevi Foundations Federation can be downloaded at 
http://www.avf.org.tr/uye_listesi.asp, first downloaded on 20.12.2011. 
664 Survey completed by Mersin Alevi Culture Association 16.06.2012.  
665 Personal interview with Adana Alevi Culture Association in Adana on 18.07.2011 and Alevi Dede at the Adana 
Cem House 18.07.2011.  
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implementing projects that they can be a part of.666 Given this, the main branch of Alevi 
Cultural Association implements several EU projects obtained directly from the European 
Commission as part of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
scheme.667 In addition to this, the Haci Bektas Veli Anatolia Cultural Foundation (HBVAKV) 
in Ankara has been granteed a project as part of the EIDHR scheme for the monitoring and 
capacity building of Alevi civil society organizations.668  
 
Other Alevi civil society organizations include the Haci Bektas Veli Anatolia Cultural 
Foundation, which has its main branch in Ankara and 39 local branches in various cities around 
Turkey.669 There is also an Alevi institute established within the auspices of HBVAKV and 
with the support of the AKD that conducts research pertaining to Alevism and the problems of 
Alevis in Turkey.670 Over time, the Alevi institute has acquired an autonomous character from 
the HBVAKV; however, the board of directors decided that the institute shall only implement 
projects that will contribute to the preparation of a New Constitution after January 2012.671 In 
addition to these, there are other independent Alevi organizations particularly those established 
by Kurdish Alevis. The 1st Kurdistan Alevi Conference was organized in February 2013 under 
the auspices of DTK and the participants agreed upon the foundation of the Mesopotamia Alevi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
666 Email correspondence with Alevi Bektasi Federation EU Projects coordinator, Cahit Korkmaz on 07.09.2012 
and personal interview with Alevi Bektasi Federation Secretary General in Adana on 18.07.2011.  
667 The ongoing and completed projects supported by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
Scheme. Available at http://www.avrupa.info.tr/eu-and-civil-society/the-european-instrument-for-democracy-
and-human-rights/projects-supported.html.    
668 Ibid.  
669 More information about the Haci Bektas Veli Anatolia Culture Foundation and its branches can be found at 
the foundation’s website, downloaded at http://www.hacibektasvakfi.web.tr/vakif%20/subelerimiz, first 
downloaded on 10.07.2011.   
670 More information on the Alevi Research, Documentation and Application Institute is available at 
http://www.alevienstitusu.net, first downloaded on 07.05.2011.  
671 The press release concerning the Alevi Institute’s decision not to implement any further projects is available 
at http://www.alevienstitusu.org, first downloaded on 28.05.2012.  
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Union;672 nevertheless, this decision was not welcome by all Alevi organizations.673 In the 
same manner, the Free Democratic Alevi Movement and the Free Democratic Alevi 
Associations are particularly close to the Kurdish political movement and act more like 
advocacy groups, organizing panels and conferences particularly for raising awareness on the 
human rights of the Alevis and the Kurdish issue. Apart from these, there is also a Nusayri 
Association named Alevi Cultural Research Association (AKAD) based in Adana, which aims 
to conduct scientific research on Alevism as well as promote and protect the Nusayri faith 
while at the same time acting as a pressure group for the prevention of discrimination against 
Nusayris. To give an example, AKAD actively participated in the Alevi Workshops organized 
by the government in 2010 to ensure that a description of the Nusayri faith is included within 
12th grade religion class books.674 Despite these, the Alevi faith is still not accepted as a separate 
religion or an Islamic faith as demanded by different Alevi groups. The Presidency of Religious 
Affairs (DIYANET) describes Alevis as various political and religious groups whose common 
feature is their commitment to the Prophet Ali.675 Therefore, according to DIYANET, it is not 
possible to distinguish Alevis from other Muslims given that the terms Alevi and Sunni cannot 
be used as antonyms but share a superordinate identity, which is Islam.676 This is particularly 
problematic for Alevi civil society organizations as they cannot be registered as belief 
organizations but they are compelled to be classified as associations. As evident from these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
672 The Final Declaration of the 1st Kurdistan Alevi Conference organized by the Democratic Society Congress, 
downloaded from http://rojpress.com/?p=7682 on 10.03.2013. Under the decisions taken during the Conference, 
the final declaration indicates the organization of Alevis living within Mesopotamia region under the name 
‘Mesopotamia Alevis Union’.  
673 Press release by Engin Gunduk, the President of Alevi Culture Associations on 06.02.2013, downloaded at 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/02/06/bu.alevi.hareketini.bolmektir/695430.0/, first downloaded on 
10.02.2013. In the press release, Gunduk on behalf of the Alevi Culture Associations states that the establishment 
of a Mesopotamia Alevis Union would divide the Alevi movement and emphasizes that they reject the statements 
included within the Final Declaration of the 1st Kurdistan Alevi Conference.  
674 “Alevi Workshops and Nusayri Description within School Books”, downloaded from 
http://www.akadadana.org/Calistay.asp, on 15.07.2011.   
675 Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), “Alevism”, downloaded from 
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/DiniBilgilerDetay.aspx?ID=688 on 11.03.2013.   
676 Ibid.  
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examples, the Alevis are united under a number of different civil society organizations with 
differing political ties; however, the problems voiced by these organizations are almost 
identical. In spite of their ideological dissimilarities, the Alevis continue to be one of the most 
highly organized minority groups in Turkey which have close ties to European networks and 
platforms.  
 
Even though the Caucasian groups, including the Circassians, Georgians, Abkhazians, 
Ossetians, and Dagistanis, were historically organized under the name Caucasian when 
establishing civil society organizations, following the harmonization reforms they reorganized 
based on their own identities instead of a superordinate identity. Most of the member 
associations of the Caucasian Associations Federation (KAFFED) continue to use the name 
Caucasian in their title whereas others have changed it to Circassian.677 KAFFED has 54 
member associations. There is only one other Caucasian federation, the United Caucasian 
Associations Federation (Bir-Kaffed) that is also based in Ankara. In addition to KAFFED and 
Bir-Kaffed, Circassian Associations Federation was established very recently in April 2013.678 
Comparatively, KAFFED is more active in terms of implementing projects and forming 
international networks. Over the years, KAFFED has implemented several EU projects in 
collaboration with its local member branch organizations.679 Furthermore, some of the 
Georgian and Abkhazian associations also parted ways with KAFFED in order to establish 
their own federations. Nine Abkhazian Associations established the Abkhazian Associations 
Federation (Abhaz-Fed)680 and the Georgians initiated the efforts to establish a Georgian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677 Personal interview with Isa Elagoz, General Secretary of Adana Circassian Cultural Association on 20.07.2011 
in Adana.  
678“Circassian Associations Federation Established”, downloaded at http://www.xabze.net/blog/cerkes-
dernekleri-federasyonu-kuruldu/, published on 17.04.2013 and downloaded on 06.05.2013. 
679 Electronic survey completed by KAFFED on 29.09.2011.  
680 Information relating to Abkhaz Associations Federation and member organizations was downloaded from 
http://www.abhazfederasyonu.org on 10.10.2011.  
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Associations Federation through a workshop in October 2011; however, the efforts remained 
inconclusive so far.681 In addition to these, there is only one Caucasian Foundation, the 
Caucasian Research, Culture and Solidarity Foundation (KAF-DAV). The Caucasians also 
exhibit diverse patterns of organization. They have established platforms, initiatives, 
movements, and groups in addition to associations and foundations. For example, the 
Georgians founded the Georgians from Turkey Platform and the Georgian Cultural Center, 
whereas the Circassians established the Democratic Circassian Initiative, the Democratic 
Circassian Platform, the Circassian Rights Initiative, and Circassian Initiative for Democracy. 
In addition to these, the Caucasus Forum was established in order to organize projects that 
address the problems of Caucasians in Turkey and act as a pressure group especially in relation 
to the human rights violations of the Caucasian groups in Turkey including the situation of the 
Chechen asylum seekers, Circassian genocide, and Karachay exile. Finally, the Ossetians in 
Turkey have one foundation, Alan Culture and Assistance Foundation, which essentially aims 
to promote and preserve the culture and identity of the Ossetian minority in Turkey as well as 
raising awareness on the issues relevant to the Ossetians of Turkey. Caucasian civil society 
organizations are highly organized as demonstrated by the varying types and levels of 
organization. However, recently different camps started to form among the Caucasian 
organizations especially pertaining to the issue of public education in mother tongue languages 
and cultural rights. Some of the Caucasian civil society organizations sided with the Kurdish 
political movement in terms of the demand for public education in mother tongue languages 
whereas others preferred to remain distant from the Kurdish organizations even though they 
acknowledged the need for mother tongue education.682 In fact, in 2011 some of the more 
progressive Circassian civil society organizations organized a demonstration in Istanbul for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681 Interview with Fazli Kaya from Georgian Cultural Center Association on 20.09.2011; “Articles on Georgian 
Workshops on the way to a Georgian Federation”, October 2011, available on 
http://www.gurculerinsesi.net/content/federasyonlaşma-yolunda-gürcü-çalıştaylarına-dair-yazılar6.   
682 Telephone interview with Sezai Babakus from the Democratic Circassians Initiative on 18.05.2012.  
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raising awareness on public education in mother tongue languages.683 Yet, others such as the 
Caucasian Foundation argued that the Turkish language should remain as the primary and 
official language of education and opening up the way for mother tongue education would lead 
to chaos and excessive demands that the Ministry of Education cannot accommodate.684  
 
The Roma or Gypsy organizations include the Roma, Dom, Lom along with other groups such 
as Tahtaci, Abdal, or Geygel; however, there is no comprehensive academic study concerning 
the fragmentations among the Roma in Turkey.685 There is also no consensus on the different 
groups within the Roma or Gypsy population, given that some prefer to call them Gypsy in 
general and categorize Roma as one of the groups within the Gypsies, whereas others consider 
the word “Gypsy” as a derogatory term and therefore prefer to use the term “Roma” as a general 
and broad term for describing all groups.686 There are a number of Roma civil society 
organizations including federations, associations, and platforms; however, there is no definitive 
information about the number of Roma associations or federations. According to Hatice 
Cetinkaya from the Zero Tolerance Association, the number of associations is around 210 with 
11 federations.687 These associations are mostly located in the western and southern parts of 
Turkey, including the Marmara, Aegean, and Mediterranean regions given that the majority of 
the Roma population resides in these parts. However, the Dom civil society organizations are 
established in the southeastern parts of Turkey and the only Lom civil society organization is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
683 “Cerkesler Anadil icin yuruyor (Circassians walk for public education in mother tongue languages)”, Milliyet 
Daily Newspaper, 13 March 2011.   
684 Hulusi Ustun. “Anadilde Egitim ve Cerkesler” (Mother Tongue Education and Circassians), Caucasus 
Foundation downloaded from 
http://www.kafkas.org.tr/yazarlar/hulusi_ustun_anadilde_egitim_ve_cerkesler.htm.   
685 Email correspondence with Ali Mezarcioglu, Roma activist, author and the editor of cingeneyiz.org on 
08.01.2012.   
686 Ibid.  
687 Email correspondence with Hatice Cetinkaya, Zero Tolerance Association on 27.05.2013. There is no accurate 
information or academic research concerning the number of Roma organizations in Turkey. Zero Tolerance 
Association works on Roma issues and conducted extensive research on Roma organizations and concluded that 
in total in Turkey there are 210 Roma associations.   
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located in the Black Sea region. There is one Dom association in Antakya and another one in 
Diyarbakir whereas the only Lom association is established in Hopa.688 Despite the 
overwhelming quantity of Roma civil society organizations, most of these associations are far 
less institutionalized when compared with other minority groups, mostly due to the low levels 
of financial capacity. Therefore they face significant sustainability problems.689 This is also 
evident from the fact that there is no Roma foundation currently established in Turkey, as 
foundations require a certain property to be donated to the foundation in question. In addition, 
most of the Roma civil society organizations, even the ones with the largest budgets, do not 
have websites or other means to communicate with the international and European networks, 
which makes it more difficult to establish networks while constraining their scope to local 
activities.  
 
The Roma organizations have closer relations with the government and state agencies when 
compared with other groups such as the Kurds or Alevis. This is partially due to the Roma 
opening initiated by the Prime Minister in 2009 where the representatives of five different 
Roma federations and 80 Roma associations met with the government and the Ministry of 
Labor to discuss their problems.690 The Roma organizations are also close to state agencies as 
most of the time they apply to local governorships for aid from the Ministry of Family and 
Social Policies Social Beneficiary and Solidarity Encouragement Fund. The demands of the 
Roma groups are largely in respect to the prevention of discrimination, access to housing, 
education and health services, poverty, and unemployment, rather than cultural or linguistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688 Surveys completed by the head of the Hatay Dom Tribe Culture Research, Solidarity and Assistance 
Association, Diyarbakir Dom Association and the head of the Artvin Lom Culture Research and Solidarity 
Association.  
689 Quantitative data reveals that 7 out of the total 15 Roma organizations surveyed indicated that their annual 
budget is less than 4000 Euros.   
690 “Turkiye’de Romanlarin Durumu” (The Situation of Roma in Turkey), Fundacion Secretariado Gitano Report, 
December 2010, 20.   
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rights.691 Following this, in 2011, 70 different Roma civil society organizations and six 
federations came together to establish the Roma Rights Forum (Rom-Fo).692 The aims of Rom-
Fo were identified as working towards securing equal rights for the Roma population, 
struggling with discrimination, and exclusion through multicultural and pluralistic policies, 
trying to overcome the prejudiced public opinion in Turkey regarding the Roma, while at the 
same time working towards the recognition and promotion of Roma identity and culture, 
supporting public agencies, and local administrations in their efforts for improving the living 
conditions of Roma population, securing the human rights of Roma wherever they reside, 
standing against all kinds of pressure contradicting international law towards Roma, starting 
campaigns against any kinds of written or visual documents that insult or exhibit hate towards 
Roma, collaborating with all kinds of civil society organization that work on the problems of 
Roma, and finally supporting all efforts that would benefit the Roma youth.693 In addition to 
these, there are other civil society organizations such as the Zero Discrimination Association 
working on issues relevant to the Roma population as well as other institutions with bigger 
capacities, such as the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly. In addition to Rom-Fo, there is a Public-
CSO Dialogue Group that is also coordinated by the Zero Tolerance Association, which brings 
together seven public institutions including the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, the 
Ministry for EU Affairs, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, and finally the Employment Agency 
with 30 Roman civil society organizations including Roma, Dom, Lom, and Abdal 
organizations registered at different cities around Turkey.694 Finally, another Roma group 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 Ibid, 34.  
692 Roma Rights Forum (Rom-Fo) was established in Istanbul in November 2012 with the participation of around 
70 Roma associations and 6 federations. “Turkey’s Roma People Unite for Rights”, 19.11.2012, 
http://www.bianet.org/english/minorities/142214-turkeys-roma-people-unite-for-rights.  
693 Hacer Foggo. 2012. “Turkiye Roman Haklari Forumu Kuruldu” (Turkey Roma Rights Forum Established), 
Taraf Daily Newspaper on 22.11.2012.   
694 Email correspondence with Hatice Cetinkaya, Zero Tolerance Association on 27.05.2013. 
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established at the national level is Turkey Roma Plan.695 Turkey Roma Plan tries to come up 
with solutions to the social and economic exclusion problems of the Roma communities.  
 
The Laz minority has relatively fewer civil society organizations in comparison to other 
Caucasian groups. They have only recently established a Laz Cultural Association in Ankara 
and they have one foundation in Bursa called the Sima Foundation. In addition to these, they 
have another association established in Istanbul, AKADER, and finally the Laz Culture, 
Solidarity and Tourism Association located in Artvin. Finally, the Black Sea Environment 
Association (KACED), which is located in Rize also implements projects on the Laz language, 
culture, and literature through the funds granted by the European Commission.696 KACED also 
works on other issues including environment, human rights, multiculturalism, EU accession, 
democratization, culture, and gender and youth issues. The association organized two other 
projects funded by the British Embassy in Ankara and the Australian Embassy in Ankara on 
youth issues and environmental problems. In a similar manner, the Laz Culture Association 
implemented an EU funded project in collaboration with Caucasian Federation (KAFFED) on 
the accommodation of diversity.697 In 2011, a number of Laz activists tried to establish the Laz 
Collective Movement Initiative with the aim to preserve and promote the Laz identity; 
however, the efforts did not yield concrete results.698 Recently, after the government initiated 
the elective classes in mother tongue languages, Laz activists started to work on a Laz language 
institute.699 Finally the Lazuri nena school book was completed before the start of the academic 
year 2013-14 and the Ministry of Education approved their appeal for opening Lazuri elective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
695 Ibid.  
696 Electronic survey completed by KACED President on 11.10.2011. 
697 KAFFED and Laz Culture Association co-organized an EU funded project titled “We would like to exist 
without differences” between 2011-2012.   
698 Nilay Vardar. “Lazlar Asimilasyona Direnc Gosteremedi” (Laz People could not resist assimilation), Bianet, 
25 May 2011, available at http://www.bianet.org/bianet/bianet/130240-temel-lazlar-asimilasyona-direnc-
gosteremedi downloaded on 28 May 2011.  
699 Ibid.   
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courses upon demand. Due to their low financial and institutional capacities, most of these 
organizations do not implement projects but rather work on linguistic issues and organize 
panels and workshops for the preservation of the Lazuri language among the Laz population.  
 
The Arab organizations in Turkey are significantly lower in contrast to their high population 
numbers. There is only one association, the Arab Solidarity and Culture Association (Arap-
Der) established in Sanliurfa where they have the highest population, and there is also one Arab 
Platform established in Siirt, and another Arab platform established in Mardin. The Arap-Der 
has around 9,000 members, and it has 11 local branch offices around Turkey, mostly within 
the cities located in the southern and southeastern regions including Mardin, Siirt, Mus, 
Batman, Hatay, Antep, Iskenderun, Adana, Istanbul, Antalya, and Manisa, as well as an 
international branch office in Mecca.700 In addition to this, the Arab activists in Mardin recently 
established an umbrella organization together with Assyrian, Chaldean, Aramaeic, and Mhelmi 
civil society organizations.701 Comparatively, the Arab organizations have the closest relations 
with the government as they meet with ministers almost every month; however, relations with 
European Union institutions is almost non-existent.702 Given this, the Arab organizations act 
as a pressure group and conduct meetings with government officials and Middle Eastern civil 
society organizations in relation to the problems of the Arab minority in Turkey along with the 
developments in the Arab world and the Middle East.703 Although Arap-Der is located in 
southeast Anatolia, the head of the Association claimed that they do not meet with the European 
delegations that visit the region as they find Turkey’s progress in the EU accession process 
satisfying in terms of economic and political stability.704 In a similar manner, the Mhelmis have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700 Telephone interview with Sukru Kirboga.  
701 “Joint Statement from Arab-Assyrian-Aramaic-Chaldean and Mhelmi Organizations”, 28 April 2013, available 
at http://www.gelawej.net/index.php/yazarlar/faruk-aras/9967-2013-04-28-12-51-50.html.   
702 Telephone interview with Sukru Kirboga. 
703 Ibid. 
704 Ibid.  
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two associations established in Mardin and Batman; however, they do not have any other type 
of civil society organization.705 Even though there are only two Mhelmi organizations, they 
organize a number of projects funded by the European Union and other international grant-
giving institutions including the Global Dialogue Foundation and Olof Palme Center.706 In 
addition to this, they have close relations with the European Commission Delegation in Ankara 
and also with other European agencies, civil society organizations, and networks.707 At the 
same time, they collaborate with Assyrian organizations on a number of projects including the 
Assyrian and Aramaeic diaspora organizations in Europe.708 In spite of these, the relations of 
the Mhelmis with the government and especially with local administrators is restricted.709  
 
There is only one Hamshen association, the Association for Sustaining and Researching 
Hamshen Culture (HADIG) established in Istanbul, in 2011.710 There are also a number of 
other organizations but they are strictly township organizations, as the name Hamshen refers 
to a town name as well. HADIG only organizes activities pertaining to the protection of 
Hamshen culture, identity, and language. The Pomaks on the other hand, have four Pomak 
associations established in Istanbul, Eskisehir, Izmir, and Biga, as well as a Pomak 
Associations Federation.711 Apart from this, there is a Democratic Pomaks Movement and a 
Pomak Institute, which has its main office in Stockholm and was established by the diaspora 
Pomak communities in Sweden.712 The Pomaks, who have been almost invisible in Turkey and 
continue to be unknown to the majority of the public, established civil society organizations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705 Personal interview with Mehmet Ali Aslan, the head of Mardin Mhelmi Association on 14.01.2012 in Mardin.  
706 Ibid.   
707 Ibid.   
708 Ibid; Personal interview with Yuhanna Aktas, the head of Midyat Assyrian Culture Association on 14.01.2012, 
in Mardin.   
709 Personal interview with Mehmet Ali Aslan.  
710 Interview with Hikmet Akcicek, the head of HADIG on 22.08.2012.  
711 Telephone interview with Mehmet Demir, head of Pomak Associations Federation on 27.06.2012.   
712 Email correspondence with Ibrahim Kenar, the head of Pomak Institute on 29.09.2011. 
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with the common goal to preserve and promote the Pomak culture, language, and identity.713 
The Pomak organizations also aligned with other minority groups in the demands for public 
education in mother tongue languages, arguing that the only way years of assimilation towards 
the Pomaks could be reversed is through mother tongue education.714  
 
Since there are only a few Molokan families left in Kars, which is located in eastern Turkey, 
civil society organizations are really scarce. There was only one Molokan association, the 
World’s Molokans Friendship Association established in 2008 in Kars by a Molokan activist. 
In comparison, the Africans have only one association, the Association for Africans’ Culture, 
Solidarity and Assistance (Afro-Turk Association) in Balikesir.715 The majority of the African 
population lives in the Aegean region and a small population lives in the Marmara region.716 
However, there is no research on population numbers in relation to or the African minority in 
general particularly with regard to the number of the second or third generation with either an 
African father or an African mother and therefore the total population numbers cannot be 
accounted for.717 Despite these, Africans in Turkey became more visible, especially in the 
recent years, mostly due to the efforts of the Afro-Turk Association. The Afro-Turk association 
implemented an oral history project in collaboration with the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly 
funded by the European Commission along with two other projects funded by the Global 
Dialogue Foundation and the Open Society Foundation.718 These projects are mainly on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 Telephone interview with Mehmet Demir. 
714 Ibid; Press release by Eskisehir Pomak Culture Association on 23.02.2013 “Pomak dili olmesin, yasasin ana 
dilimiz” (Pomak language shall not die, long live our language), downloaded from 
http://www.birgun.net/forum_index.php?news_code=1361610834&year=2013&month=02&day=23.  
715 Telephone interview with Mustafa Olpak, head of the Association for Africans’ Culture, Solidarity and 
Assistance, on 08.12.2012. 
716 Ibid.   
717 Ibid.  
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problems of the African minority in Turkey and discrimination as well as an in-depth 
demographic study.719  
 
As discussed previously, the only minorities officially recognized by the Turkish state are the 
Jewish, Greek Orthodox, and Armenian minority groups. Therefore, these non-Muslim 
minority groups were granted certain rights, including maintaining or reopening their own 
minority foundations that were established during the Ottoman Empire.720 Yet, other non-
Muslim minority groups such as the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Bulgarians, Georgians, and Latin 
Catholics were denied of this right and their properties were seized.721 As for the Greek 
Orthodox, Jewish, and Armenian foundations, they could register property until 1974. 
However, upon a decision by the High Court of Appeal in 1974, the property obtained by these 
minority foundations through acquisition, donations, or inheritance were either returned to their 
previous owners or were seized by the Treasury.722 This was only reversed with the 
Foundations Law passed in 2003. As a result, some of the property that initially belonged to 
these groups was returned yet most of the cases are still pending before the Foundations 
Department or the ECtHR.723 Given this, the civil society organizations representing these non-
Muslim minority groups are mostly the minority foundations that were established in the 1920s 
and were re-opened after 2003 after the adoption of the EU harmonization reforms. However, 
these minority foundations were only able to obtain foreign funding or open branches after the 
Foundations Law that was adopted in 2008.724 Therefore, prior to 2008, it was not possible for 
minority foundations to get EU funding at all. In addition to this, there is a Greek Orthodox 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719 Ibid.  
720 Oran 2007a, 38-39.  
721 Ibid, 35-36.   
722 Ibid, 39-40.  
723 The Constantinopolitan Society. 2012. “The Greek Minority in Turkey”, 2012 Human Dimension 
Implementation Meeting, Working Session 12, 2.   
724  Law No. 5737 of 20 February 2008, Resmi Gazete (R.G.) (Official Gazette of Turkey), 27 February 2008, No. 
26800.  
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Minority Foundations Association (RUMVADER) that works on the problems of the minority 
foundations and the Greek Orthodox minority. In a similar manner, the Armenians have only 
one association working on the Armenian minority, which is called the Armenian Culture and 
Solidarity Association. The Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association organizes panels and 
workshops along with language courses and oral history projects. There are also other smaller 
Armenian associations located in eastern and south eastern cities such as the Dersim or Malatya 
Armenians Association. The Jewish civil society organizations are confined to the religious 
minority foundations; however, apart from these they are represented through minority 
presidents.  
 
The Assyrians on the other hand are far more organized when compared with the other non-
Muslim minority groups. Given that Assyrians historically resided in the southeast, their 
organizations are mostly established in these cities. There are three Assyrian associations in 
Mardin, one association in Sirnak and finally one association in Istanbul. There is also an 
Assyrian Associations federation based in Mardin. Apart from these, there are also township 
or village organizations representing the Assyrian minority; however, they merely act as 
solidarity and beneficiary associations. There is also the Midyat Assyrian Churches Foundation 
and the minority foundations such as Dayrulzaferan Monastery Foundation, Mor Gabriel 
Monastery Foundation, and Idil Assyrian Ancient Foundation. Regarding the Chaldeans, there 
is only one Chaldean Foundation based in Mardin, which is the Mardin Chaldean Foundation 
and there is an Assyrian-Chaldean Solidarity Association that mainly works on asylum issues 
and the problems of the Chaldean or Assyrian refugees from Iraq and Syria, among others. As 
the population of the Bulgarian Orthodox minority is really scarce, Bulgarians have only one 
minority foundation based in Istanbul, the Bulgarian Exarchate Foundation. The Latin 
Catholics have churches in Adana, Antakya, Samsun, Tarsus, Mersin, Trabzon, and 
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Iskenderun, yet there are only a few Latin Catholic minority foundations. In spite of their 
smaller numbers, the Latin Catholics recently announced their demands from the new 
constitution specifically highlighting the need for legal recognition.725 Finally, there is only 
one Georgian Catholic Foundation based in Istanbul representing a small population of around 
200 people.726  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Ezidis are a rural population mostly residing in 
southeast Anatolia. There are only a few Ezidi families left,727 and most of them only speak 
Kurdish. They have only one civil society organization, the Besiri Ezidi Association, which is 
based in Batman.728 However, it mostly acts as a solidarity association. As the Ezidis of Turkey 
mostly immigrated to Western European countries, they have highly organized diaspora 
organizations, which keep close relations with the Ezidis in Turkey.729 The Ezidis also have 
belief representatives that conduct relations, especially with the local administrators as in the 
case of the Diyarbakir Ezidi Belief Representative.730 Finally, the Protestants have one 
foundation, the Istanbul Protestant Church Foundation and three associations, the Protestant 
Churches Association, Izmir Protestant Church Association, and the Diyarbakir Protestant 
Association. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
725 “Latin Katolikler Anayasal Taninma Istedi” (The Latin Catholics ask for Constitutional Recognition), T24 
Independent Online Newspaper, http://t24.com.tr/haber/latin-katolik-kilisesi-anayasal-taninma-istedi/201752.  
726 Sule Toktas and Bulent Aras. 2009. “The EU and Minority Rights in Turkey”, Political Science Quarterly 
124(4): 701. 
727 There are extremely conflicting numbers regarding the population of Ezidis, however according to the Ezidi 
Belief Representative interviewed during the fieldwork in Diyarbakir on 13.01.2012, the total number is between 
350-400. Despite this, there are some scholars who argue that the numbers are around 5000, see Toktas and Aras, 
701.  
728 Information on Besiri Ezidi Association can only be obtained through internet search on the organization. The 
association does not have a website. See “Yezidilerin Buruk Bayramı” (The Bittersweet Feast of the Ezidis), 
Radikal Daily Newspaper, 20.12.2008, the article can be downloaded from 
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729 Personal interview with Diyarbakir Ezidi Belief Representative on 13.01.2012, in Diyarbakir.  
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In addition to these minority organizations, there are a number of other associations and 
foundations that work on minority issues. These organizations are comparatively larger 
institutions with greater financial capacities, as well as human resources and are mostly based 
in major cities including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Diyarbakir. The areas of concentration 
range from democratization, rule of law, and human rights to specific minority groups, and 
their problems including the Kurds or the Roma. There are also business organizations such as 
the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and the Independent 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD). TUSIAD has only one 
representation in Ankara and its main office is in Istanbul, whereas MUSIAD has 37 branch 
offices around Turkey. Both organizations were established in the 1990s; however, MUSIAD 
stands closer to the AKP government when compared with TUSIAD.731 TUSIAD has been a 
strong supporter of Turkey’s EU accession and democratization process, and published several 
declarations and reports pertaining to these issues.732 Even though MUSIAD is less active on 
issues pertaining to Turkey’s democratization and the human rights problems, it has 
occasionally published reports on the democratization reforms in Turkey since the 2000s.733 
Most recently, MUSIAD announced a report that includes recommendations for the new 
constitution.734 Given that the minority problem is a highly contested issue in Turkey, not only 
civil society organizations such as associations or foundations, but also organizations including 
unions, professional organizations, bars, and even chambers publish declarations, organize 
press conferences, or act as pressure groups at times when necessary. Most of all, such 
organizations located in the eastern and southeastern Turkey, where the Kurdish issue is a 
pressing concern, act as advocacy groups often issuing statements related to the problems of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731 Dilek Yankaya. 2009. “The Europeanization of MUSIAD: Political Opportunism, Economic 
Europeanization, Islamic Euroscepticism”, European Journal of Turkish Studies 9: 5.   
732 Ziya Onis and Umut Turem. 2002. “Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey”, Comparative 
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733 Yankaya, 4-5. 
734 Personal interview with Mehmet Ali Dündar, head of MUSIAD Mardin Branch on 14.01.2012 in Mardin.  
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the Kurdish minority. To give an example, Egitim-sen published several reports on public 
education in mother-tongue languages whereas the Diyarbakir branch of the Turkish Medical 
Association (TTB) published a dictionary of medical terms in Kurdish and organized training 
for health services in Kurdish.735 In addition to these, throughout the years, the TTB often made 
declarations in relation to the Kurdish issue.736 Yet, the different branches of Unions or 
professional organizations generally show significant segregation pertaining to the minority 
issue most of the time and are unable to reach a common ground especially on sensitive issues 
such as the Kurdish question or linguistic rights.  
 
5.4 Patterns of Organization of Minority Groups 
The minority organizations examined in this thesis show varying patterns of association and 
organization. These fluctuations among the civil society organizations representing different 
minority groups and the civil society organizations located in different cities representing the 
same minority group can be tied to a number of factors including population levels, location, 
number of organizations established, availability of resources and the type of minority group 
that they represent. In turn, these factors also affect the patterns regarding the formation, links 
and influence of the minority organizations. For example, while some minority groups 
predominantly set up civil society organizations in one city, other groups have several 
organizations scattered across Turkey. Additionally, the structure of the civil society 
organization has an impact on the links and influence of that particular organization and the 
minority group that it represents. Moreover, the resources available for that minority group and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735 The Turkish Medical Association organized the 1st Mesopotamia Medicine Days in 2009 with the intent to 
form a common medicine literature in Kurdish, over 300 Kurdish medical professionals participated. Following 
this in March 2009, the first Kurdish Medical Handbook was published and distributed by the Diyarbakir Medical 
Association. See “Doktorlara Kurtce Kilavuz Kitabi” (Kurdish Handbook for Doctors), Radikal Daily Newspaper, 
21.03.2009, the article can be downloaded from 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/doktorlara_kurtce_kilavuz_kitabi-927312.  
736 More information on the press releases issued by the Diyarbakir Medical Association can be accessed at 
http://www.dbto.org/Aciklama.aspx.   
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the civil society organizations established by that group affect their relations with other actors, 
political or civil society, in Turkey and abroad. The number of the civil society organizations 
established by these minority groups, as revealed by the data, is not directly related to the 
population of the minority group that they represent but rather a number of factors including 
the availability of other means of representation. Location is also another significant variable 
as it leads to variation in the behavior of the civil society organizations. Finally, the activities 
organized by the civil society organizations and the aspirations of the minority group that they 
represent constitute important factors for the increased political efficacy of that minority group. 
 
To start with, while population is an important factor for establishing high numbers of civil 
society organizations as in the case of Roma and Alevis, the number of organizations 
established by a minority group is still contingent on the availability of other means of 
representation and the perception of the civil society by that particular minority group. The 
Alevis establish civil society organizations in Turkey also as belief organizations because they 
are not allowed to open Cem houses. Therefore, the civil society organizations actually serve 
as a place where they can carry out religious practices. In this case, the civil society 
organizations are established in every city where there is an Alevi population even though they 
do not carry out any activities or engage into dialogue with other civil society organizations or 
political actors. The Roma on the other hand, establish civil society organizations in the form 
of solidarity and township associations. This is mainly related to the demographics of the Roma 
minority as they are the most underdeveloped group in Turkey. Therefore, most of the time the 
members of the Roma minority apply to local administrators for social aid and benefits. 
According to the head of the Roma association in Adana, it is easier to apply for benefits and 
establish relations with local administrators, whether governorships or municipalities, through 
civil society organizations since these organizations have formal channels to contact these 
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administrators. On the other hand, Kurds have several possibilities of representation. They have 
seats in the national Parliament and the pro-Kurdish party also holds several municipalities in 
the Kurdish region. This provides them with the opportunity to voice their demands and contact 
European officials also through formal and official channels at the political level. Therefore, 
even though their population numbers are the highest, Kurds do not have several organizations 
established.  
The variation in the behavior of the minority civil society organizations can also be related to 
location. As some of the organizations are scattered across Turkey with branches in different 
cities, they do not always show uniformity in terms of their views and activities. This is most 
evident in the case of Alevis and national civil society organizations such as EGITIM-SEN. 
The Alevi organizations in the western cities only act as advocacy organizations concentrating 
on the discrimination faced by the Alevis in general, whereas the Alevi organizations in the 
eastern cities also focus on the Kurdish issue and the human rights violations in the region 
among the problems of their community. Similarly, EGITIM-SEN which is a union with 
branches in almost every city in Turkey, may carry out activities targeting different issues 
depending on the location. While the branches in the eastern cities focus on public education 
in minority languages, the branches in the western cities do not work on this issue and in fact, 
some of these may totally reject the idea of public education in different languages.737  
 
Finally, the organizations established by the minority groups can also affect their relations with 
other political and civil society actors, domestic and international. For example, the Roma lack 
the financial resources most of the time to conduct activities at the national and international 
level confining them to act as local organizations. Therefore, the activities organized by these 
minority groups only have a local influence compared to other groups such as the Caucasians 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 Personal interview with the Secretary of EGITIM-SEN in Adana. 
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who are able to carry out activities at the national and international level. In turn, the Caucasian 
organizations are able to participate in meetings with national political actors and EU 
representatives at various occasions. In conclusion, the variation in the associational structures 
of the civil society organizations representing the minority groups in Turkey are not directly 
related to a single factor but a multiplicity of factors. Some of these also impede their ability 
to establish relations with European organizations such as financial capacities, whereas others 
may facilitate their engagement with the EU as they consider the EU as a source of legitimacy 
and credibility as well as the only platform where they can voice their demands.   
 
5.5  Conclusion 
This chapter tried to discuss and evaluate the civil society organizations, minority groups and 
the legislation in Turkey as well as the types of EU funding and relations between the EU and 
non-state actors in Turkey. In this sense, it was highlighted throughout the chapter that the civil 
society organizations in Turkey developed at a very fast pace after 1999. Coupled with the 
increased pre-accession financial instruments and the enhanced level of dialogue between the 
European representatives and the non-state actors from Turkey, the EU acquired an indirect 
anchor status in Turkey for the democratization process and the protection and promotion of 
minority rights. In light of the assessment of civil society and minority groups in Turkey, the 
following chapter will present the findings of the fieldwork and the position on the ground. 
The chapter will present an evaluation of the interviews with the non-state actors and the 
comparison of these findings among different minority groups as well as the assessment of the 
different variables and their impacts on the empowerment of different civil society 
organizations in Turkey. 
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Chapter 6  
Civil Society Mobilization: Position on the Ground 
 
Following Turkey’s recognition as a candidate country by the EU in 2004 as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the legislation that governs the civil society organizations was altered 
considerably so that these organizations could establish international linkages and obtain 
funding from foreign donors. The adopted reforms were particularly significant for the 
minority groups in Turkey. As it was previously forbidden to argue that minorities exist in 
Turkey, the groups that were analyzed as part of this thesis were only allowed to establish their 
own civil society organizations only after the adoption of these reforms into domestic 
legislation. In this regard, not only were they able to establish their own organizations with a 
specific reference to a minority group, but also they were able to use, teach, publish, and 
broadcast in minority languages. To give an example, prior to the reform packages adopted by 
the AKP government after 2002, the Roma associations in Turkey could only be established as 
township associations.738 However, after the elimination of the ban on the establishment of 
minority organizations, associations were founded with the word “Roma” in their title. 
Similarly, many of the minority organizations surveyed as part of this thesis, indicated that 
their statutes include their aim to protect and preserve the culture, language, and traditions of 
the minority group they represented, which they were not able to do previously. 
 
Despite these positive developments, the legislation in Turkey concerning the freedom of 
association does not comply with European standards completely. Even though Turkey ratified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
738 Telephone interview with Semih Makaraci, the head of the Istanbul Roma Associations Federation on 
20.04.2012. 
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a number of international human rights treaties, the minority organizations in Turkey still face 
state-led pressure through police surveillance, detainment, random arrest, and closure on the 
grounds that they pursue activities that threaten the indivisible unity of the Turkish state.739 In 
addition to these, the continuing denial of the existence of minority groups by the Turkish state 
other than the three officially acknowledged non-Muslim groups considerably endangers the 
efforts of these minority groups. In addition to these, some minority groups have notably poor 
relations with the government and state institutions whereas comparatively others have closer 
relations.740 Given this, the empowerment of these minority groups becomes especially 
significant as it provides them with the opportunities to participate in the decision-making 
processes by holding mutual meetings with government officials. The aim of this second 
empirical chapter is to provide an exposition of the quantitative and the qualitative analysis 
undertaken for this thesis in order to present the results pertaining to the impact of the 
Europeanization process on the minority civil society organizations in Turkey, their 
empowerment levels measured through the level of dialogue and interaction with EU 
representatives, their attitudes towards the EU, the type and amount of funding they obtain, the 
type of projects they implement, and their relations with the government and local 
administrators, and to offer basic data on the types, size, and capacities of the minority 
organizations. The results provided in this chapter are drawn from face-to-face interviews with 
minority non-state actors as well as electronic and telephone surveys completed by 106 civil 
society organizations around Turkey that represent the 23 different minority groups included 
in this thesis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
739 Nurcan Kaya. 2011. “Freedom of Association of Groups Defending Minority Rights in Turkey”, Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network: 3-7. 
740 The surveys and interviews revealed that whereas some groups including the Alevis or Kurds have almost no 
relations with the national administrators, others including the Arabs or the Roma have close relations. Personal 
interview with Kemal Celik, the head of the Adana Alevi Culture Association and the General Secretary of the 
Alevi Bektasi Federation on 18.07.2011 in Adana; Telephone interview with Sukru Kirboga, the head of the Arab 
Association on 08.05.2012; Telephone interview with Zana Farqini, the head of the Istanbul Kurdish Institute on 
20.08.2012; Telephone interview with Erdinc Cekic, the head of the Edirne Roma Associations Federation on 
25.06.2012.  
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6.1 Minority Civil Society Organizations and Europeanization 
In order to evaluate whether the Europeanization process led to an increased civil society 
mobilization in Turkey, five research questions are constructed. These research questions are 
derived from the theoretical literature on the Europeanization of candidate states and the 
emergence of partnerships between the EU, the national government, and civil society 
organizations. The empirical model does not measure the direct participation of civil society 
organizations in decision-making processes but rather concentrates on the impact of 
Europeanization on civil society actors in general and the variation in their political efficacy 
levels. Therefore, the analysis looks into the soft power of the EU in terms of cultivating 
interaction between European and civil society actors arguing that the EU accession process 
may increase the mobilization capacities of minority civil society organizations.741 Another 
indicator of the transformative power of the EU is the empowerment of civil society actors and 
their ability to form partnerships with European organizations by bypassing the state and 
engage in an interactive process at the domestic level induced by their interaction with the EU. 
 
Given these, the empirical analysis provided in this chapter will combine the approach that 
looks into the EU’s impact on the civil society actors in terms of capacity-building and the 
ability of these organizations to connect with financial and political networks at EU level. As 
a result, the main indicator of increased civil society activism in Turkey becomes the extent of 
actor involvement beyond state and formal institutions, and in turn the changes in the 
distribution of the political resources as a result of the EU accession process. In other words, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
741 Adam Fagan. 2010. Europe’s Balkan Dilemma: Paths to Civil Society or State-Building?, London: I.B. Tauris, 
21.  
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the empirical model tests for the existence of a bottom-up political steering that occurs through 
the empowerment of civil society actors so that they can form and engage in partnerships 
beyond the domestic political arena. The model will argue that such a shift in the availability 
of resources causes civil society to engage in an interactive process at the domestic level where 
EU norms are internalized. In this sense, the data reveals that additional emphasis should be 
placed on the political culture, the state attitudes towards the civil society actors, and the 
specific features of the civil society actors including the minority group they represent, the 
local versus national divide, and participation in other international networks.742 When 
examining the increased political efficacy of minority groups as triggered by the EU, one of 
the most important determinants can be the minority-state interaction since a hostile state 
attitude towards minorities and obstructive national political administrators motivate them to 
look for political opportunities in other platforms. 
 
Drawing on the conceptual framework of Europeanization and the changes in the political 
efficacy of civil society organizations as a result of their increased interaction with the EU, the 
following research questions had been developed: 
•   How has the engagement with the EU empowered and changed the behavior of minority 
civil society organizations in Turkey?  
•   How have minority organizations benefited from the availability of EU resources? 
•   Which factors explain the differentiated impact of the EU on minority organizations in 
terms of political efficacy and mobilization? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
742 Tanja Borzel and Aron Buzogany. 2008. “Handle with care: new modes of governance and accession to the 
EU”, New Modes of Governance Policy Brief 13, 1-3.   
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•   What are the effects of other means of influence on the empowerment of the minority 
groups in Turkey such as the distinction between ethnic/linguistic and religious 
minorities or the parliamentary representation of some of the groups? 
Therefore, the following sections will examine the changes in the behaviour of minority civil 
society organizations as a result of their interaction with the EU, their use of the financial and 
political resources that were provided by the EU, other factors that the impact of the EU on 
these minority organizations is contingent upon and the effects of other means of influence on 
the empowerment of the minority groups examined. In order to answer these questions, 
descriptive statistics have been used to present the structure of the minority organizations 
examined. Additionally, qualitative data have been collected through in-depth interviews to 
comprehend how engagement with the EU, empowered these civil society organizations 
through the use of the political and financial resources, international and European networks 
and changed their political presence and participation in decision-making processes. 
 
6.2 Research Findings 
This study has focused on a sample of minority organizations and other civil society 
organizations that work or focus on the minority issue in general. These include research 
institutes, think tanks, foundations, and associations that work on issues relevant to the 
problems of minority groups, such as the internal displacement, land-mine problems in the 
Kurdish region, the mother-tongue language issue, which is prevalent for almost all minority 
groups, the property issue for the non-Muslim minority groups, the freedom of religion, which 
is particularly significant for the Alevis, or the social problems and the discrimination faced by 
the Roma. Given these, the surveys conducted with these organizations were collected through 
personal or telephone interviews as most of the organizations found completing electronic 
surveys difficult or simply declined to answer anything online. In addition to these, most of the 
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minority organizations were reluctant to complete the surveys given their fears towards 
prosecution. The Kurdish civil society organizations were especially hesitant in this sense due 
to the heightened number of arrests of Kurdish activists during the time of the fieldwork.743 In 
addition to these, some organizations rejected to participate in the study on the grounds that 
they did not want to participate in an academic research conducted by a Turkish scholar or a 
study that favors the EU. In a similar manner, some non-Muslim foundations and associations 
did not want to participate as they were branch organizations and were not allowed to act 
independent from their head offices.744 On another note, most of the Alevi branch organizations 
do not operate as a civil society organization, but call themselves a belief organization even 
though officially they are registered as associations. Finally, the level of civil society 
organizations were extremely low in the Eastern Anatolia region and even the organizations 
that represent the minority groups, such as the Armenians in Dersim (Tunceli), were registered 
in bigger cities such as Istanbul. Apart from that, the only minority organizations in Eastern 
Anatolia were those that belonged to the Kurdish and Alevi minorities along with human rights 
organizations; however, most of these were unreachable as they were registered with the 
Directorate of Associations but did not have any office and were merely represented by 
individuals. As most of the Circassian, Georgian, Abkhazian, and Ossetian organizations still 
identify themselves as Caucasian organizations, these groups were categorized under one label, 
Caucasian. To be more specific, among the surveyed there is only one Ossetian organization, 
and there is only one Georgian association called the Georgian Cultural Center Association, 
which is one of the most active among the three Georgian associations. In addition to these, 
there are a number of Georgian initiatives; however, none of these organized activities or 
implemented projects before or at the time of the field study. Among the surveyed, there are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743 During the fieldwork over 10.000 Kurdish politicians, mayors, activists and civil society organizations’ 
representatives were imprisoned approximately 6000 waiting for trial. Personal interview with Selahattin 
Demirtas, Member of Parliament, BDP and Head of BDP in Mersin on 16.06.2012.   
744 Email correspondence with Salih Kurtbas from Eskisehir Protestant Church Foundation on 28.09.2011.  
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two Abkhazian associations and an Abkhazian federation. Finally, there were three Circassian 
organizations surveyed. The official names of the surveyed organizations included the word 
‘Caucasian’.  
Table 8. Minority Groups Represented by the Organizations in the Sample 
 
Minority Group Frequency Percent 
  Kurdish 13 12.3 
 Greek Orthodox 2 1.9 
 Arab 1 0.9 
 Laz 4 3.8 
 Hamshen 1 0.9 
 Pomak 5 4.7 
 Mhelmi 2 1.9 
 Jewish 2 1.9 
 Alevi 15 14.2 
 Other 16 15.1 
 Latin Catholic 1 0.9 
 Roma 15 14.2 
 Caucasian 16 15.1 
 African 1 0.9 
 Assyrian 5 4.7 
 Protestant 3 2.8 
 Armenian 4 3.8 
 Total 106 100.0 
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Since most of the government institutions and main offices of international organizations and 
European institutions are located in Istanbul and Ankara, the civil society organizations 
included in the study sample were mostly based in these cities (Table 2). The highest number 
of the minority organizations included in the sample were located in the Marmara region, 
followed by southeastern Anatolia where Diyarbakir is located, and thirdly Central Anatolia, 
where Ankara is located. The lowest number of organizations included in the sample, were 
from the Black sea region given that the only minority groups in the Black Sea region are small 
populations of Caucasian, Laz, and Hamshen groups. The third highest number of 
organizations in the sample are located within the Mediterranean region; however, these 
organizations are particularly located in eastern Mediterranean cities, such as Adana, Mersin, 
and Antakya, where there are a number of minority groups including the Armenian, Greek 
Orthodox, Nusayri, Jewish, Arab, Alevi, Latin Catholic, Kurdish, Roma, and Circassians. 
 
Table 9. Regional distribution of minority organizations in the sample 
 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  Marmara 42 39.6 39.6 
 Black Sea 3 2.8 42.5 
 Aegean 8 7.5 50.0 
 Southeastern Anatolia 21 19.8 69.8 
 Mediterranean 15 14.2 84.0 
 Central Anatolia 17 16.0 100.0 
 Total 106 100.0  
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The total sample of 106 civil society organizations consists of 66 associations, 19 foundations, 
6 minority foundations, 8 federations, 3 Unions, and 4 other types of civil society organizations, 
including platforms, initiatives, and movements (Table 3). 
 
Table 10. Type of organization  
 
How would you classify your organization? 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative  
Percentage 
 Association 66 62.3 62.3 
Foundation 19 17.9 80.2 
Religious Minority Foundation 6 5.7 85.8 
Federation 8 7.5 93.4 
Union 3 2.8 96.2 
Other (Platform,  
Initiative, Movement) 
4 3.8 100.0 
Total 106 100.0  
 
Given this, 84.9% of the organizations surveyed reported that they work on human rights or 
minority rights issues, whereas 52.8% identified themselves as a solidarity and assistance 
organization. In a similar manner, 65.1% of the organizations surveyed claimed that they work 
on cultural issues (Table 4). On the contrary, only 13.2% of the organizations reported as 
working for gender equality and 14.2% on foreign policy. Finally, 42.5% of those organizations 
surveyed claimed that they organize educational activities. Given the negative perception of 
the word ‘minority’ in Turkey, most of the organizations prefer to identify themselves as 
working on human rights or culture, even though their activities are mostly relevant to minority 
rights.745 Their main objective is to promote and preserve the culture and identity of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
745 When the organizations were asked if they worked on minority issues, some of the interviewees insisted that 
they were not minorities but instead autochton groups residing in Anatolia.  
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minority group they represent; therefore, they mostly categorize themselves as working on 
culture while refraining from using the term ‘minority’. In addition to this, a high number of 
organizations reported that they work on educational issues on the grounds that they arrange 
language courses or implement projects on mother tongue education. Finally, almost all of the 
Caucasian organizations reported working on foreign policy as they consider themselves as 
diaspora groups and try to foster the relations between their kin states in Caucasia.  
 
Table 11. Concentration areas 
 
               Concentration Area* Frequency Percent 
 Foreign Policy  
Education 
Gender Equality 
Culture 
Solidarity and Assistance 
Human Rights or Minority Rights 
15 
45 
14 
69 
56 
90 
14.2 
42.5 
13.2 
65.1 
52.8 
84.9 
Total 
 
106  
*The participants were asked to select the areas they work on, and they were told that they 
could select more than one answer 
 
The surveys revealed that most of the organizations were not highly professionalized in terms 
of financial capacity, human resources, and the funding they receive (Table 5). The data 
showed that 50% of the surveyed organizations did not have any full-time, professional, or paid 
staff at all whereas 34% had less than five professional staff. In addition, only 8.5% of all the 
organizations in the sample reported having more than 10 full-time paid professional staff. 
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Even though most of the organizations did not have more than 5 full-time paid staff—16% in 
total—the number of volunteers was considerably higher for most of these organizations (Table 
6). In fact, 46.2% of all organizations reported that they have between 10 and 50 volunteers 
actively working for their organization. Interestingly, 21.7% indicated that they have more than 
100 volunteers. These were mostly Alevi, Roma, or Caucasian organizations located in cities 
where population numbers were high. To give an example, the head of the Mersin Alevi Culture 
Association stated that the total number of Alevis living in Mersin is around 300,000, and their 
association had around 6,000 members and among these around 500 were active.746 When 
those organizations with lower capacities implement projects, they hire external professional 
staff that have the capability and the experience to carry out a project while volunteers support 
the project coordinator for the tasks and activities related to the project.747 
 
Table 12. Number of professional staff 
 
How many people work for the 
organization full-time?  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  0 53 50.0 50.0 
less than 5 36 34.0 84.0 
between 5 and 10 8 7.5 91.5 
more than 10 2 1.9 93.4 
more than 20 7 6.6 100.0 
Total 106 100.0  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
746 Interview with the head of the Mersin Alevi Culture Association, on 16.06.2012.  
747 To give an example, the EU projects coordinator for the Haci Bektas Veli Anatolia Culture Foundation was 
also the EU projects coordinator for the Alevi Culture Association and the Alevi Foundations Federation in the 
following year.   
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Table 13. Number of volunteers 
 
How many people volunteer for your 
organization? Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 less than 10 25 23.6 23.6 
between 10 and 50 49 46.2 69.8 
between 50 and 100 9 8.5 78.3 
more than 100 23 21.7 100.0 
Total 106 100.0  
 
Regarding financial capacities, it was discovered that the sources of funding ranged between 
national government grants, individual donations and member fees, EU grants, and finally 
other types of international grants, including those provided by international donor 
organizations, foreign consulates and embassies, and the international intergovernmental 
organizations. Among the other types of international donors, it was discovered that the Global 
Dialogue Foundation in London and the Matra-Kap program of the Netherlands Foreign 
Affairs Ministry were the two most frequent donors among minority organizations.748 In 
addition to that, other international donors included the UN, the Open Society Foundation, Olof 
Palme Center, German Foundations, such as Friedrich Ebert Stiftung located in Istanbul, and 
the World Bank.749 Minority organizations have annual budgets ranging between 10.000 
Turkish Liras (TL), approximately €4,000 and more than TL100,000, which is around €40,000 
(Table 7). Some foundations reported their annual budgets as high as €400.000; however, most 
of the minority organizations have their budgets clustered between €20.000 and €100.000. As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748 Not only those organizations located in Istanbul with higher financial capacities but also smaller organizations 
such as the Africans Solidarity and Assistance Association or the Hatay Dom Association were also recipients of 
funding from Global Dialogue Foundation and the Matra-Kap program. Telephone interview with Mustafa Olpak, 
Africans Solidarity and Assistance Association; Telephone interview with Hatay Dom Association.  
749 Electronic surveys completed by TESEV, Mardin Mhelmi Association, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, Hrant 
Dink Foundation. 
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shown in Table 7, 67% of the organizations surveyed reported their annual budgets as less than 
€40.000. 
 
Table 14. Annual Budgets of Minority Organizations 
 
What is your organization’s  
annual budget? Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Less than 10.000 TL  24 22.6 22.6 
Between 10.000 and 50.000 TL 30 28.3 50.9 
Between 50.000 and 100.000 TL 17 16.0 67.0 
More than 100.000 TL 35 33.0 100.0 
Total 106 100.0  
 
Table 15. Funding Sources of Minority Organization 
 
Which of the funds given below did your organization receive? Frequency Percent 
 EU grants 
National government grants 
Individual donations and member fees 
Other international funds  
40 
11 
90 
38 
37.7 
10.4 
84.9 
35.8 
Total 104  
 
Given these, the total percentage of those that obtain funding from international donors, 
including the EU, totals 73.5%, whereas 84.9% of the organizations included in the sample 
also reported individual donations and member fees as their main sources of funding (Table 8). 
Member fees are especially relevant for those minority organizations with high numbers of 
members such as the Alevis. It is also valid for 49% of these organizations, which reported that 
they rely solely on individual donations and member fees and among these 26.9% reported that 
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they were branch organizations whereas 73.1% of these reported that they were established in 
smaller cities other than Istanbul or Ankara.  
 
Empowerment of Minority Organizations in the post-Helsinki period: 
A series of observations can be drawn from the data in relation to the empowerment and 
changes in the behaviour of minority organizations in the post-Helsinki period and their use of 
the EU resources provided to them. As mentioned in the preceding chapters, prior to the 
adoption of the reform packages, particularly the laws on the elimination of the ban on 
establishing minority organizations and the ban on foreign correspondences, the minority civil 
society organizations could not participate in European and international networks. Also, they 
could not obtain foreign funding without prior permissions. In this regard, the increased 
political efficacy of minority organizations was measured through the level of dialogue 
between the minority organizations and EU representatives. According to the findings, 28.3% 
of minority organizations reported that they meet with EU representatives regularly, four times 
a year or more, 17.0% reported that they meet twice a year, 18.9% reported that they meet once 
a year, and 20.8% reported that they meet irregularly (Table 11). On the other hand, 15.1% of 
the minority organizations reported that they do not meet with EU representatives at all. Given 
these, 64.2% of minority organizations meet with EU representatives at least once a year and 
84.9% meet at various levels. The data revealed that the difference between religious and ethnic 
minorities in terms of their dialogue with EU representatives was not statistically significant.  
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Table 16. Level of dialogue with EU representatives 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Regularly 30 28.3 28.3 
At least once every 6 months 18 17.0 45.3 
At least once a year 20 18.9 64.2 
Irregularly 22 20.8 84.9 
Not at all 16 15.1 100.0 
Total 106 100.0  
 
In comparison, the percentage of those minority organizations that meet with the government 
on a regular basis, 22.6% is lower than the percentage of the organizations that meet with the 
EU representatives regularly (Table 12). Again, it was reported that only 55.7% of the minority 
organizations surveyed meet with the government representatives at least once a year or more. 
Such a difference might be explained through the level of dialogue between the government 
and those minority groups, such as the Kurds who do not have any relationship at all. In fact, 
it was discovered that 10 Kurdish organizations out of 13, reported that they meet with EU 
officials regularly, whereas eight out of 13 Kurdish organizations reported that they do not 
meet with the national government at all. None of the Kurdish organizations reported that they 
meet with the national government regularly, whereas only three reported that they meet once 
or twice a year.  
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Table 17. Level of dialogue with government representatives 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Regularly 24 22.6 22.6 
At least once every 6 months 14 13.2 35.8 
At least once a year 21 19.8 55.7 
Irregularly 20 18.9 74.5 
Not at all 27 25.5 100.0 
Total 106 100.0  
 
Pertaining to the religious minority groups on the other hand, it was reported that 68.8% of 
religious minority groups meet with the EU representatives regularly, at least once a year or 
more, whereas only 28.1% reported that they meet with government representatives at least 
once a year or more. The chi-square test revealed that the difference between religious and 
ethnic minorities in terms of their relationship with the national government was statistically 
significant. The p = .04 was significant at the .05 level even though it was not a strong 
association with the phi coefficient value at .25. It was discovered that the relationships 
between minority organizations and the local administrators were higher than those with the 
national government. 50% of minority organizations reported that they meet with local 
administrators regularly, and 84.9% reported that they meet with local administrators at least 
once a year or more. This can be explained through a number of factors (Table 13).  
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Table 18. Level of dialogue with local administrators 
 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative     
Percent 
 Regularly 53 50.0 50.0 
At least once every 6 months 24 22.6 72.6 
At least once a year 13 12.3 84.9 
Irregularly 7 6.6 91.5 
Not at all 9 8.5 100.0 
Total 106 100.0  
 
To start with, the minority organizations in the south east meet with the municipalities that 
belong to the pro-Kurdish political party much more frequently than those in the western cities. 
In fact, out of the 21 minority organizations in south-east Turkey that were included in the 
sample, 20 organizations reported that they meet with local administrators regularly, whereas 
only 1 reported meeting irregularly and none of the organizations indicated that they do not 
meet with local administrators. In comparison, out of 21 in the south east, only 8 reported 
meeting regularly and 4 reported meeting irregularly with the national government, while 9 
indicated that they do not meet with the government representatives at all. In addition to this, 
as civil society organizations are required to register with the local governorships, they 
inevitably meet with local officials at least once a year or more and this becomes especially 
significant in smaller cities, where the total number of civil society organizations is 
considerably lower than those in bigger cities. In fact, it was reported that 45.9% of those 
minority organizations in smaller cities meet with the national government regularly, whereas 
54.1% of minority organizations in Istanbul or Ankara reported meeting with the national 
government regularly. On the other hand, 81.5% of those organizations in smaller cities 
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reported meeting with local administrators regularly, while this was 63.5% for those 
organizations in Istanbul or Ankara.  
On the other hand, the data did not yield a significant relationship between the level of 
empowerment and the location of the civil society organizations; for example, whether the 
organization is located in Istanbul or Ankara. This is due to the fact that the percentage of those 
minority organizations that meet with the EU regularly is particularly high in the Kurdish 
region. However, the results showed that there was a relationship between the empowerment 
of minority organizations and the relationships with other international organizations. It was 
reported that 72.9% of those organizations that meet regularly with the EU representatives also 
participate in other international networks. 
 
In addition to these, there is a significant relationship between the increased mobilization of 
minority organizations and the number of EU grants received by the organization. The data 
shows that all minority organizations—33 in total—that received more than one EU grant 
reported meeting regularly with EU representatives, whereas six out of seven organizations 
that regularly met with EU representatives received only one EU grant. However, the amount 
of EU funding received by minority organizations and the type of projects they implement 
differ. 33 minority organizations out of the 40 that receive EU funding reported that they 
received short-term grants whereas only 7 reported receiving long-term EU funding. On the 
other hand, 16 organizations reported receiving EU funding of less than €75.000, whereas 15 
reported receiving between €75.000 and €150.000. Finally, only 9 out of 40 minority 
organizations that receive EU funding reported receiving over €150.000. 
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Table 19. Type of EU grants received by the minority organizations 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
   
Short-term (up to 24 months) 33 31.1 31.1 
Long-term 7 6.6 37.7 
Total 40   
 
 
 Table 20. Amount of EU grants received by the minority organizations 
 
Given these, the data revealed that there is a relationship between the amount of EU funding 
received and the level of empowerment. As the amount of EU funding received by a particular 
organization increased, the level of dialogue between that organization and the EU increased 
as well. This is due to a number of factors. First of all, the civil society organizations that 
receive funding from the EU are obliged to provide interim reports to the EU body they receive 
the funding from and organize regular meetings to discuss their progress. Additionally, they 
are compelled to present the outcomes of the project through various publications, reports, 
conferences and meetings. This provides an opportunity for the civil society organizations to 
approach EU representatives on an individual level. Secondly, it is more likely for the civil 
society organizations that have received EU funding previously, to be considered for other 
funding schemes. Therefore, an organization that has received EU grants in the past, might find 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Less than €75.000 16 15.1 15.1 
Between €75.000 and €150.000  15 14.2 29.3 
More than €150.000  9 8.5 37.8 
Total 40   
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it easier to obtain another grant in the future. Finally, and most importantly, EU grants provide 
significant capacity building for the minority civil society organizations in Turkey. The grants 
obtained are not only used to diversify and expand the human resources used by the 
organization but also the tools and instruments used to disseminate the outcomes of the 
projects. Therefore, EU grants provide the resources for the civil society organizations to 
contact the European officials and the networks in Europe more efficiently.  
 
As part of the questionnaire, the minority organizations were asked which of the EU’s aims 
corresponded to the projects they implemented. In return, 42.5% reported strengthening of 
democratic institutions and the rule of law, 17.5% reported supporting Turkey’s EU accession 
process, 90% replied as improving human rights and minority rights in Turkey whereas 65% 
reported capacity-building for civil society organizations.  
 Table 21. Scope of EU Funding Received 
 
Which of the EU’s aims did your project correspond to?* Frequency Percent 
  Improving human rights and minority rights  36 90.0 
Supporting Turkey’s accession process 7 17.5 
Capacity building for civil society 
Strengthening of democratic institutions  
and the rule of law 
26 
17 
65.0 
42.5 
Total 40  
*The participants were told that they could select more than one answer. 
 
Apart from the capacities of the minority organizations, another way to measure the impact of 
the Europeanization process could be by looking at the attitudes and opinions of the minority 
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organizations towards EU funding or the EU accession process in general. The data revealed 
that the vast majority of the minority organizations that received EU funding believed that the 
EU grant strengthened their institution whereas more than half of them reported that the EU 
funding helped them form networks with similar organizations at the national or international 
level. Only one organization reported that the EU grant did not have an impact on their 
organization; whereas only 4 out of 40 believed that their organization would not have existed 
without EU funding. Finally, only one organization reported that the EU application process 
hindered their other projects and none reported that the EU grant had a negative impact on the 
organization or on their other projects.  
 
Table 22. Impact of EU Funding 
 
How would you describe the impact that EU funding had on your organization?                                                            Agree
‘EU funding has strengthened our institution’ 85% 
‘Applying for EU funding has been a distraction from our work’ 2.5% 
‘EU funding has helped us connect with local and international organizations’ 60% 
‘We would not exist without EU funding’ 10% 
‘EU funding has weakened our organization’ 0% 
‘EU funding has had no impact on our organization’ 2.5% 
 
Given this, the levels of dependency for the minority organizations on EU funding are lower 
than expected. Only 10% reported that they would not have existed without the EU funding 
pointing to the fact that the minority organizations in Turkey have other ways of funding 
themselves. In a similar manner, only 7.5% of minority organizations reported that 90% or 
more of their budget equal to EU grants, whereas 40% claimed that the grants they receive 
from the EU make up between 50% and 89% of their budget. On the other hand, 52.5% of 
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minority organizations in Turkey reported that the level of EU funding only correspond to less 
than 50% of their annual budget.  
 
Table 23. What percent of your organization’s budget is formed by EU funding? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
     
less than 10% 12 30.0 
between 10% and 49% 9 22.5 
between 50% and 89% 16 40.0 
 more than 90% 3 7.5 
Total 40 100.0 
 
Given these, the data revealed that most of the minority organizations believed that Turkey’s 
progress in the EU accession process is insufficient. To be more specific 86.8% felt that Turkey 
did not make sufficient progress in the EU accession negotiation talks; whereas 9.4% believed 
that it was neither sufficient nor insufficient and only 3.8% found Turkey’s progress as 
sufficient. On the other hand, 61.3% of the minority organizations reported that the civil society 
in Turkey has an influence over the shaping of domestic policies, whereas 38.7% believed that 
it was ineffective. The organizations that did not find the civil society in Turkey effective were 
especially high among the Alevi organizations, which frequently voiced that they could not 
meet with the government on a regular basis and the government is not abiding by the ECtHR 
decisions about the Cem houses and that the levels of discrimination did not decrease when 
compared with the past. In addition to the Alevi organizations, the data revealed that none of 
the Protestant organizations surveyed and only one Armenian organization reported that the 
civil society in Turkey had an impact on the reform process.  
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Table 24. Do you believe Turkey’s progress with respect to the EU accession process 
is sufficient? 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Definitely insufficient 51 48.1 48.1 
Insufficient 41 38.7 86.8 
Neither sufficient nor insufficient 10 9.4 96.2 
Sufficient 
Definitely sufficient 
4 
0 
3.8 
0 
100.0 
Total 106 100.0  
 
 
Table 25.            Do you believe that the civil society in Turkey is influential?  
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 No 41 38.7 38.7 
Yes 65 61.3 100.0 
Total 106 100.0  
 
The data revealed that the majority of the minority civil society organizations believed that the 
EU’s role is significant for the improvement of human rights and democratization in Turkey, 
whereas the percentage of those who believe that the EU is significant for cultural and linguistic 
rights is a little lower. According to the findings, 92.5% of the minority organizations believed 
that the EU’s role is important for improving Turkey’s human rights record and 94.3% believed 
that the EU is significant for the continuation of the democratization process. Comparatively, 
those organizations that felt the EU’s presence and the continuation of the EU accession 
process are significant for the improvement of cultural and linguistic rights is 88.7%. 
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Table 26. EU’s role in Turkey  
  I agree that the EU is significant in Turkey for the 
improvement of   Frequency Percent 
 Human rights 98 92.5 
Democratization 100 94.3 
Cultural and Linguistic Rights 94 88.7 
 
6.3 Analysis: Patterns of Mobilization of Minority Organizations   
The data shows that most of the civil society organizations in Turkey prioritize dialogue with 
EU representatives more than their relations with the national government. This is also evident 
from the qualitative data demonstrating the significance of the EU process for the minority 
groups in Turkey. For the EU, the pre-accession period of Turkey in essence signifies 
cultivating dialogue and partnerships between minority organizations and European officials 
in the context of the reform process, especially regarding policy development on controversial 
issues. However, in the context of Turkey and minority organizations, the presence of the EU, 
or their access to the EU institutions, means fostering the bottom-up Europeanization process 
and increased political efficacy. In addition, the participation of civil society actors in decision-
making processes yields the possibility of minority protection to be carried over beyond the -
accession period instead of formal transformation only that is limited to legislation and cannot 
be translated into practice more often than not. 
 
This thesis seeks to examine the extent to which the Europeanization process in Turkey has 
contributed to civil society mobilization in the context of minority rights, through their 
engagement with EU representatives. The intention of this chapter from the perspective of the 
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data was to investigate the degree to which minority organizations in Turkey have become 
more active as a result of the EU accession process, to consider the true nature of the relations 
between the minority civil society organizations, the national and local administrators in 
Turkey, and the EU representatives, as well as the impact of a number of factors including 
professional capacities, funding, international relations, size, and location on the changing 
behaviour of the minority organizations. In addition, the aim was to evaluate whether such a 
dialogue between minority organizations and the EU representatives could yield an interactive 
process at the domestic level where these organizations adopt EU norms and standards.  
 
The research revealed that minority organizations in Turkey have become more active, while 
gaining increased access to international and European platforms and networks in the post-
Helsinki period. It was discovered that such a mobilization also increased their presence within 
national public and political networks. In fact, the quantitative analysis showed that 67.3% of 
those organizations that are located in Istanbul or Ankara had regular meetings with EU 
representatives, while 61.1% of those organizations that are not located in large cities, such as 
Ankara or Istanbul, could still hold regular meetings with EU officials. The difference between 
the two types of organizations, those that are located in larger cities and those that are not, is 
around 6%. Similarly, 54.8% of all organizations in the Marmara region, where Istanbul is 
located, have frequent contacts with EU officials, while 22.1% of the minority organizations 
in the southeastern region reported conducting regular meetings with the EU representatives. 
The findings did not contradict the existing studies on all civil society organizations conducted 
by Icduygu et al. discussed in the preceding chapters.750 The scope of the minority 
organizations in terms of local, national, regional, and international divide also did not make a 
difference as among those minority organizations that reported having regular meetings with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
750 Icduygu et al., 47. 
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EU officials, 14.7% described their scope of activities as local, 14.7% as regional, 29.4% as 
national, and 41.2% as international. Given this, it may be concluded that the dialogue with the 
EU officials, in other words the increased political efficacy of minority organizations is not 
only valid for those minority organizations in larger cities conducting activities at the 
international level but also smaller organizations in other regions that describe themselves as 
local. To give an example, the head of the Mhelmi organization in Mardin, which is located in 
south eastern Anatolia, claimed that even though they are only an association established in a 
Mhelmi village in Mardin, they were able to conduct meetings with European civil society 
organizations at 16 different cities in Europe, while their association obtained funding from 
international and European donors.751 In addition to this, he stated that they were able to 
conduct these meetings in collaboration with Midyat Assyrian Culture Association, which is 
also located in Mardin.752 
 
The qualitative data revealed that the level of dialogue with EU representatives depended on a 
number of factors. Even though, the regional divide was not found to be significant in terms of 
the dialogue with EU representatives, the percentage of those organizations located in other 
regions than Marmara, South eastern or Central Anatolia was lower. Such a discrepancy could 
be explained by a number of differences between the different geographical regions. First of 
all, Marmara and Central Anatolia are the regions where the head offices of most organizations 
are located. Therefore, the minority groups, such as the Caucasian or Roma that are mostly 
residents of the western part of Turkey do not conduct regular meetings with European officials 
directly, but such networks are usually formed by their federations, as in the case of KAFFED 
or Alevi Bektasi Federation. On another note, some organizations do not allow their branches 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
751 Personal interview with Mehmet Ali Aslan. 
752 Personal interview with Yuhanna Aktas. 
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to apply for international or European funds without the knowledge and permission of the main 
office.753 In fact, it was discovered that the only Human Rights Association branch office that 
could apply for EU funding was the Diyarbakir office.754 This is due to the magnitude and the 
urgency of the Kurdish issue and points to how those civil society organizations in Diyarbakir 
or the southeastern region could be more active than those in other cities and regions. 
Moreover, the diversity of minority groups living in some regions is much higher than others 
comparatively. To give an example, the Black Sea region scored the lowest in terms of the 
dialogue between minority organizations and the EU. The Black Sea region is originally home 
to Laz, Hamshen, Lom and some Caucasian groups as well as Alevis. However, if we look 
closely, we discover that the biggest Laz and Hamshen organizations are located in Istanbul, 
the Marmara region, and Ankara. In fact, there is only one Hamshen association, which is 
located in Istanbul. In addition to this, as in the case of Laz Culture, Art, and Tourism 
Association or the Lom Cultural Research and Solidarity Association, both located in Artvin, 
they were established in the last three years and could not yet implement any projects. 
Therefore, unlike those organizations in southeast Turkey, where most of them were 
established in the early 2000s, those organizations in the Black Sea region are comparably new 
and less institutionalized. However, the data could not reveal the changes in the level of 
dialogue between the minority organizations and the EU representatives over time. Given this, 
the qualitative data pointed to a more visible presence of EU officials before 2007 especially 
in the southeastern region. As Demirtas explains, the Human Rights Association during the 
early 2000s would meet with around 300 European delegations in one year, whereas after 2007, 
as the negotiation process slowed down, the frequency of visits also dropped.755  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753 Personal interview with IHD Adana Office. 
754 Personal interview with IHD Diyarbakir Representatives. 
755 Personal interview with Selahattin Demirtas. 
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The same uniformity in terms of relations with the EU, both at the local and the national level, 
cannot be held true for the levels of EU funding received by minority organizations. Neither 
the relationship between regional divide and receiving EU funding was found significant, nor 
the location, Ankara or Istanbul, makes a difference. In accordance with this, 48.1% of those 
organizations in Ankara or Istanbul receive EU funding, whereas the numbers are much lower 
for other cities and regions, 27.8%. This is due to the fact that organizations in the larger cities 
have greater budgets and more professional staff able to complete the EU project applications, 
which is highly complicated as indicated by many interviewees. In addition to this, receiving 
EU grants is also very much dependent on professional capacities of the organization, which 
is mostly lacking for those organizations in smaller cities or less developed regions. In fact, 
50% of all minority organizations surveyed reported that they have no full-time professional 
paid staff at all, while 34% reported as having less than 5. Only 8.5% of all minority 
organizations in the sample claimed that they employ more than 10 paid staff and 7.5% between 
5 and 10 full-time employees. In addition to this, it was discovered that receiving EU funding 
has a highly significant impact on the frequency of meetings with EU officials and the minority 
organization. Therefore, it is inevitable for those organizations in Istanbul or Ankara to have 
higher levels of dialogue with EU representatives yet the difference is not as high as in the case 
of EU funding.  
 
Clearly, the Europeanization process in Turkey changed the behaviour of minority 
organizations in Turkey. In fact, 53.8% of all organizations surveyed were established in the 
post-Helsinki period. Those organizations established before 1999 include the religious 
minority foundations, which were established in the 1920s and Alevi and Kurdish 
organizations, which were established in the 1980s and the 1990s as a reaction to the 
heightened human rights violations, as well as Caucasian organizations established as solidarity 
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organizations in the 1990s. However, the professional capacities of the minority organizations 
are still extremely low. As indicated above, 50% of all organizations do not have any paid staff 
and 47% rely solely on individual donations and membership fees. In addition to this, the 
budgets of the organizations are comparably low especially among associations with low 
membership numbers. In summary, professionalism is limited and the ability of the minority 
organizations to establish relations with national political actors as a consequence of EU 
dialogue is arguably lower than expected. The lack of professionalism and the ability to 
establish relations with the government are mainly due to the approach adopted by the Turkish 
state towards the minorities and civil society organizations. As explained in the preceding 
chapters, the Turkish government provides funding and grants for civil society organizations. 
However, minority organizations are almost always excluded from these processes. In fact, as 
stated by some of the Kurdish officials, the local governorships implement these projects 
proposed by the civil society organizations themselves refusing to provide funding for the civil 
society organizations. In general, this can be tied to the hostile approach of the Turkish state 
towards the minority groups and civil society organizations. Both are considered by the Turkish 
state as the enemies of the state when they oppose or criticize state practices. Therefore, given 
the scarcity of the national grants available to them, the minority organizations feel compelled 
to apply for international grants. The problem encountered with regard to international grants 
is the lengthy application process and the lack of staff that will be able to complete EU project 
applications and implement the project itself. In light of these, the civil society organizations 
ask for membership fees to cover their basic expenses.  
 
Furthermore, in terms of dialogue with the EU and building partnerships, there are differences 
among the different minority groups. Even though the differences in terms of dialogue with 
EU representatives among different minority groups is not significant, the differences among 
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minority groups in terms of their relations with national administrators is found to vary 
significantly. Nevertheless, the qualitative data reveals that the relations with EU 
representatives is higher for those organizations with more professional capacities and lower 
for those with less resources, whereas the relationship with the state has an impact on the 
dialogue with national government. To give an example, few of the Alevi organizations 
reported having regular meetings with the government, whereas Roma organizations claimed 
that they have more frequent contacts with both national and local administrators than their 
European or international counterparts. In addition, the Roma organizations organized under 
three different platforms, which have frequent contacts at the governmental level while the 
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of European Affairs, organize meetings and training 
seminars with the Roma civil society organizations for the 2013 EU grants scheme designed 
specifically for Roma organizations. In addition to these, the relationship between the 
concentration areas of minority organizations and the EU dialogue was found to have a 
noteworthy impact on their level of dialogue with EU representatives. However, none of the 
areas of concentration are individually important in terms of the relationship with the level of 
dialogue with EU representatives. 
 
Undoubtedly, the EU is important for the minority organizations in Turkey as it is regarded as 
a platform for voicing demands and raising awareness on their problems. However, at the same 
time attention should be paid to the role of other international actors, such as the OSCE, the 
CoE, the ECtHR, and the UN. In particular, the CoE and the ECtHR are viewed as a means to 
overcome the resistant political elites in Turkey and remove the barriers before the adoption of 
the legislation that is in compliance with EU minority protection criteria. To give an example, 
the Alevi groups regard the ECtHR highly significant, and frequently express their concern 
over the Turkish government’s reluctance to adopt the ECtHR decisions concerning freedom 
	   298	  
of religion and the Cem houses. At the same time, the UN and other international donors such 
as the Global Dialogue Foundation, the Dutch embassy and the Open Society Foundation, 
along with the US, UK, Australian, and Swedish consulates and embassies are common 
providers of grants for civil society organizations. The impact of other international 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the CoE and the UN, is particularly visible within the 
reports prepared by the minority organizations with respect to the new constitution. Most of 
these reports refer to European and international human rights documents and minority rights 
regulations when outlining their demands from the new government. In terms of their demands, 
the issue of equal citizenship and non-discrimination comes first, followed by linguistic and 
cultural rights especially in regard to mother-tongue languages and cultural assimilation. 
Religious freedoms are also prevalent among the demands of the minority groups in Turkey. 
As for the religious minorities, the issues of property and the problems especially with respect 
to establishing Cem houses, churches, and synagogues, is a significant challenge.  
 
Almost all minority groups refer to the preservation of their culture and identify themselves as 
different from the Turkish majority. However, while doing so they do not classify themselves 
as minority groups but rather autochton groups, which essentially refers to being native to a 
particular region. Such a classification is especially evident for groups including Kurds and 
Alevis. Comparably, the Caucasian groups refer to themselves as diaspora communities and 
emphasize their relations with their kin states in Caucasia. Yet still, they regard those rights 
classified as minority rights within international and European documents as part of their 
fundamental rights and freedoms. This is due to the highly controversial character of the term 
minority in Turkey. In fact, some of the organizations interviewed were particularly sensitive 
towards the term ‘minority’ and declined to answer the questions as the survey mainly targeted 
minority organizations. In a similar manner, most of the interviewees, especially from ethnic 
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and linguistic minority groups, underlined their self-identification as an autochtonous group 
instead of a minority several times during the interview.756 Given these, the surveyed minority 
organizations did not find civil society in Turkey as influential as would have been expected. 
Most of the time, when interviewed, they referred to their problems with national and local 
administrators and claimed that even though they meet frequently, their impact on the policy 
development should be questioned. Even those organizations, which contributed to the new 
Constitution preparation process by conducting face-to-face meetings with the Constitution 
Preparation Committee at the National Parliament were skeptical about the results. The Kurds 
and Alevis were particularly more skeptical in that sense; however, since the pro-Kurdish party 
holds 32 seats in parliament and over 90 municipalities in the southeastern region, the Kurdish 
organizations reported that they could be more involved in decision-making processes. The 
main demand that stood out was more involvement in the national decision-making processes, 
which are more qualified rather than just consultation on specific issues.  
 
Given these, the EU is highly regarded as a means of leverage and pressure on the government 
by the minority organizations. In addition to these, some groups such as the Assyrian, Ezidi or 
Alevi regard diaspora organizations in Europe equally important in terms of lobbying. To give 
an example, the Assyrian Metropolitan Bishop of Mardin and Diyarbakir stated that the 
diffusion of a European vision started the transformation in Turkey and the establishment of 
an Assyrian Studies department at Mardin Artuklu University is particularly a reflection of the 
EU process.757 In addition to these, the municipalities in the southeastern Turkey, which belong 
to the pro-Kurdish political party, BDP, are especially involved in European networks and have 
good relations with other minority groups living in the region.758 Another problem is the lack 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
756 Such a self-identification was particularly high among Alevi and Kurdish interviewees. 
757 Personal interview with Filiksinos Saliba Ozmen in Mardin on 15.01.2012. 
758 Personal interview with Abdullah Demirbas, mayor of Sur in Diyarbakir; Personal interview with Osman 
Baydemir, mayor of Diyarbakir on 11.01.2012, in Diyarbakir. 
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of data on the minority groups; however, the EU process in that sense was significant since it 
increased the visibility of many groups. The African Association President claims that the 
projects they implemented through EU and other international funds made them visible in the 
eyes of the Turkish majority,759 while the Ezidi belief representative in Diyarbakir claimed that 
they were now more empowered when compared with the past due to three factors,760 the EU, 
their diaspora organizations, and the BDP municipalities. Given these, almost all of these 
organizations regard Turkey’s progress in the EU accession process as insufficient. The 
president of the Latin Catholic Foundation in Antakya stated that even though the impact of 
the EU on Turkey is extremely positive, the Turkish government does not give as much 
importance to the process as it should.761 In a similar manner, the head of the Circassian 
Association in Ankara claimed that the EU process was moving very slowly and especially the 
provisions relating to linguistic rights or human rights are not adopted within the national 
legislation.762  
 
Another prevalent opinion among the minority organizations is that the EU is particularly 
significant for Turkey’s democratization as it acts as a source of leverage. To give an example, 
the head of the Democratic Circassians Platform claims that Turkey becomes more 
democratized during periods when the government prioritizes the relations with the EU.763 In 
addition, as stated by the representative of the TIHV in Diyarbakir, the civil society acts as a 
bottom-up mechanism for pushing the government to implement the necessary reforms, 
whereas the EU helps civil society organizations in Turkey to preserve their independence and 
sustainability.764 In fact, as the MUSIAD representative in Mardin argued, until the EU process 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
759 Telephone interview with Mustafa Olpak. 
760 Personal interview with Diyarbakir Ezidi Belief Representative. 
761 Interview with the President of the Antakya Latin Catholic Foundation, Eli Basari 05.11.2011. 
762 Interview with the head of the Circassian Association in Ankara on 26.02.2012. 
763 Telephone interview with Sezai Babakus. 
764 Personal interview with IHD Diyarbakir Office. 
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started, the changes in Turkey had a top-down character; however, more recently the reforms 
are catalyzed through the initiatives at the domestic level.765 In a similar manner, the head of 
Mazlumder in Ankara claims that transformation in terms of human rights can only be achieved 
if the civil society organizations push for it and the government is almost always reluctant to 
act on its own.766 The EU process is, therefore, important since it is another means for civil 
society organizations to push for change. Another example of the increased mobilization of 
minority groups in Turkey is related to the BDP municipalities. Abdullah Demirbas, the BDP 
mayor of Sur in Diyarbakir puts it, the BDP municipalities in Turkey adopted some of the EU 
standards concerning minority rights although the national government does not do anything 
about it, and even though they do not have the jurisdiction to implement such practices.767 To 
give an example, the Sur Municipality and the Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality both 
provide multilingual public services in Kurdish, Armenian, Assyrian, and Turkish. In that 
sense, as the DISK representative in Diyarbakir claims, Kurdish local administrations attained 
more progress in terms of EU reforms when compared with their Turkish counterparts or even 
the Turkish national government.768 In addition, the Sur Municipality organizes Kurdish and 
Armenian language courses, restored the Chaldean church and opened up an Alevi Cem house 
and Ezidi house for practicing their religion and for organizing social gatherings through the 
EU funding obtained by the municipality. Given this, as stated by the mayor of Diyarbakir 
Osman Baydemir, the EU not only changed the domestic legislation in Turkey, but also 
contributed to changes in perceptions and ideas.769 In addition, the EU accession process helped 
both the civil society organizations and the municipalities, such as those owned by BDP for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765 Personal interview with Mehmet Ali Dundar. 
766 Interview with Mazlumder Ankara Office on 27.02.2012. 
767 Personal interview with Abdullah Demirbas.  
768 Personal interview with DISK Diyarbakir representative 12.01.2012 in Diyarbakir. 
769 Personal interview with Osman Baydemir. 
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capacity building as otherwise none of these municipalities would have been able to obtain 
funding for their projects concerning minorities from the central government.  
 
In light of the data collected, it was revealed that the EU had a differentiated impact on minority 
organizations in Turkey in terms of political efficacy and mobilization. Such differentiated 
levels of empowerment can result from a number of other factors: the level of interaction and 
the nature of the relationship with national and local political actors, how the organizations are 
established and access resources, the extent to which these organizations are connected to 
national and international networks, the population of the minority group, the region where the 
minority groups is mainly settled, how these minority groups are able to represent themselves 
in other national and international platforms as well as their attitudes towards enlargement and 
the EU. To start with, the data has shown that some of the minority organizations had almost 
non-existent relations with the national actors whereas their dialogue with the local political 
actors were significant. This is mostly relevant for southeastern region where most of the 
municipalities are held by the pro-Kurdish party. As stated by the head of the Alevi 
organization and the Ezidi representative in Diyarbakir, even though these organizations try to 
establish dialogue with the national political actors, their demands to have official contacts 
with the government are rejected.770 On the other hand, they are able to meet with the local 
administrators at the municipal level on a regular basis.771 The relationship with local political 
actors is a key interlocutor not only for the Kurds but also other minority groups as well. For 
example, the head of the Jewish foundation in Antakya stated that they are able to meet with 
the local administrators, whether the governor or the mayor, and discuss their problems 
whenever they desire even though they cannot get a response to their problems at the national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
770 Personal interview with Diyarbakir Ezidi Belief Representative and telephone interview with the head of the 
Alevi Cultural Association in Diyarbakir. 
771 Ibid. 
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level. Similarly, most of the organizations in smaller cities stated in the surveys that they are 
not able to establish dialogue with the national government whereas they can easily reach the 
local administrators. The only case where the relations with the local administrators are 
impeded occur when the local administrators adopt a hostile approach towards certain minority 
groups. For example, the Caucasian minority organizations almost all around Turkey are able 
to establish a relationship with the local governorship or municipalities in those cities where 
they are located. However, the Kurdish organizations are not able to meet with the local 
government actors even though they are located in key cities such as Diyarbakir. This is also 
true for the Alevi organizations. Almost all of the Alevi organizations stated that they face 
difficulties when trying to reach the local officials in the cities where they are located apart 
from those in Kurdish cities. On the other hand, the Roma organizations stated that they have 
good relations with the local administrators in almost all of the locations examined. This may 
be a result of the demographic structure of the Roma minority as they are mostly in contact 
with the municipalities for economic aid and social benefits.  
 
Given these, it was seen that the organizations which had no relations with the national actors 
due to the hostile approach of the Turkish state, found it more useful to establish contacts with 
the EU. Therefore, they have become more mobilized and politically active in terms of 
establishing domestic and international networks in order to voice their problems in other 
platforms. Furthermore, almost all of the organizations interviewed stated that even if they had 
some kind of relations with the national government actors, they did not find these meetings to 
be useful and did not believe that these interactions yielded any results. For example, the 
Secretary of the Alevi Federation in Ankara stated that they were called by the government to 
express their opinions on the new constitution, however even though they prepared reports and 
discussed their problems in detail, they did not receive any feedback and response from the 
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government afterwards. In fact, the head of the Caucasian federation in Ankara stated that they 
held meetings with the Minister of Internal Affairs but still they were not able to get any 
response to their demands with regard to the elimination of the ban on the use of minority 
languages in political activities. On the contrary, minority groups such as the Arabs who 
claimed that they meet with government representatives on a regular basis, do not feel the need 
to use the political and financial resources provided by the EU as they are already able to 
discuss their problems at the local and national level and participate in decision-making 
processes through meetings held with government officials and exchange of information. This 
is mainly related to their attitude towards the EU. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the 
head of the Arab civil society organization stated that they did not have any expectations from 
the EU in terms of increasing their credibility or providing them with the resources to act as a 
source of pressure. Given this, he stated that they did not feel the need to establish any dialogue 
with the EU but preferred the channels of dialogue with the government. As the EU is 
considered as a source of leverage by those minority groups which cannot reach the national 
political actors, the impact of the EU on their political efficacy is higher compared to the others. 
Furthermore, almost all of the minority organizations interviewed stated that they also did not 
feel the EU supporting them completely but they believed the EU was still necessary because 
they had almost no relations with the national government. In a similar vein, non-Muslim 
groups such as the Assyrians or Protestants state that they have almost non-existent relations 
with national political actors however they meet with EU officials regularly. As stated by the 
head of the Diyarbakir Protestant Church Association, the state officials do not respond to their 
requests therefore they prefer to bypass the national political actors and establish direct contacts 
with EU officials, who they believe act as a source of leverage on the Turkish government.  
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Another factor that the increased levels of mobilization are contingent upon is the structure of 
the organizations and the means of accessing resources. Most of the minority civil society 
organizations in Turkey are associations and only a small number are foundations along with 
federations, initiatives and confederations. This is mainly due to the fact that establishing 
foundations require a higher budget and most of the minority groups lack these financial 
resources. However, those organizations with higher budgets that are able to access political 
and financial resources through different means, are more integrated with the EU compared to 
the others. For example, almost all of the Roma organizations lack the required financial and 
human resources necessary to organize activities. Therefore, their engagement with the EU is 
limited to the meetings held irregularly or discussions held with EU officials at conferences 
and seminars. Their activities are also limited. On the other hand, civil society organizations 
such as the Turkish Human Rights Foundation have higher budgets and the necessary human 
and organizational resources such as trained staff, to establish direct contact with EU officials. 
Similarly, Alevi organizations or Assyrian associations are able to establish networks with 
European organizations not only through their own resources but also through the diaspora 
organizations established by these groups in Europe. For example, the Assyrian associations in 
Mardin meet with their European counterparts through the European Assyrian Union (ESU). 
In fact, ESU not only provides linkages between the Assyrian organizations in Turkey and 
Europe but also facilitates the ability of other minority organizations such as the Mhelmis in 
Mardin to establish contacts with European networks. The smaller minority civil society 
organizations interviewed stated that although they were able to meet with EU officials 
regularly, they preferred implementing projects and conducting activities with the use of EU 
assistance instead of acting as advocacy groups. For example, the head of the Alevi 
organization in Adana stated that they were able to meet with EU officials regularly and discuss 
their problems with them, however none of these yield any substantial outcomes as they need 
	   306	  
to implement projects with concrete results to manifest their problems more clearly. In the 
same line, the head of the Kurdish Cultural Association indicated that they feel obliged to act 
as an advocacy organization because they cannot obtain grants from the EU and only small 
grants from other international donors which significantly constrain the scope and the outcomes 
of the projects that they organize.  
  
Following this, the extent to which these organizations are connected to national and 
international networks is another significant factor that results in the differentiated impact of 
the EU on minority organizations. The engagement in national and international networks also 
depend on other factors such as the population of the minority group and the location/region 
where the minority groups are mainly settled up to a certain extent. The minority groups which 
are represented in major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara or Diyarbakir find it easier to connect 
with other national and international networks. On the other hand, those organizations located 
in smaller cities such as the Pomaks in Eskisehir have difficulty in establishing contacts with 
other civil society organizations operating at the national, European or international level. The 
data shows that those organizations which are able to connect with national and international 
networks have higher levels of mobilization compared to those acting merely as solidarity 
associations. The Roma associations in various cities around Turkey have almost no connection 
with other national or international networks. They lack the capacities and the resources to 
establish these linkages in the first place, whether it is financial or political resources, 
organizational capacity or even linguistic capacities. Similarly, the Caucasian organizations 
prefer to act only as solidarity associations where the members of the minority groups come 
together and socialize. Instead, they leave everything to the federations which is also a common 
practice for the Alevis. This way, the projects are only implemented by the larger associations 
limiting the activities of the local and smaller organizations while at the same time impeding 
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their ability to connect with European and international networks. On the other hand, a very 
small organization such as the African Culture and Solidarity Association was able to obtain 
funding from the European Commission through a national network they established with the 
Helsinki Citizens Association in Istanbul. Their connection with the national networks and 
partnership with other organizations even at the national level, provided them with the 
opportunity to obtain funding from the EU. Similarly, the Mhelmi association in Mardin was 
able to obtain funding from a number of international donors including the Olof Palme Center 
and European Union through a partnership they established with Midyat Assyrian Culture 
Association and European Assyrians Union.   
 
On another note, the ways that these minority groups are able to represent themselves in other 
national and international platforms such as the parliamentary representation, also lead to 
differentiated levels of mobilization resulting from increased interaction with the EU. For 
instance, the head of the Assyrian Culture Association in Midyat is also an active member of 
BDP. He stated that BDP provided them with the opportunity to be represented at the national 
parliament through a parliamentarian who was actually Assyrian. The presence of an Assyrian 
member of parliament provided them with the political resources to access not only 
government actors through the organization of meetings at the parliament but also with a formal 
representation at national level who is able to participate in parliamentary committees working 
on EU relations. The Assyrian Archbishop in Mardin stated that Erol Dora, BDP’s Assyrian 
parliamentarian, is able to act as a bridge between them and European political actors in order 
to establish mutual dialogue. Similarly, BDP as a political party represented in the Parliament 
and holding most of the municipalities in the Kurdish region, is able to establish formal 
relations with European officials and networks where they are able to integrate other civil 
society organizations. To give an example, BDP parliamentarians participate in official 
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meetings at the European Parliament together with Kurdish civil society representatives. The 
municipalities are able to obtain funding from the European Commission for activities and 
projects organized in partnership with civil society organizations. Finally, religious institutions 
such as the Patriarchates or Archbishops also provide other means of representation. The Greek 
Orthodox and Armenian Patriarchates in Istanbul, are not only able to meet regularly with EU 
officials and European organizations, they can also meet with government actors. As stated by 
the Armenian Patriarch, for the first time during the preparation of the Constitution, they were 
able to meet with parliamentarians and government representatives at the Grand National 
Assembly. These religious leaders are able to act as a formal means of representation and 
visited regularly by European officials to discuss the problems of their communities. The 
Assyrian Archbishop in Mardin stated that they are frequently visited by European 
Commission officials both in Ankara and Brussels, in order to discuss the developments in the 
region and related to the human rights issues in Turkey.  
 
Finally, the attitudes of minority organizations towards enlargement and the EU, also have an 
impact on the political efficacy of the minority organizations. As the EU is the main source of 
funding for the civil society organizations in Turkey and particularly minority organizations, 
those organizations that have a negative attitude towards enlargement and reject EU funding, 
have considerably lower budgets than those organizations which work towards EU 
membership. Additionally, they are able to make use of the political resources provided by the 
EU which in turn yield increased levels of civil society activism. On the contrary, as in the case 
of the Arab organization in Sanliurfa, the contacts of those organizations that oppose Turkey’s 
EU membership are only limited to national political actors and non-European networks.  
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As mentioned previously, the minority groups examined in this thesis are classified into two 
groups: ethnic and linguistic minority groups and religious minority groups. Both the 
quantitative and the qualitative data revealed that the distinction between ethnic and linguistic 
and religious minority groups does not make a difference in terms of the mobilization levels of 
these groups as a result of their engagement with the EU. The data revealed that the 
empowerment of the minority groups through an increased level of interaction with EU 
networks and representatives and changes in their political efficacy levels show variation both 
among religious minority groups and ethnic and linguistic minority groups. Whereas Kurds 
meet with EU officials and are connected with European networks more frequently, Roma or 
Caucasian groups rarely meet with these EU representatives and Arabs have no relations with 
European officials. On the other hand, religious minority groups such as Ezidis can only 
establish relations with European officials through their diaspora organizations, Alevis meet 
with EU representatives through their federations located in Istanbul and Ankara compared to 
Protestants who state that they meet or interact with EU officials on a regular basis.    
 
The data has shown that the outcomes of the engagement of civil society organizations with 
EU representatives ranged between the increased ability to access funding to establishing 
credibility and legitimacy and leverage within the domestic context. In this sense, while some 
of the organizations were able to access the resources that were not available to them otherwise 
as in the case of the Kurds who were marginalized from the political sphere, others were able 
to legitimize their demands through EU norms and standards. An example for this can be the 
demands voiced by almost all of the minority organizations with regard to linguistic rights. 
Even though, the specifics varied from one minority group to another, all of the minority groups 
stated that the EU is significant for cultural and linguistic rights. They were able to legitimize 
and establish leverage within the domestic context with the use of the EU instruments related 
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to cultural and linguistic rights. Therefore, the EU provided as a source of legitimacy and 
credibility for these minority organizations that were not visible in the public sphere in the past.      
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to shed light on the levels of empowerment minority organizations 
experience through the quantitative and qualitative data obtained during the fieldwork 
conducted in Turkey. The findings appear to explain partially the increased political efficacy 
of minority groups as the relations with the national government are still not as regular as it is 
with the EU, while minority representatives are skeptical with regards to their contribution to 
the decision-making processes. However, many organizations still consider the EU as a 
catalyzer as it defines criteria and sets objectives for the Turkish government in relation to the 
minority issue. Even though some organizations, such as the Arab association in Urfa, believe 
that Turkey has gained enough from the EU and should move on with its own agenda, many 
of the minority groups still believe that the EU is vitally important for the improvement of the 
situation of minorities in Turkey. In fact, as the head of the Midyat Assyrian Cultural 
Association claims, the civil society organizations in Turkey are transformed because of the 
EU and the positive attitude towards them; if there is any it is only because the administrators 
know that they meet with EU officials frequently.772 Nevertheless, the low professional and 
financial capacities along with the inability to obtain high levels of funding, especially from 
the EU acts as a major impediment before the sustainability of the relations between these 
minority groups and national political actors.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
772 Personal interview with Yuhanna Aktas.  
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
 
The conclusions reached within this thesis particularly point to the impact of the EU and 
Europeanization on civil society organizations and minority groups in Turkey. Existing studies 
on Europeanization have extensively researched the EU’s impact on the domestic policies and 
institutions of both member states and candidate countries. The most explicit form of 
Europeanization reflects a top-down understanding conceptualizing it as the process of 
adopting EU rules, regulations, directives and institutional structures to the domestic context. 
However, this point of view has been expanded and developed further through a bottom-up 
approach that conceptualizes Europeanization as a two-way process that starts and ends at the 
domestic level incorporating multiple actors in the decision-making processes so that they can 
influence policy outcomes at the domestic level.  
 
The data collected in this thesis allows us to investigate the transformative power of Europe in 
Turkey through the lens of civil society mobilization. Particularly, the legislative reforms 
adopted by the Turkish government between 2002 and 2007 as a response to EU conditionality 
provided the civil society actors with the legal means to make use of and benefit from the EU 
process and the resources provided by the EU. However, the data shows that there is no rigidity 
in terms of the sequence of formal compliance and the political efficacy of civil society 
organizations. To be more specific, in terms of how minority politics in Turkey is evolving in 
the context of European accession and the mutating relationships between different minority 
groups and EU representatives, formal compliance is not reflected in the same level as the 
increase in civil society activism. The data reveals that the Europeanization process in Turkey 
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changed the behavior of minority civil society organizations in Turkey, leading to the formation 
of an interactive process at the domestic level through their internalization of the EU norms in 
the existence of strong political resistance and the lack of any concrete full membership 
perspective. Given this, the main finding is that the transformative power of Europe had an 
impact on minority groups in Turkey despite the controversial character of the issue and the 
level of intransigence between the EU norms and the attitude towards the minority question in 
Turkey. In other words, the Europeanization process in Turkey created a certain momentum in 
the pre-accession period through the mobilization of civil society organizations enabling them 
to benefit from the process in pursuant of their interests.  
 
The theoretical foundation of this thesis is based on the theories of Europeanization and civil 
society. Europeanization is particularly relevant for the Turkish case as it emphasizes the 
transformation of the domestic context in terms of changing the redistribution of the resources. 
In addition to Europeanization, the new mechanisms developed for minority protection in 
Europe are also reflected in Turkey. The domestic construction and internalization of EU’s 
minority protection norms caused the civil society actors to challenge the monolithic 
understanding of Turkish citizenship. Given this, the minority representatives sought for new 
minority protection standards that can be transferred to the Turkish context and the EU norms 
helped them set the agenda in relation to the reforms that need to be adopted. The current 
legislation in relation to minority rights in Turkey was adopted as a response to EU 
conditionality after the granting of candidacy status in 1999. In addition to this, the formal 
legislation that governs the freedom of association and the civil society organizations 
particularly contributed to the mobilization of civil society actors as shown in the second 
chapter.  
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However, not only throughout the history of the Turkish Republic but also still today, the 
minority groups in Turkey cannot enjoy their universal rights equally as the ethnic Turkish 
majority. Given this, the minority issue still remains to be one of the few issues that triggered 
high levels of mobilization within national and European networks. Considering the history of 
EU-Turkey relations from the perspective of minority rights, the fourth chapter traces the 
evolution of the conditionality used by the EU towards Turkey. The EU pressure towards 
Turkish political actors for improving the situation of the minority groups is most evident in 
the period following the announcement of Turkey’s official candidacy status particularly due 
to the formalization of the relations after the start of the accession negotiations. In this regard, 
a closer examination of the impact of Europeanization on minority groups and civil society 
actors in Turkey reveals that both the quantity and the diversity of these organizations 
particularly abounded after the adoption of the legislative reforms related to civil society 
organizations. In light of this, the ethnic, linguistic and religious minority groups examined as 
part of this thesis were able to establish a number of different organizations to make use of the 
tools provided by the EU, including the pre-accession financial assistance and political contacts 
for supporting the civil society organizations.  
 
7.1 Summarizing the Research Findings 
The data collected as part of this thesis by conducting surveys and interviews with 126 different 
civil society organizations and non-state actors revealed that first of all Europeanization led to 
an increase in the mobilization capacities of the minority organizations even in relation to one 
of the most contentious policy issues and in the presence of high levels of political resistance. 
However, the research has shown that the increased levels of political efficacy enjoyed by the 
minority organizations in Turkey cannot be only tied to EU assistance and resources but it is 
also contingent on a number of other factors. Especially in relation to the minority issue, the 
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relationship between the minority groups and the national government is also an important 
determinant. The main idea is that EU generates an increased level of dialogue between 
minority organizations and European representatives while fostering their participation in 
European networks. In this sense, it was discovered that EU funding and especially increased 
dialogue with the EU engages minority organizations in domestic processes and increases their 
involvement in decision-making processes through various stages. The data also revealed that 
minority groups use their relations with EU officials as a source of leverage and a 
confrontational strategy. The difference between ethnic, linguistic and religious minority 
groups was not significant in relation to their levels of dialogue with EU officials but the data 
revealed that such a difference was statistically significant for their relations with the national 
government. To give an example, even though the relations between minority organizations 
and state officials were almost inexistent in the case of the Kurds or the Alevis, the dialogue 
between these Kurdish or Alevi organizations and EU representatives was relatively much 
higher. However, the frequency of the meetings between Roma organizations and EU officials 
were among the lowest while they had regular meetings with the national government. 
Therefore, while the minority politics in Turkey are evolving in light of the EU process, a 
hierarchy of minority groups in terms of their relations with the government has come to being. 
In this sense, the Roma organizations have the smoothest relations with the current AKP 
government, while the Kurds and the Alevis have almost no dialogue. The non-Muslim groups 
also have comparatively distant relations with the national government when compared with 
other Muslim minorities such as Roma or the Arabs. Given these, the EU provides an 
alternative platform for these excluded minority groups other than the national as it provides 
these organizations with the opportunity to have an impact on the minority politics in Turkey 
through supranational channels.  
 
	   315	  
This could be explained through a number of factors including the types and capacities of civil 
society organizations, population numbers, opportunities for political representation, attitudes 
of the state towards that particular minority group, existence of diaspora organizations 
particularly in Europe and the urban-rural divide. To start with, the data demonstrated that not 
all minority groups were organized at the same levels as others. For example, while Alevis are 
organized through a number of different associations, foundations, federations and platforms 
most of them established between 1990 and 2000, the Pomak were only able to establish a few 
associations that date back to 2009. In the same way, the Roma only have associations but no 
foundations due to the lack of financial capacity and most of their organizations are township 
organizations, which are mainly engaged in charity activities. Given this, most of the minority 
groups examined as part of this thesis have recently established civil society organizations with 
smaller budgets and usually concentrate in local activities. Therefore, more organized groups 
with higher financial and professional capacities find it easier to access the EU representatives 
when compared to others. The population numbers are also an important factor for determining 
the way certain actors benefit from the EU process. The data reveals that the higher the 
population numbers, the more diversified both qualitatively and quantitatively are the civil 
society organizations representing a certain minority group. The Kurds are a good example of 
how population numbers help the way a certain minority group is organized. As the most 
populated ethnic community, the Kurds are not only able to establish civil society organizations 
but also they are represented through local administrations and even in the Parliament. At the 
same time, high population numbers allow these groups to establish organizations with high 
member numbers and provide them with higher budgets as in the case of the Alevis. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, some Alevi organizations reported budget numbers as high 
as 300.000 Euros due to member fees collected from over 500.000 members.  
 
	   316	  
In addition to this, high population numbers allow minority groups to take an active part in 
other civil society organizations such as the major human rights organizations, professional 
organizations, unions and umbrella organizations. For instance, since the beginning of the 
1990s, the Human Rights Organization concentrates on the human rights violations in the 
Kurdish region particularly and has branches in almost every city in the Eastern and 
Southeastern Anatolian regions. In contrast, the Greek Orthodox whose population numbers 
are much lower than the Kurds, only have one association that has been established in 2012 
and religious minority foundations established prior to the foundation of the Republic. Given 
this, even though the problems and the demands of the Kurdish population are frequently 
voiced in a number of national and international platforms, there is comparatively less 
awareness on the problems of those groups such as the Greek Orthodox or the Africans. 
Political representation is also a very significant factor that might increase the frequency of 
meetings between a particular minority group and EU representatives. For example, 
parliamentary representation increases the chances to meet with European delegations in an 
official capacity through the Parliamentary Committee on EU Harmonization. The Assyrian 
civil society representatives interviewed specifically mentioned their meetings with Erol Dora, 
the only Assyrian and non-Muslim MP in order to discuss their problems. In addition to this, 
when EU representatives visit Turkey, they prefer to meet with local administrators in a 
particular city before they meet with civil society organizations. Therefore, as in the case of 
the Kurds where they are represented both through Parliamentarians or local administrations 
in the Kurdish region, European officials find it easier to meet with them to discuss the Kurdish 
issue. 
 
The surveys also demonstrated that the state attitude towards minority groups plays an 
important role in determining their relations with the national government and the EU. To give 
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an example, historically the Turkish state has been hostile towards the non-Muslim minorities 
or the Alevis and the Kurds. In comparison, the Arabs or the Roma were not classified as 
enemies of the state at any point. Given this, the level of meetings between the non-Muslim 
minorities and the national government is much less frequent when compared with the Arab 
organizations, who claim that they conduct personal meetings almost once a month. The 
strained relations might also be a result of the demands of a particular minority group. For 
example, historically Kurds have pioneered the minority groups in relation to linguistic rights, 
while Alevis have been very rigid about their demands pertaining to religious freedoms. On 
the other hands, the Arabs or the Roma have never been regarded as having separatist ambitions 
or as demanding certain power-sharing arrangements. Rather, the Roma have given up any 
claims with respect to linguistic rights, while the Arabs have always identified themselves as 
Turkish before referring to their ethnic identity. Therefore, the perception of a minority group 
automatically determines the level of relations with the state. In exchange, hostility between a 
particular minority organization and the Turkish state motivates these organizations to appeal 
to European platforms about their problems. Another important factor is the existence of 
diaspora organizations particularly in Europe. As mentioned earlier, the Ezidi representative in 
Diyarbakir stated that they were able to meet with European officials particularly through their 
diaspora organizations in Europe. In the same manner, there is a Pomak institute established in 
Stockholm that conducts joint activities with the Pomak associations in Turkey both in Turkey 
and in Sweden.  
 
Furthermore, the data showed that majority of the organizations still consider the EU as vital 
for Turkey’s democratization as they believe that the EU defines the criteria and sets the 
objectives for the Turkish government in relation to human rights and minority protection. 
Nevertheless, the low professional and financial capacities along with the inability to obtain 
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high levels of funding, especially from the EU acts as a major impediment towards the further 
mobilization of minority groups. Whereas some minority groups are highly organized, others 
lack a diverse and organized representation through civil society. It was also discovered that 
both EU funding and also other international grants play a significant role in the activism levels 
of minority organizations in Turkey. In addition to these, the data revealed that most of those 
organizations that obtain EU funding and have regular dialogue with EU representatives also 
participated in the preparation of the new Constitution.  
 
In conclusion, the Turkish case marks a distinct contrast to the Europeanization processes 
witnessed in other candidate countries. First of all, Turkey displays significant interruptions in 
the formal accession process even though the civil society actors continue to interact with the 
EU and internalize EU norms. Secondly, civil society mobilization through the engagement 
with the EU is transforming the actors in Turkey in such a way that they are not only able to 
legitimize their demands but they can also seek to enhance the EU-induced pre-accession 
reforms depending on their own interests and become a part of the decision-making processes. 
This is particularly significant since the involvement of civil society actors facilitates 
sustainability, which can be carried over to the post-accession process. 
 
7.2 Europeanization: The Case of Turkey 
The literature on Europeanization pays particular attention to the experience of the Central and 
Eastern European countries. For the CEECs, the EU primarily used a particular mode of 
network governance and employed the external governance model which in essence referred 
to a set of rules and conditions to be fulfilled in order to receive the rewards provided by the 
EU, the ultimate reward being full membership. In the case of the post-socialist states, the EU 
influenced policy development and the restructuring of domestic institutions significantly 
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while becoming the anchor of institutional transformation in these countries. The most 
important aspect of the CEE countries that distinguishes them from the Turkish case is that 
there was a membership timetable determined for these countries. In fact, the elites in the CEE 
countries were even more responsive to EU conditionality once the membership date was set. 
Given these, the CEE experience has limited predictive power for Turkey. Instead the EU has 
a different impact on Turkey that diverges from the Central and Eastern European case. While 
in the CEE countries, the EU tried a top-down Europeanization pushing for the implementation 
of the acquis by the executive elites; in Turkey the EU had a different impact that engaged civil 
society actors for inducing an interactive process at the domestic level.  
 
Therefore, the Turkish case revealed that the EU impact in Turkey is particularly relevant to 
how certain domestic civil society actors could benefit from the EU process. Given this, unlike 
the CEE countries where there was mostly a consensus on EU membership and rapid progress 
had been made in terms of the implementation of EU regulations and directives based on the 
incentives provided by the EU, in the Turkish case the formal accession process is particularly 
slow and displays a number of ups and downs. Unlike the CEE countries, there is a much higher 
resistance by the political elites in Turkey towards the reforms and consensus in terms of EU 
membership is lacking. To give an example, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which 
holds 52 seats in the Parliament, is absolutely against most of the human rights reforms that 
need to be passed in order to comply with EU standards. In addition to this, it has become 
particularly difficult to obtain the desired levels of formal compliance in the case of minority 
rights. This is not only due to the fact that the minority issue has high domestic costs in Turkey 
but also the broad and unclear characteristic of the Copenhagen political criteria which lacks 
the clear measures and benchmarks for the candidate countries as well as the ambiguous and 
contested nature of the minority issue. Therefore, given the uncertainty with regards to the full 
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membership date, the EU tries to benchmark the participation of non-state actors in Turkey and 
acts as a reinforcement mechanism. Put differently, as in the case of Turkey where formal 
progress is particularly difficult to attain, the EU tries to provide the domestic non-state actors 
with resources both by opening up the political space but also by building their capacities.  
 
7.3 Implications 
From a theoretical point of view, this thesis offers insights into the existing literature on 
Europeanization and their application to the Turkish case. Furthermore, it sheds light on how 
to best conceptualize Europeanization specifically in relation to the minority issue, which is 
one of the major stumbling blocks before Turkey’s EU accession. Other implications of this 
thesis focus on the impact of the EU accession process on civil society actors, namely looking 
at its impact on those organizations that represent the ethnic, religious and linguistic minority 
groups in Turkey. In addition, the research investigated the transformation of the civil society 
organizations and their capacities as a result of the Europeanization process. The implications 
can be categorized into two broad areas. The first attends to the nature of domestic actors in 
Turkey and the insights this offers to any discussion regarding civil society. The second relates 
to the transformative power of the EU and how this is best conceptualized in the context of 
domestic actors. In addressing these issues, the thesis brought together literature from 
Europeanization studies and research on civil society, to explain how domestic actors may still 
benefit from the EU process in the absence of credible conditionality rewards, full membership 
date and when the external incentives model does not yield the expected pace in the reform 
process.  
 
In light of these, the thesis was able to demonstrate the changing behavior of civil society 
organizations in Turkey and how the engagement with the EU provided them with additional 
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mobilization capacities. This also complemented the argument that formal compliance cannot 
be seen as the only indicator of Europeanization. In this sense, Europeanization may well 
manifest itself in different ways while generating varying outcomes in formal and informal 
compliance. Therefore, it is safe to say that there are also other significant ways to measure the 
impact of the EU process including the partnerships emerging between the civil society 
organizations and EU representatives. The findings of this thesis relating to the EU’s impact 
on civil society organizations in Turkey can explain how the EU works to mobilize the 
domestic civil society actors in a candidate country so that they can internalize EU norms. The 
Turkish case also suggests that the controversial nature of the minority issue can, to some 
extent, also contribute to the empowerment of domestic actors that strongly consider the EU as 
a tool for further enhancing the EU-induced transformation in relation to their own interests. 
Such an experience of the minority groups in Turkey also offers an alternate discourse that can 
challenge the argument that only those civil society actors in western cities, which stand closer 
to the government, can be empowered through the Europeanization process. It is revealed that 
the role of the EU accession process for improving minority rights in Turkey has been a 
common ground among different organizations. Therefore, the generally disadvantaged eastern 
and southeastern civil society organizations at times scored higher in terms of international and 
European dialogue when compared with their western counterparts. It would seem that the 
minority issue offers an opportunity to bring state and civil society actors together, even though 
such interactions do not always bring about substantive outcomes in terms of policy change. 
In most of the cases these civil society organizations expressed their concern about the absence 
of a concrete role for them. The recent new constitution process has certainly demonstrated 
this. The data revealed that EU funding and EU dialogue have contributed to the process of 
building an enabling environment where the civil society organizations were able to express 
their views and voice their demands from the new constitution. However, at the same time, 
	   322	  
most of the civil society organizations also emphasized their uncertainty about their 
contribution and whether their demands will be taken into consideration by the government 
when the actual constitution is prepared.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In light of these, the data shows that the EU’s existence is still significant for the minority civil 
society organizations in Turkey. The civil society organizations and minority representatives 
interviewed and surveyed as part of this thesis almost always emphasized that if the EU had 
not pushed for formal compliance with respect to the reforms on freedom of association 
particularly, the domestic actors would not be able to find a platform to voice their problems 
and demands. Given this, the data also shows that the relations between most of the minority 
groups with the exception of Roma and the Arabs, and the state are highly hostile. Therefore, 
it can be concluded from the data that the EU is the link that ensures that these marginalized 
minority groups are given a voice in different platforms through cooperative networks. At this 
point, this thesis concludes that there is a significant value in investigating the transformative 
impact of the EU on civil society organizations for the Turkish case for the formal compliance 
in Turkey does not reflect the actual transformative power of the EU in Turkey at the domestic 
level.  
 
This thesis was able to establish the transformative impact that the EU has on civil society 
organizations in a candidate country even for the most contentious issues. It has also shown 
that the EU provided not only new opportunity structures for the civil society organizations but 
also the resources and legitimacy to overcome the political resistance of veto players. However, 
the influence of the mobilization of civil society organizations on the limited progress achieved 
with regard to minority rights still remains unanswered. The findings were also constrained for 
demonstrating the extent to which the reforms with regard to minority rights can be tied to the 
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pressure exerted by the minority groups and their influence on the national political actors as a 
result of the relations they establish with these actors and participation in decision-making 
processes. Given these, following research can concentrate on explaining the domestic change 
in the absence of Europeanization pressures and investigate the extent to which civil society 
organizations had contributed to the transformation of the domestic context. Further research 
can also investigate whether the mobilization of minority civil society organizations still 
continue despite the increasing levels of Euro-scepticism.  
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APPENDIX 1. MAPS OF TURKEY 
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APPENDIX 2.  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES / SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
1.   Lom Cultural Research and Solidarity Association (Artvin, Black Sea) 
2.   Turkish Human Rights Foundation – Diyarbakir Branch (Diyarbakir, Southeastern Anatolia) 
3.   Abkhaz Associations Federation – (Istanbul, Marmara) 
4.   Human Rights Association – Diyarbakir Branch (Diyarbakir, Southeastern Anatolia) 
5.   ZİWANKOM Language, Culture and Arts Association (Diyarbakir, Southeastern Anatolia) 
6.   DISK – The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions Diyarbakir Branch (Diyarbakir, 
Southeastern Anatolia) 
7.   Sami Mhelmi Association for Dialogue between Languages, Religions and Civilizations – (Mardin, 
Southeastern Anatolia) 
8.   Association for Solidarity with the Oppressed – Istanbul Branch (Istanbul, Marmara) 
9.   Kurdish Culture and Research Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
10.    Kocaeli Roma Associations Federation (Kocaeli, Marmara) 
11.    Edirne Roma Culture Association (Edirne, Marmara) 
12.    Edirne Roma Associations Federation (Edirne, Marmara) 
13.    Alevi Bektasi Federation (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
14.    Alevi Culture Associations – Main Office (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
15.    Boyacikoy Surp Yerits Mangants Armenian Church Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
16.    Dersim Armenians Assistance, Solidarity and Belief Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
17.    Africans Culture and Solidarity Association (Ayvalik, Aegean) 
18.    Batman Mhelmi Association (Batman, Southeastern Anatolia) 
19.    Alevi Culture Associations – Mersin Branch (Mersin, Mediterranean) 
20.   Association for Solidarity with the Oppressed – Main Office (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
21.   Circassian Association (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
22.   Pomak Associations Federation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
23.    Istanbul Pomak Culture Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
24.    Eskisehir Pomak Culture Association (Eskisehir, Aegean) 
25.    Izmir Alevi Bektasi Association (Izmir, Aegean) 
26.    Antakya (Hatay) Catholic Church Foundation (Antakya, Mediterranean) 
27.    Hatay Dom Tribe Culture, Research and Solidarity Association (Antakya, Mediterranean) 
28.    Ankara Roma Association (Ankara, Central Anatolia)  
29.   Mediterranean Immigrants Science, Culture, Social Assistance and Solidarity Association (Mersin, 
Mediterranean) 
30.    Roma Youth Association (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
31.    Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association – Diyarbakir Branch (Diyarbakir, Southeastern Anatolia) 
32.    Istanbul Roma Associations Federation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
33.    Human Rights Association – Adana Branch (Adana, Mediterranean) 
34.    Human Rights Association Main Office (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
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35.    Democratic Circassians Platform (Istanbul, Marmara) 
36.    Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association – Mardin Branch (Mardin, Southeastern 
Anatolia) 
37.    SIMA Foundation for Eastern Black Sea Region (Izmit, Marmara) 
38.    Mersin Roma Association (Mersin, Mediterranean) 
39.    Union of Education and Science Laborers (EGITIM-SEN) – Adana Branch (Adana, Mediterranean) 
40.    EGITIM-SEN Main Office – General Secretary (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
41.    International Strategic Research Association (Mardin, Southeastern Anatolia) 
42.    Adana Circassian Culture Association (Adana, Mediterranean) 
43.    Adana Alevi Culture Association (Adana, Mediterranean) 
44.    Arab Association (Urfa, Southeastern Anatolia) 
45.    Turkish Human Rights Foundation – Adana Branch (Adana, Mediterranean) 
46.    Antakya Jewish Synagogue Foundation (Antakya, Mediterranean) 
47.    Mesopotamia Culture and Solidarity Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
48.    Adana Roma Association (Adana, Mediterranean) 
49.    Young Roma Association (Adana, Mediterranean) 
50.   Mediterranean Roma Associations Foundation (Mersin, Mediterranean) 
51.    Midyat Assyrian Culture Association (Mardin, Southeastern Anatolia) 
52.   Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association – Main Office (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
53.    Cem Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
54.    Izmir Roma Association (Izmir, Aegean) 
55.    Adana Yavuzlar Roma Association (Adana, Mediterranean) 
56.    Diyarbakir Dom Association (Diyarbakir, Southeastern Anatolia) 
57.    Diyarbakir Protestant Church Association (Diyarbakir, Southeastern Anatolia) 
58.    Haci Bektas Veli Culture Association (Nevsehir, Central Anatolia) 
59.    Basak Culture Arts Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
60.    Laz Culture Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
61.    United Caucasian Federation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
62.    Ankara Abkhaz Culture Association (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
63.    Pomak Institute (Istanbul, Marmara) 
64.    Democratic Pomaks Movement (Istanbul, Marmara) 
65.    Protestant Churches Association (Izmir, Aegean) 
66.    Istanbul Caucasus Abkhazia Culture Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
67.    Eskisehir Northern Caucasian Culture and Solidarity Association (Eskisehir, Aegean) 
68.    Caucasian Associations Federation (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
69.    Inegol Circassian Adhige Culture Association (Bursa, Marmara) 
70.    Caucasus Culture and Research Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
71.   Istanbul Protestant Church Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
72.    Laz Culture, Arts and Tourism Association (Artvin, Black Sea) 
73.    Georgian Cultural Center Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
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74.    Biga Caucasus Culture Association (Canakkale, Aegean) 
75.    Istanbul Caucasus Culture Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
76.    Bolu Abkhaz Culture Association  
77.   Alevi Foundations Federation (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
78.   Alan Ossetian Culture and Solidarity Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
79.   Community Volunteers Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
80.   Antakya Greek Orthodox Church Foundation (Antakya, Mediterranean) 
81.    Helsinki Citizens Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
82.    Hamshen Culture Research and Solidarity Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
83.    Hrant Dink Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
84.    Hubyar Sultan Alevi Culture Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
85.    Alevi Bektasi Education and Culture Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
86.    KACED Black Sea Environment Association (Rize, Black Sea) 
87.    Intercultural Dialogue Platform (Istanbul, Marmara) 
88.   Turkey Jewish Rabbinate Foundation (Beyoglu Jewish Synagogue Foundation) (Istanbul, Marmara) 
89.    Association for Solidarity with the Oppressed – Batman Branch (Batman, Southeastern Anatolia) 
90.    Greek Orthodox Foundations Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
91.   TESEV - Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
92.    Haci Bektas Veli Anatolia Culture Foundation (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
93.    Folk Poets Culture Association (Ankara, Turkey) 
94.    Sahkulu Sultan Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
95.    Zero Discrimination Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
96.    Social Democracy Foundation (Istanbul, Marmara) 
97.    Social Transformation Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
98.    Turkish Human Rights Foundation Main Office (Ankara, Central Anatolia) 
99.    Diyarbakir Civil Involvement and Anti-violence Association DUY-DER (Diyarbakir, Southeastern 
Anatolia) 
100.   Istanbul Kurdish Institute – Kurdish Language and Culture Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
101.   Mardin Monasteries and Churches Foundation (Mardin, Southeastern Anatolia) 
102.   Idil Assyrians Association (Sirnak, Southeastern Anatolia) 
103.   Mardin Youth and Culture Association (Mardin, Southeastern Anatolia) 
104.   Armenian Culture and Research Association (Istanbul, Marmara) 
105.   Kurdi-der Kurdish Language and Culture Research Association Main Office (Diyarbakir, Southeastern 
Anatolia) 
106.   Mardin Mor Gabriel Monastery Foundation (Mardin, Southeastern Anatolia) 
107.   Bursa Circassian Cultural Association (Bursa, Marmara) 
108.   Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Osman Baydemir 
109.   Sur Municipality Mayor Abdullah Demirbas 
110.   Mardin Mayor Besir Ayvazoglu 
111.   Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Leader and MP Selahattin Demirtas 
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112.   Peace and Democracy Party MP and National Parliament Constitution Preparation Committee 
Member Sirri Sureyya Onder 
113.   Deputy Patriarch of the Armenian Patriarchate Aram Atesyan 
114.   Press Coordinator of the Turkish Jewish Rabbinate Lisya Tavasi 
115.   Diyarbakir Mardin Assyrian Metropolitan Bishop Filiksinos Saliba Ozmen 
116.   Patriarchal Vicar of the Assyrian Orthodox Church in Istanbul and Ankara Mor Filiksinos Yusuf Cetin 
117.   Phanar Greek Orthodox Patriarchate Press Officer Father Dositheos Anagtopoulos 
118.   Adana Jewish Minority President 
119.   Antakya Jewish Minority President Saul Cenudioglu 
120.   Mersin Akdeniz Mayor Fazil Turk 
121.   Mardin Bar Association General Secretary 
122.   European Assyrians Union President- Sabro Newspaper Editor Tuma Celik 
123.   Diyarbakir Alevi Religious Leader (Dede)  
124.   Ezidi Belief Representative in Diyarbakir Yilmaz Demiray 
125.   Priest of the Adana / Iskenderun Latin Catholic Church 
126.   Adana Alevi Religious Leader (Dede)  
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APPENDIX 3. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
1.   What is the name of your organization? 
 
2.   How would you describe your organization (you may tick more than one box)? 
☐ Non-governmental organization 
☐ Religious organization 
☐ Charity organization 
☐ Union 
☐ Platform for other organizations 
☐ Minority foundation 
☐ Research institute / think-tank 
☐ Beneficiary organization 
☐ Other (please specify): 
 
3.   When was your organization established (please tick)?  
☐ Less than a year ago 
☐ Less than four years ago 
☐ More than four years ago 
☐ Within the last eight years 
☐ Over eight years ago 
4.   Where is your organization’s main office located?  
 
5.   What is the scope of your organization’s work? (you can tick more than one box) 
 
☐  Human rights  
 
☐ Democratization / rule of law 
 
☐ Education 
 
☐ Foreign policy 
 
☐ Gender equality 
 
☐ Minority rights 
 
☐ Beneficiary and solidarity 
 
 
6a. How many people work for the organization full-time?  
 
 ☐ Less than 5 people 
 
 ☐ Between 5-10 people 
 
 ☐ More than 10 people 
 
 
 
6b.  How many people volunteer for the organization? 
 
☐ Less than 5 people 
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 ☐ Between 5-10 people 
 
 ☐ More than 10 people 
 
6c. What is the number of women working for your organization? 
 
 ☐ Less than 5 women 
 
 ☐ Between 5-10 women 
 
 ☐ More than 10 women 
 
6d. Does your organization accept membership? (If no, please go to question 7) 
 
 ☐ Yes     ☐ No 
 
6e. What is the number of members registered to your organization? 
 
 ☐ Less than 50 
 
 ☐ Between 51-100 
 
 ☐ More than 100 
 
 
7.   How would you describe your organization? 
 
☐ Local 
 
 ☐ Regional 
 
 ☐ National 
 
 ☐ International 
 
8.   What is the annual budget of your organization? 
 
☐ Less than 50.000 TL 
 
 ☐ Between 50.001 and 100.000 TL  
 
 ☐ Between 100.001 and 150.000 TL 
 
☐ More than 150.001 TL 
 
 
9a. How often does your organization meet with government representatives?  
 
 ☐ Less than once a year 
 
 ☐ Once a year 
 
 ☐ Once every six months 
 
 ☐ Once every three months 
 
9b. What is the character of your meetings? 
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 ☐ Phone conversations 
 
 ☐ Unofficial meetings / other venues 
 
 ☐ Official meetings 
 
9c. Does your organization meet or have contact with representatives from other political parties?  
 
9d. How often does your organization meet with / have contacts with other political party representatives? 
 
☐ Less than once a year 
 
 ☐ Once a year 
 
 ☐ Once every six months 
 
 ☐ Once every three months 
 
9e. Does your organization meet with EU officials?  
 
9f. How often does your organization meet with EU officials? 
 
 ☐ Less than once a year 
 
 ☐ Once a year 
 
 ☐ Once every six months 
 
 ☐ Once every three months 
 
9g. Does your organization meet with other international organization representatives (UN, Foreign Consulate 
Generals, Foreign Foundation representatives etc.)? 
 
 
10. Have you ever received funding from: (you may tick more than one box) 
 
☐ European Commission grants (by applying directly to the EC) 
 
☐ EU grants (by applying to the Central Finance and Contracts Unit) 
 
☐ Small EU grants (by applying to the Turkish National Agency) 
 
 ☐ Grants given by the Turkish government  
 
 ☐ Individual donations 
 
☐ International grant-giving organizations (in Turkey and abroad) 
 
 ☐ United Nations 
 
☐ Foreign consulates  
 
☐ World Bank 
 
 ☐ Other (please specify): 
 
 
11. What percentage of your annual budget is EU grants? 
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 ☐ Less than 10% 
 
 ☐ Between 10-49% 
 
☐ Between 50-89% 
 
 ☐ More than 90% 
 
12. Do you currently have an EU project? 
 
13. Have you ever received an EU grant? 
 
 ☐ Yes 
 
 ☐ No 
 
14. Which EU objective does/did your project relate to? (Please tick) 
☐ European Commission grants (by applying to the EC) 
 
☐ Strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law 
 
☐ Supporting the EU reform process 
 
☐ Promotion of human and minority rights, and gender equality 
 
☐ Development of civil society 
 
 ☐ Regional co-operation 
 
☐ Sustainable development and poverty reduction 
 
 
14. Is/Was this the first EU grant your organization been awarded?  
 
 ☐ Yes    ☐  No 
 
15a. Are you currently receiving funding from any other donor agency?  
 ☐ Yes    ☐  No 
 
15b. If you answered ‘Yes’, which donors have you received funding from? 
 
16. How much money have you been awarded by the EU? 
 ☐ Less than €10k 
 
 ☐ Between €10-50k 
 
☐ Between €50–100k 
 
☐ More than €100k 
 
17. How would you describe the impact that EU funding has had on your organization? Please tick the relevant 
boxes (you may tick more than one box)  
 
☐ EU funding has strengthened our organization 
☐ Applying for EU funding has been a distraction from our work 
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☐ EU funding has helped us connect with similar organizations 
 
☐ EU funding has changed the issues we work on 
 
☐ EU funding has had no impact on our organization 
 
☐ We would not exist without EU funding 
 
☐ EU funding has helped us connect with similar organizations in EU countries 
 
☐ EU funding has weakened our organization 
 
18. Are you satisfied with Turkey’s level of progress in the membership negotiations? 
 
☐ Extremely dissatisfied 
 
☐ Dissatisfied 
 
☐ Neutral 
 
☐ Satisfied 
 
☐ Extremely satisfied 
 
 
19. Are you satisfied with civil society’s role in the reform process? 
 
 ☐ Yes   ☐ No 
 
20. Do you believe the EU has a significant role in improving Turkey’s human rights record? 
 
 ☐ Yes   ☐ No 
 
21. Do you believe the EU has a significant role in improving the situation of minorities in Turkey? 
 
☐ Yes   ☐ No 
 
22. Do you believe that the EU process should necessarily continue for Turkey’s democratization process? 
 
☐ Yes   ☐ No 
23. Did you participate in the Constitution Preparation Process? 
 
 ☐ Yes   ☐ No 
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